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State v. Cook
332 S.E.2d 147
W. Va.
1985
Check Treatment

*1 job left alone to do their without interfer- part petitioner. is, duct on the It judiciary ence from those of us therefore, who only our conclusion that not expertise insight have neither the nor the complained the action justified, may it to evaluate their decisions. well have only appropriate been the re- sponse University. available to the Mr. North asserts that he has competent shown himself to be a student Accordingly, for the. reasons set forth person and a who will competent prac be a above, judgment of the Circuit Court of titioner of medicine. But he has also County Kanawha is affirmed. capacity shown substantial for fraud and Affirmed. deceit a carefully plan contrived to cheat way into medical school in the first instance. practice of medicine is not a

simple application matter of routine of sci principles

entific relating physiology,

pharmacology, pathology or surgery. even

Physicians only must not technically

competent, but possess must also 332 S.E.2d 147 surpassing degree of ethical commitment Virginia STATE of West and a sense decency. of human On the record, any person reasonable would be justified in having reservations about Theodore Thomas COOK. whether Mr. possesses North sufficient No. 16183. character to practice allow him to medicine without subjecting public potential Supreme Court Appeals unethical conduct. See W.Va.Code 30-3- license commits fraud in 14(c) [1980] may which be denied to its provides procurement. any person that a medical who Submitted Jan. Decided June West Virginia. 1985. 1985. Dissenting Opinion July 1985.

Although we have disparaged Mr. arguments, North’s nothing we have but

surpassing admiration for Mr. North’s

counsel, Heiskell, Edgar Mr. F. who has

doggedly, diligently, skillfully kept Mr. fact,

North’s case alive since 1977. In Mr.

Heiskell, points, at accomplished almost finally, given

miracle. But the amount money Virginia the State of West has

spent education, on Mr. North’s reluctant-

ly, we find we must affirm the circuit

court, equally thorough job which did an

reviewing this case. Judge John-

son, speaking for our Court Landeman al., Beardsley & et Wilson 29 W.Va. observed that anis all- “[f]raud vice,

pervading and whatever it touches throughout.

taints Part can not be bad good.

and the rest It is all bad.” That today

observation is as true as it was near-

ly years ago; any one hundred action University

the President of the or the Regents, expulsion,

Board of short of

would necessarily have constituted some

degree of reward for fraudulent miscon- *5 Gen., III, Stanton, Atty. Asst.

George P. Charleston, appellee. for Kauffelt, Ben- and James T.D. Kauffelt Charleston, appellant. for Snyder, N. jamin intoxicated, muttered, McGRAW, extremely “I then Justice: you going appel- think to rob me.” appeals Cook from a Thomas Theodore lant that this statement was not testified the Circuit Court of Kanawha order of final that Frye made. further testified Richie 4, 1983, May which con- County entered and the then exited vehicle appellant degree of first mur- his conviction firmed began wrestling appel- around. mercy der a recommendation of without merely he left the truck lant testified that penitentia- him to life in sentenced himself, Frye to relieve and that followed. ry. assignments numerous He advances got any event, two men out of after the assertedly warranting his reversal of error truck, up a picked peen Price ball Mark Disposition of a few of these conviction. got hammer the backseat and out. from assignments unnecessary renders address- Therefore, Richie, appellant ing assignments. after the According other follow- ing Frye, discussion of the circumstances his a brief subdued the much smaller broth- conviction, resulting we address his will er beat him death with the hammer. assignments. According each of the relevant appellant, after he had himself, around relieved he turned to see May Roy met On striking Frye Mark in the head with the appellant’s Frye near the at a tavern home testified, hammer. individuals Both how- drinks, sharing in Madison. After a few ever, Frye’s then took Frye purchase expressed a desire some pocket checkbook wallet from marijuana. suggestion, At the Mark’s and returned to the instruction Frye’s two men left truck for Mark, truck truck with who drove the over home of Mark Price order to secure this Frye’s body they dying dead or were arrived, purchase. When indi- Price leaving. cated that he believed friend lived who nearby might marijuana have some After men left dining, the three Charles- *6 men, along three Mark’s sale. These with Frye’s ton in headed for truck and Cleve- brother, Price, younger Richie juvenile, a land, They stopped Ohio. and rested brief- house, went to this friend’s but discovered motel, ly paying a Ripley their bill The entourage that he was not there. then Frye’s with one checks. After their Van, went to another tavern in order to departure Ripley, their way from on to return, Frye await this friend’s where Cleveland, by stopped Mark was an Ohio beer, bought group including some a police being clocked at eighty- officer after departure pack upon again six their to Although per four miles hour. the officer Mark’s friend. search for ascertained none of the vehicle’s occu- truck, pants incredibly, he only owned the friend, failing to locate

After Mark’s required hand his Whitesville, Mark to over driver’s a group first went to bar in license, they continued to beer, after which on Frye purchased a case where store, Cleveland. liquor purchased then a where he liquor Apparently, and mixers. the other Cleveland, Once Mark sold truck tried, men also on occasions various a man for one hundred dollars to he had afternoon, throughout the cash some bar, and, appellant, along met in a with the checks, Frye’s consent, his with in order to checkbook, using Frye’s attempted to

purchase marijuana. more alcohol Frye’s transfer funds from bank Dan- travels, the course of their Richie served as May ville to bank in Cleveland. On bartender, according testimony, employee, who Danville bank by Frye’s instructed his brother to mix death, Frye’s Virgi- aware of notified West stronger” the oth- drinks “a little bit than nia authorities that the Cleveland bank had ers. telephoned Frye’s verify account.

Eventually, Cleveland were immediately Mark drove to a deserted authorities no- Capitol suspects near the State tified the three men were road Charleston. Frye. day, At the murder Later that point, begins to con- Cleve- Richie, According given land Frye, suspects’ flict. who was authorities were descriptions and the supra; Syl. pt. Hawkins, full names and identi- fication of the warrants for their numbers 280 S.E.2d 222 frequented Upon checking Craft, supra; Syl. pt. arrest. a hotel transients, case, by police Duvemoy, supra. Cleveland discovered In the instant appeared critical fact knowledge that Mark Price’s name on the within the of the arresting register. guided appel- hotel clerk officers at the time of the hotel lant’s arrest was that the police description room and Price’s unlocked the men, appellant, Frye who had been seen sleeping, door. The three who were with on death, prior the afternoon to his forwarded offered no resistance as were then authorities, along Charleston with arrested. name and warrant identifi- Although neither Mark nor Richie Price number, cation matched a Cleveland bank speak police would with Charleston after employee’s description of one of the men their arrival in Cleveland in early morn- attempted who had to transfer funds from ing May 23, 1981, hours of appellant Frye’s Virginia West bank account two speak indicated that he would with the days fact, Frye’s after along death. This concerning officers the crime. His state- with the additional circumstance of the de- substantially ment corresponded to the tes- Price, scription of Mark who had been seen Price, timony of Richie with the notable accompanying Frye and appellant on exceptions Frye of his during restraint of prior death, the afternoon to his forwarded killing Frye’s statement that he authorities, along Charleston with believed that he was about to be robbed. Price’s name and warrant identification number, matching employ- the same bank I description ee’s of the other man had who challenges first attempted Frye’s to transfer funds from validity of the warrant issued for his ar account, provided arresting officers note, however, officer, rest. We that “An ample probable with cause to believe that authority peace, with may, conserve the an offense had been committed and that warrant, any person without a arrest who had been involved in its com- he, cause, upon probable believes has com mission. appel- We therefore hold that the mitted or committing felony, though it illegal. lant’s arrest was not appears afterwards felony that no was ac *7 II 2, tually perpetrated.” Syl. pt. State v. 578,

Duvernoy, assignment The next 156 W.Va. 195 S.E.2d 631 (1973); 2, of error is the Syl. pt. Drake, trial court’s see also v. admission State 169, certain evidence (1982); 170 seized from the hotel room Syl. W.Va. 291 S.E.2d 484 pursuant 1, to searches pt. 58, conducted without a Sprouse, State 171 v. W.Va. 297 warrant. respect With to warrantless (1982); 6, Syl. pt. S.E.2d 833 Craft, State v. searches, this in Syllabus Court noted Point 741, (1980). 165 W.Va. 272 S.E.2d 46 The Moore, 837, 1 of v. 165 272 State W.Va. determining standard for the existence of (1980), that: probable cause to make a warrantless ar Syllabus rest is set forth in Point 1 judicial of State Searches conducted outside the Plantz, 24, v. process, prior approval 155 W.Va. 180 S.E.2d 614 without by judge that, provides which magistrate, per “Probable are se unreasonable cause to make an a arrest without warrant under the Fourth Amendment and Arti- III, exists when the Virginia facts and circumstances cle Section 6 of the West knowledge arresting within the subject only spe- of the offi to a few Constitution — prudent cers are sufficient cifically to warrant a established and well-delineated believing man in exceptions. that an has exceptions jealously offense been 3, drawn, committed.” Syl. pt. carefully See also v. and State and there must be a Boswell, (W.Va.1982); Syl. showing by exemption 294 S.E.2d 287 those who seek 2, pt. Meadows, exigencies State v. 292 S.E.2d 50 that the of the situation made (W.Va.1982); 2, Syl. pt. Drake, imperative. v. that course State

192 Meadows, of crime.” 3, strumentalities evidence Syl. pt. v. su- State also See 3, Syllabus part, v. Weigand, 169 Point State Thom- pt. v. Syl. State pra; 1, 640, (1974). 1, 445 (1982); as, 739, Syl. pt. 157 W.Va. 203 S.E.2d 289 508 S.E.2d W.Va. 772, Cain, 169 W.Va. 289 S.E.2d v. State Boswell, 2, pt. supra; Syl. State v. See also 1, Syl. v. 167 (1982); pt. Farley, State 488 428, 4, Buck, 170 W.Va. Syl. pt. v. State 620, fur- 280 234 We S.E.2d W.Va. (1982); v. Syl., 294 281 State Han S.E.2d noted, 2 Point v. Syllabus ther State 354, 157 shaw, W.Va. 294 S.E.2d 170 Moore, supra, “The burden rests on Vance, 168 W.Va. Syl. pt. v. State preponderance of the by to show a State (1981); Syl. pt. v. 285 437 State S.E.2d search falls evidence the warrantless supra. The rationale this ex Farley, exception.” an authorized See also within ception requirement is that: to the warrant Meadows, Syl. pt. supra; Where, once an otherwise lawful search supra. v. The State pt. Farley, State inadvertently police progress, is in challenged sei- argues that the search and evidence, piece upon come would proper under the “incident to a zure .was inconvenience, a needless and often be “plain exceptions arrest” view” valid and dangerous the evidence or sometimes —to requirement. the search warrant police require to the themselves—to ignore it until have obtained them Syllabus Point 6 of v. State describing particularly it. warrant held, Moore, following supra, this Court 395 U.S. 89 California, v. Chimel 403 at Coolidge Hampshire, v. New U.S. (1969),that, 685 “A L.Ed.2d 467-68, S.Ct. at L.Ed.2d at 584. 91 S.Ct. person and the warrantless search case, present arresting In the when physi geographic immediate area under his entered hotel room unan- officers is to a cal control authorized as incident drawn, shotguns appel- nounced with arrest.” also v. valid See State sleeping lant the Price brothers were and Hodges, S.E.2d no together. They bed offered resist- (1983); Syl. pt. 3, Drake, supra. v. State complied ance with the officers’ order exception rationale for the war this Each searched next to “freeze.” man was requirement rant is that search of bed, Mark immediately physical limited area under the handcuffed. The officers then Price were “necessary person control of an arrested area around and searched immediate might used weapons to uncover bed, seizing some underneath items of prevent against arresting officer clothing. completed, After this one of par destruction evidence arrested began examining the officers items located Moore, ty.” v. 165 W.Va. some from the on a dresser distance bed. Point Syllabus at 813. In 7 of times address One of these was an book Moore, supra, following Coolidge which, upon inspection, closer was ascer- Hampshire, 403 U.S. 91 S.Ct. New belong Roy tained officer to *8 held this L.Ed.2d 564 Court Frye. the address book on the Under that: also, upon was a checkbook which dresser inspection, belong was plain A closer ascertained property warrantless search of later, Roy Frye. Two minutes constitutionally permissible pro- to three view scene, “(1) three after the officers secured the requirements vided met: had investigations arrived to police observe the in scientific unit must evidence Although sight “process” the hotel plain without benefit a search room. ex- were still invading one’s reasonable Price brothers [without arrived, (2) they privacy], police must in the room when unit pectation this began its legal right they are were escorted out have a be where before sight premises. This unit seized plain observa- search of the when make and, (3) checkbook police proba- must book and the tion have address and its of the room con- photographs ble cause that evidence took believe fruits, in- seen constitutes contraband tents.

Unquestionably, arresting days. offi duct a search that lasted four Court, refusing recognize top cer’s search of the of the dresser was a “murder amendment, scope geo exception” outside the scene to the fourth the immediate stated graphic physical area under the that: control of Furthermore,

the three arrestees. the ad There was no that indication evidence dress book and the checkbook offered no lost, destroyed, would be or removed dur- immediately apparent evidence of criminal ing required the time to obtain a search case, activity. strikingly In a Indeed, similar police guard warrant. at the Circuit, in Second United States v. Beren apartment minimized that possibility. (2d Cir.1977), 562 F.2d guer, suggestion 210-11 And there is no that a search held that seizure of top easily a billfold from the warrant could not and convenient- justified ly of a bureau was not under either have been obtained.

the “incident to a “plain valid arrest” or 437 U.S. at 98 S.Ct. at 57 L.Ed.2d where, exceptions although view” the de Similarly, case, at 301. present room, fendant was in the same he was there was no excuse for the failure to companion shackled to a on a bed and the prior obtain a warrant to the search of the reach, and, clearly billfold was out of his by group motel room the second of officers although large the billfold contained de premises after had been secured. currency, apparent nomination this was not Thus, the State failed to meet its burden until after the billfold itself had been Syllabus under Points 1 and 2 of case, present searched. In the where the Moore, show, supra, by preponderance arrestees, handcuffed, three two of them evidence, of the exigencies that the of the apparently were seated on a bed one with situation with which the officers were con- shotguns pointed them, or more the ar fronted made the course of action taken resting officer’s top search of the Therefore, imperative. the evidence seized dresser outside of the area of physical their by officers, group including the second clearly control unnecessary under ei checkbook, the address book and the ther the safety protec law enforcement illegally obtained and should not have been tion of evidence rationales for both the appellant’s admitted at the trial. “plain “incident to a valid arrest” and Ill Furthermore,

view” doctrines. the address assign next book and the obviously checkbook were ment of error involves the admission of weapons and offered no indicia of owner evidence seized from Mark Price at the ship. time of his He arrest. concedes that he evidence, The seizure of along standing challenge lacks the constitu photographs with the taken of the room See, tionality of the search of Price. e.g., contents, and its complicated was further Tadder, pt. the fact that it was executed a sec maintains, 313 S.E.2d 667 He how group began

ond ever, of officers who conduct the existence of items taken ing their search after arrestees were possession from the victim in the of Price premises. removed from the On cross-ex was irrelevant to the issue of his involve amination, arresting homicide, robbery officer admitted at ment either in the or the and, therefore, suppression hearing the room these items should not have could have been secured and a respect warrant been admitted. With to the admis *9 prior obtained by sibility generally, the search and seizure of this evidence Court group that, consistently this second of re “The action of a officers. this has held spect, the admitting excluding instant case bears in evi resemblance trial court the circumstances involved in in of its discretion Mincey v. dence the exercise will Arizona, 385, 2408, by appellate 437 U.S. 98 S.Ct. 57 not be disturbed the court (1978), arresting appears L.Ed.2d 290 where it that such action offi unless amounts 10, Syl. pt. cers secured the scene of a homicide until to an abuse of discretion.” 55, ten 141 Huffman, detectives arrived minutes later to con- v. W.Va. 87 S.E.2d State 194 2, 411, (1981). v. W.Va. 545 Further- State Syl. 280 S.E.2d see also (1955); pt. 541 317, more, proof of respect with the burden Peyatt, 173 S.E.2d 574 315 W.Va. issue, Syllabus in this Court held Kopa, v. 6, 173 on this State (1983); Syl. pt. W.Va. Starr, 905, v. 4, 158 W.Va. State (1983); pt. of State 43, Syl. Point 5 412 311 S.E.2d that, 640, “The State 600 216 S.E.2d 242 Ashcraft, 172 309 S.E.2d v. W.Va. Oldaker, of prove, preponderance least v. (1983); pt. 3, 172 must at State Syl. evidence, 3, (1983); Syl. confessions or state- 258, pt. 843 the 304

W.Va. S.E.2d Louk, 639, which amount to ad- 301 ments of an accused State v. 171 W.Va. S.E.2d Rector, v. 2, part on or all of an offense were State (1983); Syl. 167 missions pt. 596 into 748, (1981). voluntary may before such be admitted 597 In a W.Va. 280 S.E.2d also See degree case.” murder and the evidence of a criminal prosecution for first 456, State, Hilliard, 1, court in Hall v. State v. Syl. 173 W.Va. battery, pt. the sexual Wilson, v. (1983); Syl., State (Fla.1979), 35 683, held that 318 S.E.2d 381 690 So.2d (1982); 443, Syl. 294 S.E.2d 296 comparisons between the hair of 170 W.Va. results of 556, Williams, State v. pt. 171 W.Va. accomplice specimens discovered on and 1, 1, v. (1983); Syl. pt. State the 301 S.E.2d 187 body of the victim were relevant to Woods, 767, 169 289 S.E.2d 500 guilt evidence in- W.Va. defendant’s because the Mitter, 1, State v. (1982); 169 Syl. pt. indicated that accom- troduced trial 652, (1982); together Syl., on W.Va. 289 S.E.2d 457 plice and the defendant were 719, Sprouse, v. 169 289 Sim- State W.Va. night question. of murders in Per evidence, (1982); pt. 3, State v. action, Syl. present S.E.2d 228 ilarly, in the Price, 121, singer, 169 W.Va. 286 S.E.2d 261 Richie particularly the of Vance, v. (1982); 1, State Syl. pt. 162 appellant clearly that the demonstrated 467, (1978). Ulti- W.Va. 250 S.E.2d 146 together night of Mark Price were on however, mately, recognized Furthermore, this Court death. the evi- victim’s Vance, State v. su in Syllabus Point 3 Price, impli- Mark which dence seized from pra, “A trial court’s decision regarding death, in Frye’s cated him was consistent will voluntariness of a confession appellant’s theory that with the he wrong plainly disturbed unless bystander more or less an innocent weight clearly against the evidence.” killing. We therefore conclude that Taylor, 174 1, v. Syl. See also State pt. trial did not abuse its discretion court 225, (1984); 4, Syl. pt. W.Va. 324 S.E.2d 367 person admitting evidence seized from Cheshire, 123, v. State 173 W.Va. 313 of Mark Price. Cecil, (1984); 4, State v. Syl. pt. S.E.2d 61 IV 27, (1983); Syl. W.Va. 311 S.E.2d 144 173 Gwinn, 2, 456, State v. pt. 288 169 W.Va. challenges next (1982); pt. 3, State v. Good Syl. 533 S.E.2d finding capable court’s that he was mon, 123, (1981); 170 W.Va. 290 S.E.2d 260 intelligently waiving his constitutional Vance, 666, State v. Syl. pt. 168 W.Va. rights making police before statement (1981); v. State Syl. pt. S.E.2d 437 285 correctly he shortly after his arrest. As Lamp, 163 254 W.Va. S.E.2d 697 notes, 1 of Syllabus this Court held Point Hamrick, 236 160 W.Va. Unquestionably, the evidence submitted (1977), that, elicit S.E.2d 247 “Confessions clearly intel- demonstrated ed from law enforcement authorities tests, deficiency. Three lectual batteries persons suspected who because of crimes two administered connection with knowledgeably of mental condition cannot proceeding, produced full in- criminal scale intelligently right 42, 48, waive coun their telligence quotient scores of are inadmissible.” See also sel range placing of mod- Jackson, State v. Furthermore, 298 erate mental retardation. Ad (1982); pt. 4, State v. Syl. appellant, the evidence indicated that kins, years 170 W.Va. time twenty-six S.E.2d old at arrest, Kelley, completed grade, is pt. 168 W.Va. never the fourth illiterate, (1981); Syl. functionally pt. has considerable Boyd, meeting difficulty the normal demands 167 W.Va. 280 S.E.2d *10 hand, Daggett, pt. 5, everyday of life. On the other the State v. married, possessed had been a V license, driver’s suffers from no mental appellant assigns The error as the trial disease, previous experience had with law permit court’s to the refusal of Price, pursuant prior to appeal enforcement officials a Mark Price. of mur- whose a pending arrest, der conviction was at the time of drug and that indicated he under- trial, appellant’s consented, the against had possible stood the seriousness and conse- counsel, ques- the advice of to answer two against quences charges of the Addi- him. tions as follows: allegation tionally, police there is no of Q. Jeep parked While the at Hill- deception the largely or coercion and excul- Drive, any crest Roy at time did patory given character of the statement say, Frye you “I going think supports trial the court’s conclusion that rob me.” meaning the understood “the and A. No. any effect of or admission confessions or Q. any Did at Theodore Cook time other against statement his own interests.” initially helping Roy than Frye out Jeep of grab, the vehicle ever hold trial court’s of evaluation the onto, any way Roy restrain conflicting evidence was both well-reasoned Frye? considering thorough, only and not the his A. No. presented, toric and scientific evidence but attorney that, Price’s indicated after an- appellant’s also demeanor and conduct swering questions, these two Price would Adkins, in the courtroom. In invoke his privilege fifth amendment 54, W.Va. at at S.E.2d we held against self-incrimination and refuse to an- that: any questions. spite swer further In of the person less of than normal [W]here exculpatory corroboratory and of nature intelligence does capacity not have the this testimony, trial court sustained meaning understand the and effect his prosecutor’s objection calling confession, and such lack of capacity is Price as a witness because the denial of shown suppression evidence at the be cross-examination “would unfair to the hearing, it is error the trial judge not prosecution.” However, suppress the confession. The trial ruling court’s failed to where the lower defendant’s than normal take into account extent to which the intelligence is not clearly shown testimony of Price would have his waived such impair capacity as would his to un- privilege against self-incrimination. meaning and derstand the effect his States, Brown v. United 356 U.S. confession, said intelli- lower than normal 155-56, 626-27, 78 S.Ct. 2 L.Ed.2d gence is but one factor be considered the Court noted: judge weighing totality testifies, voluntarily a witness [W]hen surrounding of the against circumstances privilege self-incrimination is amply challenged respected accept- need of confession. without ing testimony antiseptic freed from the Adkins, inAs State 170 W.Va. at adversary process. test of the wit- at full where the defendant’s ness, himself, if certainly party, he is a intelligence quotient scale score was determines area of and disclosure Cheshire, 173 W.Va. at inquiry. therefore of has Such witness 313 S.E.2d at the defendant’s where choice, weighing advantage after scores were we conclude against privilege self-incrimination ruling judge’s ques- that the trial on this against advantage putting for- tion, average below ward his facts his version intelligence impair capacity did not witness, reliability testify not meaning understand the of his effect reasonably He claim all. cannot confession, clearly against not gives only Fifth him Amendment weight presented plainly but, of the evidence if he testify, choice elects to (cid:127) wrong. immunity from cross-examination on *11 196 activity while put dispute. concerning It himself he has

matters deserted road. parked on the the truck was Fifth Amendment of the would make 367, States, 340 U.S. Rogers v. United See safeguard against judi- only a humane 344, 438, 440-41, 371, L.Ed. 348 71 95 S.Ct. posi- but a self-disclosure cially coerced (1951) [“[Tjhe of this Court decisions the truth a to mutilate invitation tive against holding privilege explicit in that hardly “[Tjhere is to party offers tell. solely for the benefit ‘is self-incrimination letting af- the defendant justification witness,’ personal purely ‘is of firmatively perjurious testimo- resort to witness,’ ... a refusal privilege of the dis- ny in reliance on the Government’s justified by a desire cannot be answer challenge credibility.” ability to his punishment....” from protect others 65, States, 62, U.S. 347 v. United Walder Furthermore, omitted) (Footnotes ]. 356, 503, 354, 507 98 L.Ed. 74 S.Ct. scope of respect general rules with (1954). party of the other The interests applica- have been cross-examination would of courts of regard for the function ble: rel- the truth become justice to ascertain to cross-ex- rules exist as Several basic evant, con- in the prevail balance is that of a The first amination witness. scope determining the siderations is coex- scope of cross-examination against self-incrim- privilege limits of the with, by, the material and limited tensive ination. given direct examination. evidence on privilege analyzing scope In may a witness also be The second self-incrimination, against this Court stated affecting matters cross-examined about 40, 51-52, Burton, 163 W.Va. v. credibility. “credibility” in- his The term (1979), that: 137 254 interest and bias the wit- cludes the uniformly recognized that It is rather ness, statements made inconsistent against ex- privilege self-incrimination and to a certain extent the witness which, questions only to those tends not rule is that witness’ character. third answered, support in themselves if would judge has discretion as to the trial conviction, but also those disclosures extent of cross-examination. a link in the chain of might furnish Richey, 171 v. lead to evidence which could evidence or (1982). prosecution. used in the criminal be acknowledge the sensitive nature We States, 406 Kastigar v. United U.S. de- competing interests involved: the (1972); 32 L.Ed.2d 212 92 S.Ct. presenting her interest in his or fendant’s Gault, 87 S.Ct. re 387 U.S. defense, the to establish a own witnesses (1967); Malloy Hogan, L.Ed.2d 527 exercising his or her interest witness’ 12 L.Ed.2d 653 378 U.S. 84 S.Ct. self-incrimination, against and the privilege States, 341 v. United Hoffman securing effective interest prosecution’s 95 L.Ed. U.S. S.Ct. na- the critical cross-examination. Given interests, however, ture each these Therefore, testi- the extent the least to special under a obli- court was his mony of have established Price would an accommodation. In gation to seek presence Frye’s alleged mur- at the time of hearing proceeding, an camera instant der, it of an incrimina- admission appropriate to determine would have been priv- ting fact which would have waived precise extent to which Price would nonpar- A against ilege privilege against self-incrimination. his sought have invoke voluntarily ty Perhaps, who testifies as after he dis- witness self-incrimination. incriminating may cross-exam- an- fact that he would be directed to covered long his concerning questions despite such fact as invoca- ined swer certain amendment, further in- fifth he would have sought do not tend to tion of the answers testify. On the Seifert, offer criminate. See United States withdrawn hand, (9th Cir.1980). prosecution might have dis- For F.2d exam- other willing to he submit ple, covered that Price could have been cross-examined

197 long charges phasis separation as as the answers of first cross-examination on the sought degree aggravated robbery did not tend further incriminate and murder him. In of such an in the absence camera into two counts of his indictment. Al- however, hearing, though separate we are left with no firm contained two counts of indication, indictment, however, admittedly single appellant other than the un- counsel, representations clearly being charged certain of Price’s that he knew was as by robbery, to what the exact nature of Price’s testi- with murder and felony not Therefore, mony upon degree aggravated would have been. with murder first and remand, willing testify, if remains robbery. rejecting Price In a contention that the trial conduct an in underlying felony court should camera failure to mention the hearing to the exact precludes ascertain nature an for indictment conviction felo- pa- murder, Price’s and to ny establish the v. Young, Court State 1, 118, (1983), appropriate rameters of cross-examination. 173 311 135 W.Va. S.E.2d holding Syllabus our reaffirmed Point 5 VI Bragg, supra, of State v. that: The appellant advances several as An charges indictment which signments First, error. of instructional feloniously, wilfully, defendant mali- appellant complains concerning ciously, deliberately, premeditatedly and regarding court’s failure to instruct lesser unlawfully slay, did kill murder and included offenses of murder. In v. State support sufficient a conviction for 41, 46, 838, Wayne, 162 245 W.Va. S.E.2d of, murder committed in the commission (1978), upheld 842 judge’s this Court a trial arson, rape, attempt to commit rob- give refusal in instructions on lesser bery burglary, necessary, it not be murder, felony stating cluded offenses of W.Va.Code, 61-2-1, to set under forth that: the manner or means the death which theory State’s sole was a murder [T]he the deceased was caused. during attempted robbery, an which is aggravated of a charge inclusion degree pursuant first murder to W.Va. robbery merely supplied in count two Code, and, [1923]; 61-2-1 the defense additional that he with notice maintained the defendant did kill Ar- not being charged felony Syl- with murder. any thur Felder under circumstances. McGraw, 1 labus 140 Point State v. Therefore, only since the evidence indi- 547, (1955), W.Va. 85 S.E.2d this Court 849 complete cated degree first murder or that, “Immaterial, unnecessary held innocence, the refusal of an instruction averments, might harmless which be omit- on proper. lesser offenses was affecting charge ted in- without 455, Bragg, See also v. 160 W.Va. State against dictment accused which 465, 466, (1977). con- 235 S.E.2d 472 This proved, may need not con- properly be that, “Jury forms general with the rule rejected surplusage.” sidered and See possible only instructions on verdicts must Hudson, Syl. pt. also State v. 157 W.Va. include those crimes for which substantial (1974); pt. Syl. 415 206 S.E.2d State presented upon evidence has been which Cogar Haynes, ex rel. v. 154 W.Va.

jury might justifiably find the defendant (1971); Boles, 180 492 148 Pyles v. guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (1964). Clearly, 135 S.E.2d W.Va. 692 Demastus, pt. v. 165 W.Va. count indictment two (1980), 270 Syl. pt. S.E.2d 649 see also robbery, charging aggravated him with Gum, W.Va. State v. 309 S.E.2d unnecessary Bragg, under Neider, 170 and, Syllabus under supra, 8 of State Point W.Va. 295 S.E.2d Williams,

Second, pun- appellant protests jeopardy prohibited double regard aggra- felony the trial refusal to instruct ishment for both murder court’s robbery. Therefore, ing aggravated robbery and in vated it did entitle its lesser places particular aggravated robbery em- him on cluded offenses. He to instructions rec- mercy, that such possible recommendation of offenses as lesser included and its defen- mean ommendation would verdicts. eligible parole consider- dant could be requests Finally, re mini- having only ation after served Syllabus holding in of our consideration that otherwise years mum ten *13 of Sims, 212, 162 W.Va. Point 7 of v. State peni- to confined the defendant would be that, (1978), 834 “The crime of 248 S.E.2d possibility of for life tentiary without not re felony-murder in this State does parole. malice, pre quire proof of the elements of It 3, Kopa, intent to kill. is specific pt. supra; or v. Syl. meditation See also State 138, if the occurs deemed sufficient homicide pt. 4, Headley, v. 168 W.Va. Syl. State of, accidentally during the commission or (1981). Superficially, these 282 S.E.2d 872 commit, enumer attempt the one of the contradictory. proportions two seem however, holding, This has ated felonies.” distinction, however, the between critical Wayne, reaffirmed in v. 169 been State eligibility for parole of grant actual 785, 480, (1982); 482 289 S.E.2d W.Va. parole consideration. 191, Hatfield, 169 286 State v. W.Va. 293, 160 at Lindsey, In v. W.Va. State 402, (1982); Taylor, 408 n. 2 v. S.E.2d State 739-40, this that 233 S.E.2d at Court held 380, 635, (1981); 168 285 637 W.Va. S.E.2d committed reversible error when trial court Grimmer, 8, and, Syl.. pt. v. 162 State jury they if recom- it instructed a that 588, (1979), 780 251 S.E.2d over W.Va. mercy the would be “en- mended defendant grounds, Petry, on other State v. ruled “subject” parole the titled” and under 153, 346, (1980), 166 273 S.E.2d 352 W.Va. statute, that, quite applicable stating “It is disguised and, tersely thinly in as we noted in possible, probable, jury that the in fact Taylor, in v. 168 W.Va. exasperation State the instant case would have recommended 384, again, at 285 S.E.2d at 637: “Once the mercy they thought not the had defendant W.Va.Code, felony-murder rule codified in parole.” have entitled would then been 61-2-1, is constitutional.” at Similarly, Headley, v. 168 W.Va. State 142, 875, 282 we held that a trial S.E.2d VII it court committed reversible error when concerning appellant complains cer- if jury they that recom- instructed prosecutor by the dur- tain remarks made mercy “eli- mended the defendant would be ing closing argument. Specifically, he ob- that, gible” parole, stating “While it for jects possibility to references made statement, an accurate this instruction if parole years of within ten to twelve misleading gave jury it because degree of first mur- jury returned verdict members, presumed are to have who mercy. der He with a recommendation of law, impression that knowledge of the that, Syllabus 1 correctly notes Point of immediately at go could free 284, 160 233 Lindsey, State v. W.Va. parole the whim of the board.” that, (1977), “It S.E.2d 734 this Court held case, trial In the instant duty jury is the determine the if jury that judge properly instructed guilt or of the accused in accord- innocence mercy at the recommended ance with evidence introduced eligible pa not concern itself with “would be for consideration trial and must possible parole probation.” only having role after served a minimum matters of Parks, (10) sentence, 4, eligi Syl. pt. years 161 ten of such See also State v. such 511, (1978). bility way guaranteeing 848 This immediate W.Va. 243 S.E.2d in no Syllabus Syllabus held in Point 3 of Lind- 3 Court also release.” In Point v. State however, sey, 641, that: supra, Boggs, 138 S.E. 103 W.Va. 321 that, this Court held “The discretion of jury may return a In a case which ruling propriety on the trial court in the first guilty verdict of of murder argument by jury counsel before the will mandatory duty of degree, it is the court, appellate request, not be interfered with without to instruct court, appears rights may unless it that jury that to such verdict it add a

199 Woods, complaining party preju- supra; Johnson, have been Syl. pt. State v. diced, injustice manifest resulted 159 226 S.E.2d 442 W.Va. pt. Syl. therefrom.” See also v. State excluding Even Richie’s Flint, 676, 301 171 W.Va. muttered, you Frye going “I think (1983); pt. Haddox, 166 me,” truck, prior exiting rob suffi- (1981); W.Va. 276 S.E.2d 788 presented cient evidence was to establish a Curotz, 142 State v. W.Va. 93 S.E.2d pre-existing intent to rob the mind (1956); Syl. pt. 1, 142 Gory, appellant. Syllabus Point 2 of State v. (1956); Syl. W.Va. pt. 93 S.E.2d 494 Wayne, 169 W.Va. S.E.2d Bail, that, felony-murder Court held “The stat- Lewis, Syl. pt. State v. 133 W.Va. applies felony ute where the initial and the *14 (1950); Syl. pt. 8, 57 513 S.E.2d State parts one homicide of continuous trans- v. Reppert, 132 W.Va. 52 820 S.E.2d action, closely point and are related in of (1949); Simon, State v. 132 time, connection, place, and causal Syl. W.Va. 52 S.E.2d pt. 725 killing the in flight where is done from the Allen, 45 State v. 30 209 W.Va. S.E. prevent the scene of crime to detection (1898). Argument prosecution of in the promote escape.” Although this describes this case clearly appel- limited to the the felony classic murder situation of initial eligibility parole lant’s for consideration felony subsequent homicide, and it illus- possibility discharge and of in ten or time, the importance place, trates of and and, years, twelve in particularly light of Frye’s causal connection. initial murder the eligibility court’s instruction that for subsequent robbery occurred within parole way guaranteed consideration no minutes, location, at the same and with no release, immediate the court’s trial refusal discernible break in the causal connection. to grant appellant’s for motion mistrial Therefore, the trial to court’s refusal direct upon prosecutor’s based the comments was upon a for verdict the based the not an of abuse discretion. prosecution’s prove failure an intent to prior Frye’s rob homicide not erro- VIII neous. appellant’s assign

The final ment of is error that the trial court erred IX by failing to direct a motion for directed conclusion, In to the due trial court’s upon verdict prosecution’s based failure of pursuant admission evidence obtained prove that intent to in the rob existed a warrantless search and seizure of the mind of the of striking before Cleveland hotel after room the fatal of Syllabus blows. Point 1 permit arrest and its blanket refusal to Fisher, State v. W.Va. Price, testimony of Mark we must reverse this Court held that: his conviction and remand his case for re- Upon motion to direct verdict trial. defendant, the evidence is be viewed Reversed remanded. light prosecution. most favorable to It is necessary in appraising its sufficien- BROTHERTON, dissenting: Justice cy reviewing trial court or court I Because would have affirmed the deci- beyond be convinced a reasonable doubt court, I sion of the trial must dissent from defendant; guilt ques- of the of the majority’s holding in this case. tion is whether there substantial evi- upon jury might dence which justifi- majority The reversed the of conviction ably guilty beyond find the defendant (1) Cook Theodore for two reasons:

reasonable doubt. failure to exclude a checkbook obtained Gum, seizure, (2) pt. a warrantless search and Syl. supra; also v. See State Syl. pt. Oldaker, supra; Syl. pt. the refusal the trial court to allow the Horton, of Mark Price. The court trial (1982) pt. was correct both decisions. pur- Question: any Cook at seized Did Theodore Although the checkbook was initially helping Roy seizure, than time other a warrantless search suant to grab, ever Frye jeep out of vehicle admissible because was nevertheless onto, Roy Frye? any way restrain exception. police The were hold plain view in Cleve- Theodore Cook was alerted that No. Answer: companion’s Cook and land because (R. 1205). in financ- of the deceased’s checkbook use police trip. of this the ing their Because attorney that after an- Price’s indicated importance aware were well swering questions these Price would two police The as evidence. knew checkbook privilege invoke his Fifth Amendment case could be as the checkbook in this against self and refuse an- incrimination recently a crime as a important evidence of any questions. swer further case. When gun fired would be in another objection prosecutor’s sustained court room, pur- entered hotel the officers Cook’s calling to the as a witness because Price warrant, they almost an arrest suant denial of would be cross-examination immediately noticed checkbook on the 1210). (R. prosecution. unfair view, plain The checkbook was dresser. trial court was correct in its decision. to be police legal right had a *15 Cross examination is the fundamental room, proba- and had more than hotel testimony in reliability test of the of our this would be cause to believe that ble justice.1 for a system of In order witness upcoming evidence in criminal important an direct, competent testify on that to be to require- I case. believe this satisfies subject must be cross-examina- witness to syl. plain exception. ments for a view See may tion. Even criminal defendants opinion. majority pt. 6 of any cross-examined as other witness. attempted During his trial the (1966). The State W.Va.Code 57-3-6 has § call Mark Price to the stand to answer to right to all defense wit- cross-examine Price, alleged on an questions two direct. A to nesses. witness who refuses be cross- murder, appeal accomplice in the whose of testify should allowed to examined not be pending at a murder conviction was the See, Carter, People Mich.App. e.g., trial, consented, had time of the (1980) (Defense 293 N.W.2d 681 wit- counsel, advice against answer anticipated taking fifth ness who amend- questions, as follows: two ment on cross-examination not allowed to Question: jeep parked While testify.) already If he testified has and drive, Roy did any at Hillcrest time pertinent questions refuses to then answer say, you going “I think Frye are rob cross-examination, testimony in his direct me?” Wigmore should be stricken. 5 Evidence 1974). (Chadbourn No. rev. Answer: § legal greatest engine past, policy ever invented for 1. For two centuries of the An- system glo-American discovery has been of truth. of evidence necessity testing by regard the cross-examina- Striking power expose tion as a vital feature of the law. The belief that illustrations of its safeguard testing value of plentiful no human and in inaccuracies records; falsehoods are our comparable furnished statements cross-examination, to that enough, apparent and it is in some of that no state- trials, the conviction great the failures Continental that (unless by special exception) ment should be justice hardly under could have occurred probed used as until it has been and practice of effective cross-examination. The test, increasing found sublimated has (which special chancery procedure weakness of strength lengthening experience. in traditions) lay in its followed Continental ob- abuses, stacles to effective cross-examination. mishandlings, Not even the and praise of and its The cross-examination effica- puerilities which so often found associat- cy as a fundamental test of truth have often availed to ed with cross-examination have nulli- subject exposition by and fy may been the comment It in more than its value. be that one jurists. judges place system our sense it takes in our which (Chadbourn Wigmore occupied system § Evidence rev. torture the medieval Nevertheless, 1974). beyond any civilians. it is doubt suggests Well, majority Haight, The that an camera I Miss I have heard great only hearing appropriate Haight, have confidence Miss not would been I ability in her but have in her precise confidence determine the extent to Price which integrity Haight’s it’s opinion Miss testify. Although would Price was not although say she didn’t I it—if present, court did conduct an in cam- that — threatened him with if contempt of court inquiry era to the extent of Price’s Mr. speak up, Haight’s he didn’t it was Miss The testimony. inquiry clearly indicated opinion he would become recalci- subject that the would witness not himself cooperate. going trant and not I am So Snyder, to cross-examination. Mr. attor- your objection to sustain Mr. Brown. defendant, that, ney for indicated (R. 1210). very will answer two limited “[Mark Price]

questions relating I that will ask him to a scope clearly of cross-examination is specific point during time this entire a matter within discretion of the event, point that at that he judge. will answer no Virginia Evidence in and West questions ques- Virginia may other from me or no It been other have § possible, prosecution ques- unlikely given however these tions for the or no other facts, compromise for a been have anybody tions for fifth will invoke his reached between defendant’s interest (R. 1202). privilege.” amendment Mr. getting prosecu in and the evidence Snyder that, prosecution also indicated “the right tion’s of cross-examination. have, probably will if things go accord- way ing they appear going, to be Unquestionably, such compromise opportunity reasonably cross-examine encouraged. question should be be- any aspect this individual on of his testimo- Court, however, fore the is who should ny aspect any of what interest or bias he proposing bear the com- burden such a *16 (R. might this anything.” have case or promise. majority opinion The page 1203). Haight, Miss Mark attorney appears put obligation upon this Price, testifying indicated that he court: “Given the critical nature of each interests, however, against advice and these her “after the discus- trial court special him, obligation was under it is a to seek my prediction sion with also (Emphasis added.) accommodation.” after those two areas Mr. at- Price would judge burden should not be on the trial amendment, tempt to invoke the fifth propose compromise. such He did not any questions beyond to answer other mat- talk to the witnesses is unfamiliar with pertaining Sny- ters to the two matters Mr. they testify Also, may what to. he is total- 1207). already spoken (R. der has to.” special ly problems unaware of the tactical She also indicated that Mark would Price may In that the defense have. this case any questions refuse to answer other even probable that the defense did not want being contempt by if threatened with subject Mark Price as a witness if he was prosecution argument court. The its to cross-examination. Mr. Price also noted that it indeed wanted to cross-exam- accused of the murder. He have would other any ine Mr. Price would defending been his own neck. If forced particu- witness and drew attention to the may he testify, further well have accused “In lar difficulties with this witness. this delivering Cook fatal blow. There- particular position defendant’s court fore, trying judge’s efforts to effect If testify. has no hammer to make him compromise probably would have been him man testify, court order were futile. having life in already been sentenced to prison mercy, thirty days requires without A rule which the defense to —or joke jail perjures big if himself—is a proffer suggestion compromise he would 1210). (R. court, exercising upon its subject him.” more effective to a review discretion, appeal. refused to allow Mark Price This Court would have a record basing compromise Mark ar- testify, ruling heavily showing its on offer and the attorney’s predictions: guments support objections thereof and Price’s ruling. judge’s along with

thereto totally in the dark present we are case possible compromises may there

as to what been, any.

have if reasons, I would have

For above of the trial court. the decision

affirmed Anthony

John TURNER HOLLAND, Warden,

Manfred WVP.

No. 16566.

Supreme Appeals Court Virginia.

West

March 1985. 11, 1985.

Rehearing Denied June *17 Turner, Anthony pro se.

John Gen., Lopez, Atty. Andrew Asst. Charles- ton, for appellee.
MILLER, Justice: petition In this for writ habeas corpus, the relator contends that circuit five-year en impermissibly court added burgla to his sexual hancements abuse Both arose out of ry convictions. offenses

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Cook
Court Name: West Virginia Supreme Court
Date Published: Jul 15, 1985
Citation: 332 S.E.2d 147
Docket Number: 16183
Court Abbreviation: W. Va.
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