State v. CraddockState v. Craddock
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{¶2} The following facts give rise to this appeal. Craddock was indicted for the following offenses: four counts of rape, by use of force or threat of force, in violation of
{¶3} Craddock pleaded guilty to counts one and two (i.e., rape) with the “force or threat of force” specification removed. He also pleaded guilty to counts nine, ten, and eleven. The remaining counts were dismissed.
{¶4} A sexual predator hearing was held on February 10, 2000. At that hearing, the trial court heard evidence and classified Craddock as a sexual рredator. Immediately following that hearing, Craddock was sentenced. He was sentenced to ten years each on counts one and two to run concurrently with each other. He was sentenced to five years each on counts nine, ten, and eleven to run concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the sentences on counts one and two.
{¶5} Craddock appeals the denial of his motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea and the sentencing decision of the trial court and advances four assignments of error.
{¶6} “Assignment of error number one: The trial court erred in not holding a hearing on appellant‘s motion to withdraw guilty plea.”
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{¶8} These assignments of error argue that the trial court ignored a manifest injustice by refusing to hold a hearing on Craddock‘s motion to withdraw a guilty plea and subsequently denied the motion.
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{¶10} “A motiоn to withdraw a plea of guilty * * * may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.”
{¶11} “It has been expressly recognized by the weight of authority that a defendant seeking to withdraw a plеa of guilty after sentence has the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice.” State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261. A decision on a defendant‘s motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Boynton (Aug. 14, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 71097.
{¶12} An abuse of discretion is more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court‘s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. State v. Clark, 71 Ohio St.3d 466, 1994-Ohio-43. When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court is not free to merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. In re Jane Doe I (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 135. With this standard in mind, we review the matter before us.
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{¶14} Craddock‘s motion included only one source of evidence – his own affidavit. In addition, that affidavit recounted events that occurred off the record (i.e., Craddock‘s claim that his attorney did not inform him of the potential maximum sentences that he faced in exchange for pleading guilty). In contrast to this self-serving affidavit, the trial сourt had significant evidence that denying Craddock‘s motion would not be a manifest injustice.
{¶15} The prosecutor informed Craddock, on the record, that his plea of guilty to counts one and two carried a mandatory sentence of three to ten years. The prosecutor also informed him that he could receive a one- to five-year sentence following his plea of guilty to counts nine, ten, and eleven. Following that explanation, Craddock acknowledged that he understood the potential sentences he was facing.
{¶16} Craddock‘s counsel also stated on the record that he had informed Craddock of the potential result of his pleading guilty. Craddock had no questions and indicated he understood everything that was being said. Finally, the court specifically informed Craddock that “there is no promise on what type of sentencing you are going to get. Do you understand that?” Craddock replied, “Yes, Sir.”
{¶17} In light of these facts, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in determining that no manifest injusticе had occurred, in refusing to hold a hearing on Craddock‘s motion and in denying Craddock‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We,
{¶18} “Assignment of error number three: The trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentences on each of the counts to which appellant рlead [sic] guilty.”
{¶19} In order for a trial court to impose the maximum sentence, it must make the required findings set forth in
{¶20} In State v. Edmonson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 329, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that in order to lawfully impose a maximum prison sentence, the record must reflect that the trial court found the defendant satisfied at least one of the criteria set forth in
{¶21} In addition,
{¶22} In the present case, the trial court made the required finding under
{¶23} The appellee‘s argument that the court heard evidence in connection with Craddock‘s sexual predator classification that justified the imposition of a maximum sentence is without merit. The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined sexual predator hearings as civil actions. State v. Gowdy (2000) 88 Ohio St.3d 387. While this court has consistently held that “* * * a sexual predator determination hearing is akin to a sentenсing hearing * * *,” this likening has been consistently applied to issues concerning standards of admissible evidence, not issues involving required findings or reasons for a sentence. State v. Purser (2003), 153 Ohio App.3d 144. There is a clear distinction between the purpose of sentencing and the purpose of a sexual predator hearing. Unless the court clearly integrates or incоrporates the hearings together and expressly indicates the findings or reasons stated in one are to be applied in the other, statements in a sexual predator hearing cannot be used to satisfy the statutory required findings and reasons for maximum or consecutive sentences.
{¶24} In this case, the trial court‘s statement at sentencing thаt “The harm caused was so great that any single sentence would not adequately reflect the harm that was done to these children,” is only a finding and does not provide reasons for the imposition of maximum sentences. The statement that the case involves “children” does not, by itself, distinguish the facts in the case from any other case involving the statutory rape of a child.
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{¶26} While we philosophically agree with the prosecutor‘s position that evidence that may have contained sufficient facts to warrant maximum sentences existed and was offered at the sexual predator hearing, the reasons that might be drawn from this evidence to support the finding were not stated or articulated in either the sexual predator hearing or the sentencing hearing. The comments by the court, in both hearings, detailed none of the specific information outlined by the prosecutor, or in the exhibits offered, that would have justified the imposition of maximum sentences.
{¶27} Because
{¶28} “Assignment of error number four: The trial court erred
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{¶30} As to the need for consecutive sentences, the court found only that “* * * consecutive sentences are necеssary in this case. The harm caused was so great that any single sentence could not adequately reflect the harm that was done to these children.” This statement provides only one of the three required findings. Further, it contains no reasons from any of the evidence offered by the prosecutor or from the P.S.I. to support the imposition of consecutive sentences.
{¶31} Appellee would have us “boot strap” the comments given in the sexual predator hearing transcript, held just prior to the sentencing, into the sentencing hearing to satisfy the statutory requirements for consecutive sentences. Again, as with the analysis on the issue of maximum sentences, even if the sexual рredator comments had been incorporated into the sentencing hearing, those earlier comments detailed none of the specific information outlined by the prosecutor or in the exhibits offered that would have justified the imposition of consecutive sentences.
{¶32} We note that the court does not have to use thе exact terminology of the statute in setting forth its findings. We have previously recognized that
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{¶34} Upon our review of the record here, we find the trial court failed to make all of the required findings and did not state any reasons for imposing consecutive sentences.
{¶35} For the reasons outlined above, the fourth assignment of error has merit and we remand the case for resentencing.
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{¶37} It is, therefore, ordered that appellant and appellee share the costs herein taxed.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., concurs.
DIANE KARPINSKI, J., concurs.
(SEE SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION).
KARPINSKI, J., concurring.
{¶38} I agree with the lead opinion in this case, except for its discussion of the mechanics of imposing consecutive sentences. While it is true that the trial court need not follow a “predetermined format setting forth the reasons for its findings,” I do not agree that the procedure the Supreme Court of Ohio described in Comer, ante, is satisfied if “the ability to clearly align the findings and reasons for maximum or consecutive sentences” is “clear from the record as a whole,” as the lead opinion says.
{¶39} First, the statute is not satisfied by the mere ”ability to clearly align the findings and reasons.” (Emphasis added.) The statute is not satisfied by some pоtentiality of alignment; the finding and its reasons must in fact be demonstrably aligned.
{¶40} Second, neither the statute nor the Supreme Court permits this alignment to be drawn from the “record as a whole.” In explaining the consecutive sentence, the Supreme Court stated: “***a trial court must clearly align each rationale with the specific finding to suppоrt its decision to impose consecutive sentences.” p. 468 This statement sharply spells out the requirement of a “specific finding” for “each rationale.”
{¶41}
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.