STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Corey Allen THIEL, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 41811.
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2015 Term.
Feb. 27, 2015.
343 P.3d 1110
working, Dr. Greenwald gave her a lifting restriction of 35 pounds. Dr. Greenwald‘s restrictions indicated that Shubert could still work in some capacity, which supports the Commission‘s finding that she “can still perform many jobs for which she is best suited.” Further, Shubert provided no testimony from a vocational expert stating how much of the labor market was no longer accessible to her. While Shubert relies on a vocational expert from the SSA‘s decision, that report was not in evidence before the Commission. She also did not provide evidence that clearly indicates a different disability rating. The Commission considered Shubert‘s physical impairment and non-medical factors, arriving at a 10% permanent disability rating based upon that information. The record contains evidence a reasonable mind would accept to support that decision. Thus, substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission‘s decision.
C. The Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied Shubert‘s motion for reconsideration.
Shubert also appeals the Commission‘s denial of her motion to reconsider. We review the Commission‘s decision to deny a motion for reconsideration using an abuse of discretion standard. Hope v. Indus. Special Indemn. Fund, 157 Idaho 567, 574, 338 P.3d 546, 553 (2014).
In its order denying reconsideration, the Commission reiterated that it found Dr. Greenwald persuasive, while recognizing Dr. Frizzell‘s opinion that Shubert was not medically stable in July of 2008. The Commission noted that it had considered the conflicting medical evidence, including Dr. Frizzell‘s recommendations and treatments. The Commission stated:
Dr. Greenwald provided thoughtful, diligent care over a significant period of time, much of which Claimant refused outright, or simply failed to follow through on. Dr. Greenwald‘s records and reasoning for Claimant‘s treatment and the date of medical stability were discussed below in the Commission‘s decision, and found persuasive. It is worth noting that although Dr. Frizzell did opine in July of 2008 that Claimant was not medically stable and was a candidate for a spinal stimulator trial, that trial, when conducted by Dr. Thompson, did nothing to alleviate Claimant‘s symptoms. Although Dr. Frizzell proposed yet more testing, we find, on balance, that Dr. Greenwald correctly found that further treatment/testing would not be efficacious.
The Commission noted that Shubert never provided expert testimony about a permanent disability rating beyond Dr. Greenwald‘s 5% permanent partial impairment rating, so she had not proven a higher rating.
Shubert did not present any legal basis to reverse the Commission‘s order. Indeed, the Commission‘s denial of Shubert‘s motion to reconsider simply articulated and bolsters the Commission‘s reasoning for the findings in its original decision. In short, the Commission found Dr. Greenwald persuasive, and Shubert did not provide evidence that could outweigh that credible opinion. Thus, we affirm the Commission‘s denial of Shubert‘s motion to reconsider.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the Industrial Commission‘s order and denial of Shubert‘s motion to reconsider. Costs to Respondents.
Justices EISMANN, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON concur.
Ada County Public Defender‘s Office, Boise, attorneys for respondent. Dylan J. Orton argued.
W. JONES, Justice.
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2011, Corey Thiel (Thiel) was charged by the State of Idaho (State) with felony domestic battery. Pursuant to an agreement with the State, Thiel pled guilty to an amended charge of misdemeanor domestic battery and was placed on supervised probation. Approximately one week after entry of this guilty plea, on February 29, 2012, Thiel was charged with a misdemeanor violation of a no-contact order for an incident that occurred while the battery charge was pending. On March 13, 2012, Thiel pled guilty to violating the no-contact order, and
Less than two months thereafter, on May 2, 2012, the State moved for the court to issue a bench warrant for Thiel‘s arrest based on probation violations. At a June 15, 2012 hearing on the State‘s motion, Thiel admitted the violations, specifically regarding his failure to appear for drug testing and for providing a diluted drug test. The court reinstated Thiel on probation. Approximately four months thereafter, the State moved for a second set of probation violations, alleging that Thiel failed to maintain contact with his assigned probation officer and also failed to provide documentation that he had completed the required domestic violence treatment. At a March 15, 2013 hearing on the State‘s motion, Thiel admitted the violations. The court revoked Thiel‘s probation and imposed his original sentence of 356 days, with a credit of 67 days. Thiel was taken into custody and began serving his sentence in the Ada County Jail.
On October 15, 2013, the Ada County Sheriff‘s Office submitted a letter to the magistrate court recommending that Thiel be granted an early release for good behavior pursuant to
On November 14, 2013, Thiel separately moved for his “immediate release” based on the Sheriff‘s letter. On November 15, 2013, the magistrate court denied this motion, writing, “I will not sign an order releasing an untreated, violent offender into the community. The Ada County Sheriff, if he believes he has the authority to do so, may release regardless of my [expressed] concerns for safety.” Thiel appealed this denial of his motion for release to the district court.
In its intermediate appellate capacity, and on an expedited basis, the district court reversed the magistrate court‘s decision, holding that where a county sheriff recommends an inmate be released pursuant to
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
- Whether
Idaho Code section 20-621 vests the magistrate court with the discretion to reject a sheriff‘s recommendation for an inmate‘s early release based on good behavior. - Whether
Idaho Code section 20-621 , if it provides no discretion to the magistrate court, violates separation of powers.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court exercises free review over questions of statutory interpretation and application. Flying Elk Inv., LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 15, 232 P.3d 330, 336 (2010) (citations omitted). On review, “[a]n unambiguous statute must be given its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning. Statutory provisions should not be read in isolation but instead are interpreted in the context of the entire document.” Id. “A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction.” Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 398, 111 P.3d 73, 83 (2005) (quotation omitted), rev‘d on other grounds by Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 152 Idaho 495, 272 P.3d 467 (2012). However, statutory language is not ambiguous “merely because the parties present differing interpretations to the court.” State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 274, 92 P.3d 521, 524 (2004) (citing Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992)). Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Eisenman, 153 Idaho 549, 552, 286 P.3d 185, 188 (2012).
V. ANALYSIS
A. Idaho Code section 20-621 plainly vests no discretion with the magistrate court.
The parties’ dispute centers on whether
Every person serving a jail sentence in a county jail in the state of Idaho who has a good record as a prisoner and who performs the tasks assigned him in an orderly and peaceable manner, shall upon the recommendation of the sheriff be allowed five (5) days off of each and every month of his sentence, by the magistrate judge.
The State argues that the statute unambiguously vests discretion with the magistrate court. Alternatively, the State asserts that the statute is ambiguous, pointing to the conflicting meanings of the terms “recommendation,” “allowed,” and “shall” as support. In applying the plain and ordinary meanings of these terms, the State describes a “recommendation” as “a suggestion which may or may not be followed, rather than a mandatory directive,” and as an “action which is advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect.” As to the legislature‘s use of “be allowed,” the State asserts that the phrase connotes “permission or eligibility,” but does not mandate or direct acceptance. Thus, in parsing the language, the State argues that while the statute provides county sheriffs with the authority to recommend early releases under certain circumstances, it does not expressly bind or require magistrate courts to follow said recommendations. The State contends that if the legislature intended to bind the court to these recommendations, it would have made its intention clear by expressly stating “shall release” or “shall follow the recommendation for release.”
The State also advances certain policy arguments in support of its position, specifically that there is “no oversight or review” of a sheriff‘s determination that an inmate has complied with the statute. For example, in the letter recommending Thiel‘s early release, the Ada County Sheriff‘s Office quoted the relevant language from the statute, but provided no documentation or support evidencing that Thiel‘s custodial time qualified as good and peaceable. Lastly, the State contends that an interpretation of the statute offering no judicial discretion or review endangers certain rights held by Idaho crime victims pursuant to
Thiel argues that the statute is plainly worded and unambiguous, and asserts that
” ‘The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.’ ” State v. Doe, 156 Idaho 243, 246, 322 P.3d 976, 979 (2014) (quoting State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007)). “The interpretation of a statute ‘must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.’ ” Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg‘l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003)). Thus, this Court‘s role is typically limited to “appl[ying] the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms and, where possible, [giving effect to each and] every word, clause and sentence.” Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003).
Following the plain language of
The Court‘s precedent with this statute supports this reading. Without expressly stating that the magistrate court lacks discretion, the Court previously held that the statute at issue vests authority with law enforcement to determine whether an inmate qualifies for early release under the statute. See State v. Hughes, 102 Idaho 703, 639 P.2d 1 (1981). The Hughes Court held that under
“If [a] statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.” Schwartz, 139 Idaho at 362, 79 P.3d at 721. “We have consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.” City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993).
The State relies on statutory construction to support its argument that there is uncertainty regarding the magistrate court‘s role in the good-time early release process. Specifically, the State contends that the legislature would not have included the magistrate judge in the statute if it did not intend for the court to have some discretion in the matter. This argument is unavailing. While the magistrate judge is certainly included in the statutory scheme, the statute vests no discretion with the judge. Rather, the magistrate judge‘s designated role is a ministerial one. Under the statute, if a sheriff finds that an inmate in county jail has a good custodial record and has performed the tasks assigned in an orderly and peaceable manner, and the sheriff so recommends, the magistrate judge is required to commute five days off of each and every month of the inmate‘s sentence. The magistrate court is included in the process for procedural clean-up reasons; more plainly, for purposes of administrative record-keeping and finality, as well as serving as a potential mechanism for providing crime victims with notice of the act of release, there must be some official court record memorializing early releases.
Beyond the statute at issue, the State argues that if
The statutes at issue here can easily be harmonized, as there is no apparent conflict between the good-time early release statute and the Victims’ Rights Act. The Victims’ Rights Act states that a crime victim is entitled to be notified of any proceeding related to a defendant‘s release, as well as when a defendant is actually released.
The Victims’ Rights Act gives crime victims a voice in proceedings related to pleas, sentencing, incarceration, probation, or release. However, an impact can only be had in proceedings where judicial discretion is involved. The Victims’ Rights Act creates a right to be heard at proceedings “considering” a defendant‘s possible release, which connotes the exercise of discretion. As stated above, the good-time early release process involves no exercise of judicial discretion. Since the court has no discretion in the process outlined in
For all of these reasons, this Court holds that the respective roles and duties of the sheriff and magistrate court in the early release process outlined in
B. Idaho Code section 20-621 does not violate separation of powers.
If the statute is held to vest no discretion with the magistrate court, the State argues that it violates the Idaho Constitution by improperly divesting sentencing authority from the judiciary. For the reasons outlined below, this argument fails.
The Idaho Constitution prohibits any branch of government from exercising powers that properly belong to another branch, unless expressly directed or permitted by the State Constitution.
“[T]he powers reserved to the several departments of the government, but not specifically enumerated in the [C]onstitution, must be defined in the context of the common law.” State v. Branson, 128 Idaho 790, 792, 919 P.2d 319, 321 (1996).
It was early held by this [C]ourt that the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties belongs to the legislative department of government; that the power to try offenders, and to enter judgment convicting and sentencing those found guilty, belongs to the judicial department; [and] that the power and prerogative of granting pardons, paroles or commutations belong to the executive department. Spanton v. Clapp, 78 Idaho 234, 237, 299 P.2d 1103, 1104 (1956).
The statute at issue in this case,
In arguing that the statute improperly divests sentencing authority from the judiciary, the State relies on this Court‘s holding and rationale in State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971). McCoy involved an attempt by the legislature to establish, by statute, a mandatory minimum sentencing scheme. The McCoy Court struck down the statute based on the judiciary‘s common law authority to suspend a sentence. The Court in State v. Branson explained the McCoy holding as follows: “[T]he [common law] authority possessed by the courts to sentence necessarily included the power to suspend that sentence, [thus] this power may not properly be abrogated by statute. It is an ‘inherent right’ of the judiciary and one which the separation of powers doctrine places beyond legislative mandate.” Branson, 128 Idaho at 792, 919 P.2d at 321. Thus, the McCoy Court held that the legislature could not enact a mandatory minimum sentence absent a constitutional amendment, given that “the judiciary possessed the power at common law to suspend a sentence” and a mandatory minimum sentence interferes with this power. McCoy, 94 Idaho at 240, 486 P.2d at 251.
In response to the Court‘s holding in McCoy, the legislature proposed and the people adopted an amendment to Article V, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.
The facts presented in this case are not the same as those in McCoy. The Court‘s holding in McCoy was premised on courts possessing, at common law, the power to suspend a sentence. However, a suspension is not the same as a commutation. For one, “[a] commutation diminishes the severity of a sentence, e.g. shortens the term of punishment,” while a suspension delays the entry of a sentence. Standlee v. State, 96 Idaho 849, 852, 538 P.2d 778, 781 (1975). More importantly, whereas the authority to suspend a sentence rests with the judiciary at common law, courts do not similarly possess the power at common law to commute a sentence. A commutation is inherently a creature of the executive branch. For these reasons, the State‘s reliance on McCoy is misplaced.
The legislature has the constitutional authority to identify and define criminal acts, as well as the power to prescribe penalties for these crimes. If it has the power to do these things, it surely has the power to enact a targeted early-release scheme to lessen the penalties for these crimes. Furthermore, the legislature has the authority to delegate the good-behavior determination to an executive branch agency. Thus, the good-time early release program contained in
VI. CONCLUSION
This Court affirms the judgment of the district court that the statute vests no discretion with the magistrate judge. Further, this Court holds that the statute itself does not violate separation of powers principles under the Idaho Constitution.
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices EISMANN, J. JONES, and Justice Pro tem KIDWELL concur.
343 P.3d 1119
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Matthew James GONZALES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 40038.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Feb. 17, 2015.