State v. CoonState v. Coon
{¶ 1} Charles E. Coon appeals the entry of the Jackson County Municipal Court overruling his motion for a new trial pursuant to
I.
{¶ 2} On April 19, 2002, Ohio State Highway Patrol Lieutenant Pride stopped Coon‘s automobile after observing that its tires extended much wider than the bumpers on the vehicle. Lt. Pride cited Coon for a violating
{¶ 3}
{¶ 4} The Jackson County Municipal Court conducted a bench trial regarding the seat belt and bumper height violations on November 12, 2002. Finding that the statute did not define the term “wheel track distance“, the court looked to the plain meaning of the term. The court found: “In the dictionary, a wheel is the solid disk that a tire is placed on. The track is the mark the tire would make when on the wheel. Distance is the space between two points. Here the two points are the outside of the track on the tire on the wheel. If the distance between the outside point on each tire is greater than the length of the bumper then the Defendant would be in violation of the code.” Based upon this definition of “wheel track distance” and the evidence presented, the trial court found Coon guilty of the bumper violation. On November 19, 2002, the court imposed a fine of one hundred dollars and ordered Coon to pay costs within one month.
{¶ 5} Coon appealed his conviction to this court. See State v. Coon (Apr. 22, 2003), Jackson App. No. 02CA20 (”Coon I“). However, upon finding that Coon paid his fine and costs in full, and that he failed to offer any evidence that he would suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil rights from such a judgment or conviction, we dismissed his appeal as moot.
{¶ 6} On March 17, 2004, Coon moved the trial court for a new trial pursuant to
{¶ 7} Specifically, Coon argued that at the time of his conviction,
{¶ 8} Additionally, Coon asserted that, although he filed his motion for a new trial more than fourteen days after the trial court rendered its decision, it was timely filed. He claimed that the delay in filing was excusable because he was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion “due to the difficulty in obtaining the necessary updates from the Ohio Department of Public Safety.”
{¶ 9} The trial court denied Coon‘s motion on May 26, 2004, noting that it made no finding that Coon was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion, and that his motion was untimely filed more than fourteen days after the trial court‘s November 14, 2002 decision.
{¶ 10} Coon appeals, raising the following assignment of error: “The Court abused its discretion in denying the Motion for a New Trial without an evidentiary hearing, and did not provide a valid basis for overruling the Motion.” Additionally, on November 12, 2004, Coon filed a motion for sanctions, noting that the State failed to timely file its brief or to comply with our August 10, 2004 entry ordering it to file a brief within twenty days of the entry.
II.
{¶ 11} In his sole assignment of error, Coon contends that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his motion for a new trial on the ground that his motion was untimely filed pursuant to
{¶ 12} In contrast, the State argues that even if the trial court were to determine that Coon was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion until the director of public safety amended
{¶ 13} As we noted in Coon‘s prior appeal, “[w]hen a defendant convicted of a criminal offense has voluntarily paid the fine or completed the sentence, an appeal is moot when no evidence is offered from which an inference can be drawn that the defendant will suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil rights from such a judgment or conviction.” Coon I at 2, citing State v. Berndt (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 3. See, also, State v. Wilson (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 236; Rocky River v. Kline (Sept. 6, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 77057; State v. Pickens (Aug. 1, 2001), Wayne App. No. 01 CA 0003. Having found that Coon already paid his fine and costs in full, failed to request a stay, and failed to offer any evidence that he would suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil rights from his conviction, we dismissed his previous appeal as moot. Coon I at 2.
{¶ 14} Now, Coon appeals the trial court‘s denial of his request for a new trial. Again, we note Coon has paid his fine and costs in full, and he has failed to offer any evidence that he will suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil rights from his conviction. Accordingly, we find that we must dismiss his appeal as moot. See Cleveland v. Beck (Nov. 24, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 64182. However, even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Coon‘s appeal was not moot, he could not prevail.
{¶ 15} We will not disturb a trial court‘s decision granting or denying a
{¶ 16} We have applied the abuse of discretion standard of review to
{¶ 17} Here,
{¶ 18} Coon claims that he was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion within fourteen days of the trial court‘s decision because it took time to get the director of public safety to amend
III.
{¶ 19} In his November 12, 2004 motion for sanctions, Coon notes that the State failed to timely file its brief in the instant appeal. Coon also notes that the State then failed to abide by our August 10, 2004 entry, wherein we sanctioned the State by denying it oral argument in this action, and further ordered the State to file its brief within twenty days of that entry. The State ultimately filed a motion to file its brief instanter accompanied by its brief on November 30, 2004, and we approved the filing of the State‘s brief by an entry dated December 9, 2004. Because Coon failed to allege that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the State‘s conduct, we overrule his motion and decline to order further sanctions.
IV.
{¶ 20} Because we find that Coon has paid his fine and costs in full, and he has failed to offer any evidence that he will suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil rights from his conviction, we find his appeal moot and dismiss it. Furthermore, even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Coon‘s appeal is not moot, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that his motion was not timely filed. Additionally, because we find that Coon failed to allege that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the State‘s failure to file its brief in accordance with our order, we overrule his motion for sanctions.
Appeal Dismissed.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the APPEAL BE DISMISSED and that Appellee shall recover of Appellant costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Jackson County Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Exceptions.
Abele, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion. McFarland, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.