State v. CostagliolaState v. Costagliola
Defendant pleaded guilty to a complaint charging him with violating
The record on appeal reveals two arguments which were advanced in opposition to the motion for vacating the judgment and seeking supervisory treatment. It should be noted that the arguments raised and discussed are not definitively disposed of at the municipal court level, but are present in the record and must be considered by this court for a proper disposition of the appeal.
The conflicting positions between defendant and the State (municipal court) center first on the effect of
In construing the suspension statute the primary function of the court is to implement the essential objective and purpose for which this particular legislation was enacted. State v. Madden, 61 N.J. 377 (1972); West Milford Tp. Planning Bd. v. West Milford Tp. Council, 123 N.J. Super. 135 (Law Div. 1973).
Where the application of a statute is involved, intention is to be gleaned from the words used, and they are to be given their plain, ordinary and well understood meaning in the absence of an explicit indication to the contrary. Rubamer v. Thompson, 130 N.J. Super. 181 (Law Div. 1974); Albert F. Ruehl Co. v. Bd. of Trustees of Schools for Indus. Ed., 85 N.J. Super. 4 (Law Div. 1964). “[The court has] no legislative authority and should not construe statutes any more broadly nor give them any greater effect than their language requires.” Belfer v. Borrella, 9 N.J. Super. 287, 293 (App. Div. 1950). See also, Mountain Lakes Bd. of Ed. v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245 (App. Div. 1959), aff‘d 31 N.J. 537 (1960). Although a fundamental principle, it might well be noted that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. State v. Edwards, 28 N.J. 292 (1958); Sate v. Genser Trucking Co., Inc., 87 N.J. Super. 43 (Cty. Ct. 1965). In the exposition of statutes the judiciary is to accord to a legislative expression its usual connotation and intendment, relating particular words and phrases in context so that each individual part or section is made consistent with the general objective of the statutory system as a whole. Cedar Park Cemetery v. Hayes, 132 N.J. Super. 572 (Law Div. 1975);
Initially, the State contends that defendant cannot avail himself of the benefits of the suspension statute since a judgment on conviction (a sentence) has already been entered against him which he is now serving. It is argued that as a result of this judgment defendant cannot be considered as being “charged with or convicted of any offense” within the meaning of
The court would have to construe the word “conviction” to mean “conviction and sentence” or “conviction and judgment” in order for defendant to come within the ambit of the statute. Therefore, we must examine the meaning accorded the word “conviction” as used in this statute.
The decisions in this State have concluded that the ordinary legal meaning of conviction, when used to designate a particular stage of a prosecution, is the confession of the accused in open court, or the verdict returned against him, which determines the fact of his guilt. “Judgment” or “sentence” is the appropriate word to denote the action of the court before which the trial is held, declaring to the convicted defendant the consequences of the guilty verdict. This distinction between “conviction” and “judgment” has generally been observed in New Jersey. State v. Henson, 66 N.J.L. 601 (E. & A. 1901); Stewart v. Stewart, 93 N.J. Eq. 1 (Ch. 1921). In State v. Mc Call, 27 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1953), where the court interpreted the word “conviction” in the context of a criminal statute, it concluded that the Legislature used the words “conviction” and “sentence” in a mutually exclusive manner. See also, State v. Baker, 133 N.J. Super. 398 (App. Div. 1975).
Subsection b of
This construction of
Taking all of these factors into consideration, this court concludes that the Legislature, under
At the municipal trial the judge discussed, but did not definitively dispose of, the question concerning the applicability of
The second objection to suspension raised by the State is that the provision of
In construing the legislative intent we must look to the objective sought to be attained, the nature of the subject matter, the contextual setting, and all statutes in pari materia. The statute must be construed as a whole with reference to the system of which it is a part.
[Pfitzinger v. Bd. of Trustees, 62 N.J. Super. 589, 601 (Law Div. 1960)] It should not be construed so as to reach an absurd or anomalous result, but should receive a reasonable construction to serve apparent legislative purposes. State v. Brown, 22 N.J. 405 (1956); Davis v. Heil, 132 N.J. Super. 283 (App. Div. 1975), aff‘d 68 N.J. 423 (1975)
Considering the legislative history of Title 24, the court stated in State v. Di Luzio, 130 N.J. Super. 222 (Law Div. 1974):
The purposes behind granting a suspension of proceedings for certain first offenders charged with the use or possession of narcotics is to insure “that youthful offenders are not saddled with a lifetime arrest record” and to channel such offenders into appropriate treatment and supervisory programs. An intensified treatment program may be the best hope of combatting the drug problem. [at 228-229]
In light of these goals it would be absurd and anomalous to attribute to the Legislature the intent to place first offenders who are in possession of or under the influence of cocaine, opium and heroin, under supervisory treatment and not provide the same benefit to those whose first offense is marijuana.
This position is further supported by the language in
Whenever any person who has not previously been convicted of any offense under the provisions of this act, or, ... under any law of * * * this state * * * relating to * * * marijuana * * * is charged with or convicted of any offense under subsection 20a(1), (2) and (3) and b, the court may: (1) suspend further proceedings and * * * place [defendant] under supervisory treatment.
The inclusion of a marijuana conviction as a previous offense which denies a person the benefits of the suspension statute, clearly manifests the Legislature‘s intent to deal with the problem of first-offense marijuana use under the ambit of
The absence of subsection 20(a)(4) from the numerical reference in
There are no New Jersey cases on this point. However, in Ronson Patents Corp. v. Sparklets Devises, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Mo. 1951), and Fleming v. Salem Bros. Co., 38 F. Supp. 997 (D. Or. 1940), the courts concluded that a palable clerical error should not override obvious legislative intention. In construing a statute the court may correct such errors whenever necessary to carry out the intention of the legislature — the intent being gathered from the legislation as a whole in conjunction with the policy and spirit of the law as reflected in its legislative history. Where the legislative intent is clear, it must be given effect regardless of inaccuracies of language. Accordingly, the courts in these cases concluded that they had the authority to disregard and rectify numerical errors in statutes. See also 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 341-342; Black on Interpretation of Law (2 ed.) § 58; Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, § 319; State Prop. and Bldg. Comm‘n v. Hays, 346 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961).
Warren v. Marion Cty., 222 Or. 307, 353 P.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1960), deals specifically with the problem of inconsistent references caused by the numerical reorganization of amended statutes. In this case the Oregon Legislature enacted a statute with a numerical organizational scheme. An examination of the legislative history of this statute revealed that a clerical error was made in the course of amending. In that process, one of the sections of the statute was omitted and the remaining sections were then renumbered. However, the Legislature inadvertently neglected to amend a reference to this statute in a companion bill to reflect the altered numbering. The court determined that it had the authority to make the revision necessary to express the real legislative purpose.
Considering the above, this court concludes that the exclusion of subsection 20(a)(4) of