STATE OF OHIO v. LAWRENCE DAVIS
CASE NO. 10 MA 160
STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS SEVENTH DISTRICT
November 18, 2011
2011-Ohio-6025
Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, Case No. 05 CR 193. Modified and Remanded.
JUDGMENT: Modified and Remanded.
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: Atty. Paul J. Gains Mahoning County Prosecutor Atty. Ralph M. Rivera Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor Youngstown, Ohio 44503
For Defendant-Appellant: Lawrence Davis, Pro se #494-988 Mansfield Correctional Institution P.O. Box 788 Mansfield, Ohio 44901
JUDGES: Hon. Cheryl L. Waite Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich Hon. Mary DeGenaro
Dated: November 18, 2011
{1} Appellant Lawrence Davis argues that the trial court failed to properly notify him that he would be subject to post-release control after he was convicted of five counts of trafficking in cocaine. Appellant contends that his sentence is void due to the trial court’s error under the holdings of State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250 and State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197. The record reflects that the trial court informed Appellant regarding post-release control at his sentencing hearing, but only noted in its judgment entry that he was advised pursuant to
History of the Case
{2} On March 3, 2005, Appellant was indicted on five counts of drug trafficking. Each count was charged under
{3} Appellant filed a motion for postconviction relief, which was overruled by the trial court, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. State v. Davis, 7th Dist. No. 08 MA 16, 2008-Ohio-6211.
{4} On August 23, 2010, Appellant filed a motion to correct a void sentence. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on September 9, 2010. The hearing transcript is not part of the record. The court overruled the motion on September 21, 2010. This appeal followed on October 10, 2010.
{5} “The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to properly include post-release control into its judgement [sic] entry of sentence journalized on December 14, 2005; violating
{6} “The trial court abused its discretion when it overruled Mr. Davis’ Motion to Correct a Void Sentence for lack of properly imposed post-release control.”
{7} Both of Appellant’s assignments of error deal with the allegation that the court’s sentencing entry fails to properly give notice of post-release control, and thus, they will be treated together. Post-release control is a period of supervision by the Ohio Adult Parole Authority following release from prison. Appellant argues that, under
{8} Appellant contends that the phrase used in his sentencing judgment entry is not adequate notice of post-release control. The judgment entry states: “Defendant was also advised pursuant to
{9} Errors in notifying a defendant about post-release control have generated much litigation in Ohio. Jordan, supra, held that that a sentence that does not contain the proper notifications about post-release control must be vacated. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. In Bezak, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court held that, without the proper post-release control notifications, the sentencing entry is void in its entirety and that the defendant is entitled to a completely new sentencing hearing. Id. at syllabus.
{10} Various problems arose in applying Bezak, particularly with regard to questions of res judicata in cases that had already been through the direct appeal process but were later found to have issues regarding notification of post-release control. It became unclear when, if ever, such cases became final, or how to deal with resentencing and subsequent appeal if the post-release control error was
{11} “[W]e hold that the new sentencing hearing to which an offender is entitled under Bezak is limited to proper imposition of postrelease control. In so holding, we come more into line with legislative provisions concerning appellate review of criminal sentences.
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) permits an appellate court, upon finding that a sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law, to remand for resentencing. But a remand is just one arrow in the quiver.R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) also provides that an appellate court may ‘increase, reduce or otherwise modify a sentence * * * or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing.’ (Emphasis added.) Correcting a defect in a sentence withouta remand is an option that has been used in Ohio and elsewhere for years in cases in which the original sentencing court, as here, had no sentencing discretion. {12} “Correcting the defect without remanding for resentencing can provide an equitable, economical, and efficient remedy for a void sentence. Here, we adopt that remedy in one narrow area: in cases in which a trial judge does not impose postrelease control in accordance with statutorily mandated terms.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶29-30.
{13} In this appeal, it appears that the trial court did not include enough information in the judgment entry to fulfill the statutory post-release control notification requirements. The judgment entry does not state that the defendant was subject to mandatory post-release control or for how long. Therefore, Appellant’s assignments of error are partially well-taken. Appellant desires the remedy of a new sentencing hearing, but that remedy is not appropriate in this case. Pursuant to Fischer, we hereby modify and correct Appellant’s post-release control to apprise him of post-release control, and we remand the case to the trial court with instructions to correct the sentencing entry to reflect this advisement. The following additional language, or language substantially similar, must be added to the sentencing judgment entry:
{14} “The offender will be supervised under
Vukovich, J., concurs.
DeGenaro, J., concurs.
