State of Ohio v. Marcus Crawford
Court of Appeals No. L-17-1297
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
Decided: June 28, 2019
[Cite as State v. Crawford, 2019-Ohio-2660.]
Trial Court No. CR0201602264
Appellee
v.
Marcus Crawford
Appellant
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alyssa Breyman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Karin L. Coble, for appellant.
*****
MAYLE, P.J.
{1} Following a jury trial, appellant, Marcus Crawford, appeals the August 4, 2017 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to a mandatory prison term of 10 years to life. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{2} On July 11, 2016, Crawford was indicted on one count of rape of a person less than 13 years of age in violation of
{3} On June 10, 2016, S.B., who was 11 years old, and some of her siblings were visiting their mother‘s house in Toledo. Their mother, stepfather, grandmother, stepgrandfather, a man called “Slurp,” and Crawford were also at the house. S.B. said that she knew Crawford before June 10 and thought he was “trustworthy” and “protective of” her.
{4} Late that morning, S.B. walked to a nearby library branch by herself so that she could use a computer. She originally told the police that she walked to the library with three of her brothers, which she admitted on cross-examination was a lie that she told so that she would not get in trouble. She said that she was not allowed to walk to the library by herself and that her aunt (who was her legal guardian) would have been upset with her if she had known. She also admitted that she “always lie[s]” to avoid getting in trouble.
{6} S.B. said that Crawford came to the library while she was there and sat next to her. She testified that Crawford “kept following” her around the library. The state entered into evidence surveillance video from the library‘s security system. The video showed Crawford entering the library, walking past the computer where S.B. was sitting, and going to another area of the library. Shortly after, he returned to the main area and sat at a computer that was not near S.B., but immediately stood up and moved to the computer next to hers. For approximately 30 minutes, Crawford and S.B. used the adjacent computers, and the video appears to show them frequently speaking and looking at each other‘s screens. When Crawford stood to leave, S.B. also got up. Although S.B. and Crawford left the library at the same time, she said that they “went our separate ways.”
{7} While S.B. was walking, Crawford came up behind her, “snatched” and choked her, and took her down an alley near the library to a garage filled with garbage. In the garage, Crawford took off his jacket, laid it on the ground, and told S.B. to lie down. When she refused, she said that “he holded [sic] my hands, and he just kept squeezing my neck. And he was like, ‘You can die right now.‘” S.B. said that Crawford “tricked” her by asking her to get something and then pulling down and removing her pants and underwear. He then “put his private part in my private part.” She clarified that
{8} Following the rape, S.B. said that Crawford took her to the store and bought her chips and candy. She then returned to her mother‘s house, where she washed the blood out of her underwear because it was “nasty” and she did not know what else to do. She also reported the rape to her mother. She recalls telling her mother to “shut up because I didn‘t want Marcus to hear.” D.M. testified that he heard his stepgrandfather yelling at Crawford who responded by saying “he didn‘t do that * * *.” S.B.‘s mother called her aunt, who took S.B. to the hospital for a sexual assault examination.
{9} At the hospital, S.B. was examined by Amber Showman, a sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE“). Showman said that S.B. was laughing and smiling when Showman introduced herself, but became tearful when describing the rape. During the exam, S.B. had a “flat affect with an occasional smile * * *.” According to Showman‘s notes in S.B.‘s medical records, S.B. identified Crawford as her assailant. S.B. reported that she was leaving the library when Crawford came up behind her, choked her with his arm, took her into a garage, and told her to take off her pants. She refused, so Crawford choked her again. He then pulled down her pants, laid her down, pulled up her legs, and “put his privates in” her. Afterward, Crawford told S.B. not to tell anyone or he would
{10} Showman‘s physical examination of S.B. showed that S.B. did not have any marks on her neck, which Showman said is typical. Although Showman did not see any visible injuries in S.B.‘s vaginal area, S.B. was extremely tender to touch and was “almost crying in pain” because she was so sore, which prevented Showman from doing a thorough examination for injuries. As part of the exam, Showman took swabs of S.B.‘s neck, vaginal area, and perianal area, and collected S.B.‘s clothing, which she included in the rape kit that was turned over to the police.
{11} On July 14, 2016, S.B. was examined by Dr. Randall Schlievert, who testified as an expert in the treatment and diagnosis of sexual abuse. The examination consisted of an interview by a social worker and a physical examination by Schlievert. The version of events that S.B. gave during the interview was mostly consistent with the version that she told the SANE and testified to at trial. Schlievert testified that he saw a “hymenal transection” during the physical examination, which he claimed was only possible if there had been “penetrating trauma.” Based on S.B.‘s description of events and the tear in her hymen, Schlievert concluded that S.B. had been sexually assaulted.
{12} Detective Rebecca Kincaid of the Toledo Police Department was the detective assigned to investigate this case. As part of her investigation, Kincaid
{13} Kincaid came to the hospital while S.B. was being treated. When the sexual assault examination was finished, Kincaid drove S.B. and her aunt to the library to have S.B. show her the garage where the rape occurred. Kincaid also interviewed S.B. Based on Kincaid‘s testimony, the version of events that S.B. reported to Kincaid was generally consistent with S.B.‘s trial testimony, although Kincaid admitted on cross that S.B. said Crawford brought chips and soda back to her mother‘s house, not that Crawford took her to the store after the rape.
{14} During the interview with Crawford (a portion of which was played for the jury), Kincaid said that Crawford initially denied having sex with S.B., but changed his story after Kincaid collected his DNA. In Crawford‘s second version of events, he admitted that he “fucked up,” but placed the blame for the incident on S.B. Crawford claimed that S.B. followed him down the alley, “tried to come on to” him, and he “let her a little bit.” He admitted that his penis had been in S.B.‘s vagina, but said that “I didn‘t fuck [a] sixth grader.” Instead, he said that S.B. pulled down her pants and climbed on top of him, and he let her “put it in and then [he] pulled it out.” He claimed, however, that he did not “put it in her.”
{15} Kincaid sent Crawford‘s DNA sample and S.B.‘s rape kit to the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation (“BCI“) for testing. A forensic scientist with BCI testified that she identified semen on the vaginal and perianal swabs from S.B.‘s rape kit
{16} On cross-examination, Dreyer admitted that she did not test the swab taken from S.B.‘s neck. Because it is not feasible for BCI to test every sample from every case, Dreyer said, in rape cases, they start by testing samples that were collected internally or from an orifice—“especially an internal orifice collection“—and that had a bodily fluid identified on them. Because Dreyer found DNA in the vaginal sample, she did not test the remaining samples in the rape kit.
{17} Based on this evidence, the jury found Crawford guilty.
{18} On August 1, 2017, the trial court sentenced Crawford to a mandatory prison term of 10 years to life.
{19} Crawford now appeals, raising two assignments of error:
Assignment of Error One: The trial court violated appellant‘s right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10.
Assignment of Error Two: The verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Crawford‘s Speedy-Trial Rights were not Violated
{20} In his first assignment of error, Crawford contends that his constitutional speedy-trial rights were violated. His arguments in support, however, focus on his statutory right to a speedy trial. The state counters that Crawford waived this error by not raising it in the trial court and, regardless, that he was brought to trial within the statutory timeframe.
1. Statutory Speedy-Trial Right
{21} The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the
{23} The state argues that Crawford‘s case was subject to numerous tolling events that brought his trial date within the statutory limit. We agree.
a. Relevant Events
{24} The following events are relevant to our speedy-trial determination:
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| July 21, 2016 | Crawford was arrested. |
| July 27, 2016 | Crawford filed his discovery demand. |
| August 16, 2016 | Crawford appeared for a pretrial, and the trial court rescheduled the matter for a pretrial on September 6, 2016, at Crawford‘s request. |
| September 6, 2016 | Crawford appeared for a pretrial, and the trial court rescheduled the matter for a pretrial on September 20, 2016, at Crawford‘s request. |
| September 8, 2016 | The state filed its discovery response. |
| September 15, 2016 | Crawford was indicted on an unrelated charge. |
| September 19, 2016 | Crawford‘s attorney filed a motion to withdraw. |
| September 20, 2016 | Crawford appeared for a pretrial at which the trial court granted counsel‘s motion to withdraw. The trial court appointed new counsel and rescheduled the matter for a pretrial on October 4, 2016. |
| October 4, 2016 | Crawford appeared for a pretrial, and the trial court rescheduled the matter for a pretrial on November 1, 2016, at Crawford‘s request. |
| November 1, 2016 | Crawford appeared for a pretrial, and the trial court rescheduled the matter for a pretrial on November 22, 2016, at Crawford‘s request. |
| November 22, 2016 | The trial court held a pretrial at which Crawford was not present and rescheduled the matter for a pretrial on November 29, 2016, at Crawford‘s request. |
| November 29, 2016 | Crawford appeared for a pretrial, and the trial court rescheduled the matter for a pretrial on December 13, 2016, at Crawford‘s request. |
| December 13, 2016 | Crawford appeared for a pretrial, and the trial court rescheduled the matter for a pretrial on December 20, 2016, at Crawford‘s request. |
| December 20, 2016 | Crawford appeared for a pretrial, and the trial court rescheduled the matter for a pretrial on January 17, 2017, at Crawford‘s request. |
| January 17, 2017 | Crawford appeared for a pretrial. The trial court set a jury trial for February 27, 2017. |
| January 20, 2017 | Crawford filed a motion for relief from prejudicial joinder. |
| January 30, 2017 | The state filed a notice that it did not intend to join this case and the case related to the September 15, 2016 indictment for trial. |
| February 17, 2017 | The state filed a motion to continue the jury trial. |
| February 23, 2017 | The trial court vacated the February 27 trial date and set the matter for a pretrial on February 28, 2017. |
| February 28, 2017 | Crawford appeared for a pretrial. The trial court and counsel discussed the motion for relief from joinder, but the court did not issue a ruling. The court granted the state‘s motion to continue and set a jury trial for March 20, 2017. |
| March 14, 2017 | Crawford appeared for a pretrial at which his attorney made an oral motion to withdraw. The trial court held the motion in abeyance and rescheduled the matter for a pretrial on March 21, 2017, at Crawford‘s request. |
| March 21, 2017 | Crawford appeared for a pretrial at which the trial court granted counsel‘s motion to withdraw. The trial court appointed new counsel, rescheduled the matter for a pretrial on April 18, 2017, and set a jury trial for May 8, 2017. |
| April 18, 2017 | Crawford appeared for a pretrial at which the May 8 trial date was confirmed. |
| May 8, 2017 | Crawford‘s jury trial began. |
b. Applicable Law
{25} Under
{27} The reasons for charging days to the defendant (i.e., tolling speedy-trial time) are outlined in
{29} Under
{30} Under
{31} When determining the “reasonable” tolling period incurred by a defendant‘s motion, a reviewing court must consider the particular circumstances of the case, the complexity of the facts and difficulty of the legal issue involved, and the time constraints on the trial court. State v. Arrizola, 79 Ohio App.3d 72, 76, 606 N.E.2d 1020 (3d Dist.1992) (Finding that a 228-day period between filing of motion to suppress in an OVI case and trial court‘s decision was unreasonable when “[n]othing appear[ed] on the record which would justify this amount of time.“); see also, e.g., State v. Ford, 180 Ohio App.3d 636, 2009-Ohio-146, 906 N.E.2d 1155 (1st Dist.), paragraph two of the syllabus (Finding that a five-month delay was unreasonable and that, “[a]lthough a
{32} Under
{33} We will now apply these general legal principles to Crawford‘s case.
c. Speedy-Trial Calculation
{34} Crawford was arrested on July 21, 2016. Under the statutory scheme, although speedy-trial time begins to run when an accused is arrested for the offense in question, the actual day of the arrest does not count.
{35} Following his arrest, Crawford was held in jail in lieu of bail until his trial, which entitled him to triple speedy-trial-time credit for each day he was held.
{37} First, Crawford filed a discovery demand on July 27, 2016. The state responded to Crawford‘s discovery demand on September 8, 2016—43 days later. This was beyond the “reasonable” period of 30 days for the state to respond to a discovery demand. Bates, 6th Dist. Williams No. WM-12-002, 2013-Ohio-1270, at ¶ 21. We therefore find that Crawford‘s discovery demand tolled speedy-trial time for 30 days, until August 26, 2016.
{38} Second, between August 16, 2016, and January 17, 2017, Crawford requested nine continuances and fired his attorney. Each of these events resulted in time tolling.
{39} Third, on January 20, 2017, Crawford filed a motion for relief from prejudicial joinder in anticipation that the state would attempt to try this case and the case related to the September 2016 indictment together. On January 30, 2017, the state filed a notice that it did not intend to join the cases. Although the parties and the trial court discussed the motion at the pretrial on February 28, the court did not issue a ruling until May 8, 2017, the day that Crawford‘s trial began.
{41} Fourth, on March 14, 2017, Crawford requested a continuance and on March 21, 2017, his second attorney withdrew, which resulted in time tolling until the pretrial on April 18, 2017.
{42} No tolling events occurred from April 18 to May 8, 2016—the period between the pretrial at which the trial date was confirmed and the beginning of the trial—so these days are chargeable to the state.
| Dates | Tolling event | Days chargeable to the state |
|---|---|---|
| July 21 to July 27, 2016 | 183 | |
| July 27 to August 26, 2016 | A reasonable time for the state to respond to Crawford‘s discovery demand | Tolled |
| August 16 to January 17, 2017 | Period during which Crawford requested nine continuances and fired his first attorney | Tolled |
| January 17 to 20, 2017 | 3 | |
| January 20 to 30, 2017 | A reasonable time for the trial court to resolve Crawford‘s motion for relief from prejudicial joinder | Tolled |
| January 30 to March 14, 2017 | 43 | |
| March 14 to April 18, 2017 | Period during which Crawford requested one continuance and fired his second attorney | Tolled |
| April 18 to May 8, 2017 | 20 | |
| Total days chargeable to the state | 84 |
{44} Because the number of days chargeable to the state—84 days—is fewer than the 270 days within which the state was required to bring Crawford to trial under
{45} Although Crawford did not make any arguments related to the violation of his constitutional speedy-trial rights, he assigned violation of his constitutional rights as error. We find no error.
{46} To determine whether a defendant was deprived of these constitutional rights, we must balance four factors: “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant‘s assertion of a speedy-trial right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 88, citing State v. Selvage, 80 Ohio St.3d 465, 467, 687 N.E.2d 433 (1997), and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). But we must first make a threshold determination that the delay in bringing the defendant to trial was “presumptively prejudicial“; if it was not, we need not inquire into the other factors. State v. Hull, 110 Ohio St.3d 183, 2006-Ohio-4252, 852 N.E.2d 706, ¶ 23. The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that a delay becomes presumptively prejudicial as it approaches one year. Adams at ¶ 90, citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992), fn. 1. Regardless, whether the length of a delay is presumptively prejudicial is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Hull at ¶ 23.
{47} Based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the 291-day delay in this case was presumptively prejudicial—particularly because nearly one-half of the delay was caused by Crawford requesting numerous continuances and needing new
{48} Crawford‘s first assignment of error is not well-taken.
B. Crawford‘s Conviction is not Against the Weight of the Evidence
{49} In his second assignment of error, Crawford argues that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence because of inconsistencies in S.B.‘s testimony and her admission that she “always lie[s]” to avoid getting in trouble. We disagree.
{50} When we review a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, we weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the jury clearly lost its way in resolving evidentiary conflicts so as to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). We do not view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. “Instead, we sit as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and scrutinize ‘the factfinder‘s resolution of the conflicting testimony.‘” State v. Robinson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1369, 2012-Ohio-6068, ¶ 15, citing Thompkins at 387. Reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for “the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{52} Crawford was convicted of rape of a person less than 13 years of age in violation of
{53} After reviewing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the conflicting testimony, we are not convinced that the evidence weighs heavily against a conviction. We cannot say that the jury lost its way or created a manifest miscarriage of justice (despite the inconsistencies in S.B.‘s testimony) because the pertinent portions of S.B.‘s testimony—i.e., her descriptions of Crawford engaging in vaginal intercourse with her—were supported by other evidence. Crucially, S.B. testified that Crawford inserted his penis into her vagina, which was confirmed by (1) the presence of DNA consistent with Crawford‘s in S.B.‘s vaginal area and (2) Crawford‘s admission to Kincaid that his penis was in S.B.‘s vagina. The inconsistencies in S.B.‘s
{54} Accordingly, we find that Crawford‘s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. His second assignment of error is not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{55} Based on the foregoing, the August 4, 2017 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Crawford is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.
Christine E. Mayle, P.J.
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
CONCUR.
JUDGE
JUDGE
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.