STATE OF OHIO v. ROBERT D. DOTSON
No. 101911
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
June 18, 2015
[Cite as State v. Dotson, 2015-Ohio-2392.]
BEFORE: Stewart, J., Keough, P.J., and Blackmon, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-14-585052-A
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 18, 2015
Robert L. Tobik
Cuyahoga County Public Defender
John T. Martin
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
Eric L. Foster
Assistant County Prosecutor
Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Robert Dotson asks this court to vacate his guilty pleas to having a weapon while under disability and carrying a concealed weapon on the ground that his pleas were involuntary. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions.
{¶2} The Cuyahoga County Grand Jury charged Dotson with carrying a concealed weapon, improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, having a weapon while under disability, tampering with evidence, and obstruction of justice. At the time he was charged with these offenses, Dotson was on postrelease control (“PRC“) from another case, and had 765 days of PRC remaining on that conviction. As a result of plea negotiations, Dotson pled guilty to carrying a concealed weapon and the weapon disability charge in exchange for the state‘s dismissal of the remaining charges.
{¶3} Prior to accepting Dotson‘s guilty plea, the judge inquired if Dotson was on PRC from another case. When told that he was, the court did not explain to Dotson that
{¶5} On appeal, Dotson argues that his guilty plea must be vacated because his plea was not knowing and voluntary, as the trial court did not advise him that it could terminate his PRC and impose a prison term for the remainder of that time. Dotson argues that this advisement falls under the
{¶6} The United States Constitution requires a trial court, prior to accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, to determine that the plea is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. State v. Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d 130, 132, 532 N.E.2d 1295 (1988), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed. 274 (1969). From a constitutional standpoint, this requires the court to inform a defendant of five rights: his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, the right to confront one‘s accusers, his right to have guilt proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses — and then determine if the defendant understands these rights. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 19-21.
{¶8}
In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation * * *.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
{¶9} The requirement that the trial court inform the defendant of the maximum penalty involved under
{¶10}
(A) Upon the conviction of or plea of guilty to a felony by a person on post-release control at the time of the commission of the felony, the court may terminate the term of postrelease control, and the court may do either of the following regardless of whether the sentencing court or another court of this state imposed the original prison term for which the person is on post-release control:
(1) In addition to any prison term for the new felony, impose a prison term for the post-release control violation. The maximum prison term for the violation shall be the greater of twelve months or the period of postrelease control for the earlier felony minus any time the person has spent under postrelease control for the earlier felony. In all cases, any prison term imposed for the violation shall be reduced by any prison term that is administratively imposed by the parole board as a postrelease control sanction. A prison term imposed for the violation shall be served consecutively to any prison term imposed for the new felony. The imposition of a prison term for the post-release control violation shall terminate the period of post-release control for the earlier felony.
{¶14} However, even if the Second District is correct in concluding that
{¶16} Although the record reflects that the court did not advise Dotson of its ability under
{¶18} Thus, we conclude that in the absence of contrary evidence, Dotson was not prejudiced by the court‘s failure to advise, as he faced the possibility of harsh prison time had he gone to trial and been convicted. Indeed,
{¶19} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MELODY J. STEWART, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, J., CONCUR
Notes
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant‘s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.