State v. DesalvoState v. Desalvo
{¶ 3} Appellant later entered a no contest plea to one count of simple assault, a first degree misdemeanor pursuant to
{¶ 4} On June 2, 2003, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 180 days in jail, a $250 fine, $60 in court cоsts, and required him to make restitution to the victim. It must be noted that there is a material error in the trial court's judgment, because on the very same line of the judgment entry the court imposes both 180 days of jail time and six months of jail time, which are not the same thing. This will be discussed in more detail below.
{¶ 5} The trial court ordered Appellant to start his jail sentence on June 16, 2003. No credit was given for time served.
{¶ 6} On July 14, 2003, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. This was given Appeal No. 03-MA-127. Also on July 14, 2003, the trial court stayed the execution of the remainder of Appellant's sentencе and he was released from jail.
{¶ 7} On January 29, 2004, the appeal was sua sponte dismissed.
{¶ 8} On March 9, 2004, the trial court ordered Appellant to serve the remainder of his jail sentence, starting on April 10, 2004.
{¶ 9} On July 22, 2004, Appellant filed a motion with this Court to reopen his appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel, which was granted. Also on July 22, 2004, this Court stayed the execution of Appellant's sentence pending appeal, and Appellant was once again released from jail. *3
{¶ 10} On June 29, 2005, this Court released its Opinion inDeSalvo 1. This Court overruled Appellant's assignments of error based on our conclusion that Appellant had fully served his 180-day jail sentеnce. We would have come to this conclusion based only on the record before us in that appeal and any representation contained in Appellant's brief. Our Opinion notes that Appellee failed to file a brief in the matter. DeSalvo 1, ¶ 7.
{¶ 11} On December 15, 2005, the trial court issuеd the judgment entry that is presently on appeal. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve what it calculated as the remaining 46 days of the original 180-day jail term, starting on January 7, 2006.
{¶ 12} On January 6, 2006, Appellant filed the instant appeal. On that date, we granted a stay of execution. Appellant filed his brief on August 18, 2006, after being granted leave to do so by this Court.
{¶ 13} On October 12, 2006, Appellee filed a motion for an extension of time to file a brief, arguing that defense counsel and this Court misdirected filings and notices in this appeal and that it only recently received a copy of Appellant's brief. Appellee argued that Appellant failed to send his brief to the correct address. Appellee also claims that this Court failed to send him the August 25, 2006, journal entry accepting Appellant's brief instanter, which would have notified Appellee that a brief had been filed. On November 2, 2006, this Court granted Appellee 30 days to file a responsive brief.
{¶ 14} On December 4, 2006, Appellee filed another motion for leave to plead, arguing that the prosecutor had still not received, or only recently received, Appellаnt's brief. It is unclear, and in fact, inconsistent for Appellee to have argued *4 that it had seen Appellant's brief on or before October 12, 2006, and then to assert that the prosecutor had only recently received this brief on or about December 4, 2006, and so needed more time to file a response. Nevertheless, we granted Appellee's motion to file the brief instanter on December 19, 2006.
{¶ 15} There is some discussion in the briefs about a trial court journal entry from May 3, 2006, in which Appellant's counsel allegedly told the court that Appellant was prepаred to dismiss the appeal and was ready to begin serving the 46 days of jail time. Appellant's counsel purportedly asked the court to suggest a date to begin serving the jail time. This journal entry is not in the record, and since it was supposedly issued after this appeal was initiated, it has nо bearing on the outcome of this case. "It is settled that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction and that any subsequent ruling or order by the trial court is null and void." In re Estate ofMeyer (1989),
{¶ 17} A criminal defendant may appeal the sentence imposed by the trial court if the sentence is contrary to law.
{¶ 18} Appellant argues that he has already served his 180-day jail sentence because this Court so held in DeSalvo 1. Appellant contends that we have already issued a final ruling concerning whether he served his 180-day prison term, and that the trial court is bound by this ruling. Appellаnt is correct in this contention. In DeSalvo 1, we recognized Appellee's failure to file a brief and accepted Appellant's statement of the facts and issues as correct, pursuant to
{¶ 19} Appellee's further argument on appeal is that this Court had no jurisdiction to conclude that Appellant served his jail term, and that our supposedly erroneous conclusion renders DeSalvo 1 null and void. Appellee contends that this *6
Court made a finding dehors the reсord, and that such a finding is beyond our jurisdiction. Appellee argues that DeSalvo 1 violates
{¶ 20} Appellee has misinterpreted
{¶ 21} Most appeals involve a review of both law and fact, but that does not equate a return to the prior practice of "appeals on questions of law and fаct." For example, a review of a motion to suppress always, "presents a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Burnside,
{¶ 22} Assuming a reviewing court makes an error in interpreting the facts in the record, such a factual error in the appellate decision may be further appealed to *7
the Ohio Supreme Court or may be the subject of an application for reconsideration in the court of appeals itself,
{¶ 23} It is axiomatic, then, that, "[t]he judgment of the reviewing court is controlling upon the lower court as to all matters within the compass of the judgment." State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges,Court of Common Pleas (1978),
{¶ 24} A close inspection of the original sentencing entry reveals that the trial court sentenced Appellant to both "180 days" and "six months" in jail. Both phrases appear on the same line in the judgment entry. These two jail sentences are not the same. Given the fact that some months have 30 days, some have 31, and one has either 28 or 29 days, it is quite unlikely that any 6-month jail term would equal exactly 180 days. In Appellant's case, a six-month jail term would actually have equaled 183 days. It is not clear to us what Appellant's actual sentence is, given the conflicting notations in the trial court's judgment entry. At any rate, the trial court had no authority to order a six-month jail term for a first degree misdemeanor. See
{¶ 25} It is impossible for this Court, Appellant, Appellee, or even the trial court, to accurately determine how many days might remain on Apрellant's sentence, since two different jail terms were imposed. Appellee cannot persuasively argue that this Court miscalculated in the earlier appeal the amount of time left on Appellant's sentence not only because Appellee is working from the record in its current state, but because that number cannot actually be determined. Even under Appellee's argument, it is not clear whether Appellant has 46 days, or 49 days, or some other amount of jail time left to serve.
{¶ 26} Appellee seems to imply that our determination that Appellant served his 180-day jail sentence was only dicta in DeSalvo 1. This is not a persuasive *9
argument. "`Dicta' is defined as `[expressions in court's opinions which go beyond the facts before court and therefore are * * * not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent.'" Westfield Ins. Co. v.Galatis,
{¶ 27} Based on this Court's earlier ruling in DeSalvo 1, Appellant hаs served his jail sentence and cannot be ordered to serve an additional 46 days of jail time. Appellant's assignment of error has merit, and the judgment of the trial court is hereby vacated. There remains a question as to whether Appellant has paid restitution to the victim, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings dealing with any remaining aspects of the sentence other than the length of incarceration.
Donofrio, J., concurs.
*1DeGenaro, P.J., concurs in judgment only.