STATE OF OHIO v. NATHAN DEES
C.A. Nos. 30106; 30107; 30108; 30128
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
January 31, 2025
[Cite as State v. Dees, 2025-Ohio-294.]
HUFFMAN, J.
Trial Court Case Nos. 2024 CR 00181; 2024 CR 00038; 2023 CR 03533; 2024 CR 398 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
Rendered on January 31, 2025
GARY C. SCHAENGOLD, Attorney for Appellant
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by SARAH H. CHANEY, Attorney for Appellee
HUFFMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Nathan Dees appeals from his convictions in four separate cases. In each case, his sentence included the imposition of a $30 financial sanction under
I. Background Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Between November 2023 and February 2024, Dees was arrested four times and was charged with several felonies in four separate cases. He was appointed counsel in each case after the trial court determined that he was indigent and unable to afford counsel. In March 2024, Dees entered guilty pleas to the following charges: breaking and entering; receiving stolen property (motor vehicle); receiving stolen property (motor vehicle); and grand theft (motor vehicle).
{¶ 3} The trial court sentenced Dees to 12-month prison terms in each of his four cases, to be served consecutively. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated it had considered Dees‘s presentence investigation report (PSI), without further elaboration. The court waived other fines and costs to assist Dees with making a restitution payment to the victim, but it ordered him to pay $30 as a financial sanction in each case under
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 4} Dees asserts the following assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS IMPOSITION OF A $30
{¶ 5} Dees contends that the trial court should have waived the $30 sanctions set out in
{¶ 6} At the outset, we note that Dees did not object at sentencing and seek a waiver of the financial sanctions imposed by the trial court. “In criminal cases where an objection is not raised at the trial court level, ‘plain error’ is governed by Crim. R. 52(B), which states, ‘Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.’ ” State v. Wertman, 2019-Ohio-4940, ¶ 16 (5th Dist.). An error does not constitute “plain error” unless “but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.” Id., quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 7} An appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised in the trial court only where the appellant demonstrates that “(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant‘s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the . . . court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 17, quoting United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 (2010). “Notice of plain error
{¶ 8} Because Dees did not raise any objections before the trial court, he waived all but plain error on appeal, and we will apply plain error analysis to his assignment of error. Dees, as the appellant, bears the burden of demonstrating that plain error by the trial court affected his substantial rights. Id. at ¶ 18, citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993); State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118 (2004).
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} Although
{¶ 11} Dees contends that the trial court considered him to be indigent when it appointed counsel for him and thus erred by imposing the financial sanctions under
{¶ 12} In sentencing Dees, the trial court considered Dees‘s PSI. It was not required to hold a hearing on the issue of financial sanctions or to take express factors into consideration when imposing such sanctions. See State v. Parks, 2024-Ohio-5026, ¶ 73 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Hull, 2017-Ohio-7934, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Culver, 2005-Ohio-1359, ¶ 57 (2d Dist.). “While it might be preferable, a trial court is not required to expressly state that it considered [a] [d]efendant‘s ability to pay a fine.” Id. at ¶ 73, quoting State v. Parker, 2004-Ohio-1313, ¶ 42 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Slater, 2002-Ohio-5343 (4th Dist.). “The court‘s consideration of that issue may be inferred from the record under appropriate circumstances.” Id. The trial court may fulfill its obligation “by considering a presentence investigation report . . . which includes information about the defendant‘s age, health, education, and work history.” (Citation omitted.) Id., quoting State v. Willis, 2012-Ohio-294, ¶ 4 (2d Dist.); accord State v. Kirchgessner, 2022-Ohio-3944, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.); State v. Moore, 2019-Ohio-4806, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 13} In this case, the fact that Dees qualified for appointed counsel was insufficient to demonstrate that Dees, who was only 35 years old at the time of sentencing,
{¶ 14} Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred by finding the sanctions to be non-waivable. The question of ability to pay financial sanctions is different from indigence for purpose of appointed counsel, and Dees has not demonstrated that the trial court committed “plain error” affecting his substantial rights by imposing costs as it did. Dees has not demonstrated that the trial court‘s imposition of $120 in financial sanctions affected his substantial rights or the fairness and integrity of the proceedings or resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, Dees‘s assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 15} The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
EPLEY, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur.