State v. DolenState v. Dolen
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.
The state petitions for a writ of common law certiorari pursuant to Rule 9.100, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
Respondent and one Clifford Glen Snider were arrested and charged with the sexual battery of the woman respondent now seeks to depose. Snider has been convicted and is now serving his sentence for that offense. The state alleges that the witness is a woman of Peruvian descent in her mid-fifties who speaks little or no English, suffers from a heart condition and is fearful of confronting respondent. The witness has already testified in two preliminary hearings and at the trial of Snider.
The record reflects that the trial judge based his determination on the belief that the sixth amendment right to confrontation allowed, if not required, defendant‘s presence at a discovery deposition and on the failure of the state to present contrary case authority.
Respondent contends that the trial judge‘s denial of the protective order does not violate the essential requirements of law which is necessary for this court‘s assumption of jurisdiction. The basis for this contention was that at the hearing the state failed to raise the question of the witness‘s heart condition or her physical health, and that the litigants must first present an issue to the trial court rather than raise it for the first time on an appellate level.
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... have the right ... to confront at trial adverse witnesses. (Emphasis added.)
The taking of a deposition of a witness which may or may not be used at trial cannot be construed as a part of the trial within the above constitutional mandate.
The right to take a deposition in criminal proceedings for discovery purposes is afforded by
The sixth amendment guarantees the right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him; however, the primary interest secured by the clause is the right of cross-examination rather than the right of physical confrontation. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). An adequate opportunity for cross-examination may exist even in the absence of physical confrontation Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 414, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). The confrontation or examination guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments is confrontation at trial. Nelson v. O‘Neal, 402 U.S. 622, 91 S.Ct. 1723, 29 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971). Thus, an out of court statement made in the absence of the accused may be admitted as evidence as long as the declarant testifies at the trial and is subject to full and effective confrontation. Id. at 627, 91 S.Ct. 1723, 1726, 29 L.Ed.2d 222. The scope of the “trial” has not been extended to discovery depositions1 as they are not true judicial proceedings.
There is no rule of criminal procedure, statute or constitutional provision mandating the presence of the defendant at a discovery deposition. Thus, his exclusion is a matter of sound judicial discretion.
In this instance, the state has alleged that the witness, victim of the crime, is in poor physical and mental health and has expressed a deep fear of a close one-to-one confrontation with defendant. In the exercise of its discretion, the court should consider the cost, inconvenience and security of transporting a defendant to the deposition and the effect on the mental and physical well-being of the witness, as well as the detriment to the defendant if he is not able to attend. Here, the state has alleged that a probable and great detrimental effect would occur upon the witness far outweighing any possible benefit the accused may attain by being personally present at the deposition.
The court based its ruling on an absolute right of confrontation contrary to the basic requirements of law due the state. The state has no remedy by appeal. Therefore, we grant certiorari and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the motion for the protective order to determine whether the potential detrimental effect upon the
Writ of certiorari is issued and the order denying the state‘s motion for protective order is quashed.
DAUKSCH, C.J., and COBB, J., concur.