State of Ohio v. Jesse E. Dyer, Jr.
Court of Appeals No. L-17-1258
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
Decided: April 26, 2019
2019-Ohio-1558
SINGER, J.
Appellee
v.
Jesse E. Dyer, Jr.
Appellant
Trial Court No. CR0201702122
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Alyssа Breyman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Clayton M. Gerbitz, for appellant.
SINGER, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jesse E. Dyer, Jr., appeals from the September 28, 2017 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of two counts of rape, a violation of
{¶ 2} On June 30, 2017, appellant was indicted on two counts of rape of a person under the age of 13, in violation of
{¶ 3} On September 28, 2017, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant entered an “Alford” guilty plea to cоunts 3 and 4 and was convicted of the offenses charged in the information. Appellant appeals and asserts the following assignments of error.
I. APPELLANT’S PLEAS WERE NOT VOLUNTARILY AND INTELIGENTLY [SIC] MADE.
II. THE JUDGMENT ENTRY OF SENTENCE IMPOSING MANDATORY PRISON TIME WAS ERRONIOUS.
{¶ 4} In his first assignmеnt of error, appellant challenges that the trial court should not have accepted his “Alford” guilty plea because it was not voluntarily and intеlligently made.
{¶ 5} A guilty or no contest plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily to be valid under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996).
{¶ 6}
{¶ 7} Under Ohio
{¶ 8} Nonetheless, because an Alford guilty plea is a waiver of a right to trial and consent to the conviction of guilty with a protestation of innocence, Alford, 400 U.S. at 37,
{¶ 9} Other appellate courts have also required, based on the language in Alford, that the “basic factual framework for the charge and plea” must be presented at the hearing so the trial court can determine if thе plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. State v. Gibson, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0029, 2018-Ohio-4725, ¶ 8; State v. Underwood, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2017-0024, 2018-Ohio-730, ¶ 18.
{¶ 10} In presenting the basic factual framework for the charge and plea, the recitation of the facts by the state need not include every significant fact supporting the charges where such information is otherwise included in the record. See Drzayich, 2016-Ohio-1398, 62 N.E.3d 850, at ¶ 15-16 (the trial court sufficiently evaluated the plea when
{¶ 11} At the plea hearing in the case before us, the prosecution set forth the factual basis fоr the plea as follows:
Jesse Dyer, on or between the 23rd day of November, 2016 and the 31st day of December, 2016, did knowingly have sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely compelled the other person to commit by force or threat of force, in violation of
The State would have shown beyond a reasonable doubt two separate and distinct acts of sexual conduct. Specifically, * * * through the testimony of the child victim with thе initials AS, that Jesse Dyer was her mother’s boyfriend and was an authority figure to her. The child would have testified that Jesse Dyer penetrated her butt and her mouth with his penis on 2 separate occasions.”
{¶ 12} Appellant argues the prosecution did not assert that any subtle or slight force was involved. He contends that even in the case of an authority figure, there must be some subtle, slight, psychological, or emotionally powerful force involved.
{¶ 13} We agree thаt to establish a conviction for rape under
{¶ 14} Therefore, we find there was sufficient factual information for the trial court to determine thеre was a strong factual basis for the charges and the plea was rationally made and, therefore, was constitutionally valid. Therefore, we find аppellant’s first assignment of error not well-taken.
{¶ 15} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to inform him that his prison term would be mandatory as required by
{¶ 16} The record reflects the court informed appellant prior to the entry of a plea that all of the sentences for the offenses to which he was entering an Alford plea “required mandatory prison terms” and appellant acknowledged he understood. The written plea agreement also included notice that the offense of rape alleged in both counts carriеd a mandatory prison term of 3-11 years. However, later in the hearing when the
{¶ 17}
{¶ 18} Having found that the trial court did not commit error prejudicial to appellant аnd that substantial justice has been done, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this aрpeal pursuant to
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Mark L. Pietrykowsk, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________
Thomas J. Osowik, J. JUDGE
CONCUR. _______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.