State v. CollinsState v. Collins
Alison Boggs for Appellant
Andrew M. Bigler for Appellee
{1} Defendant-appellant, Daniel A. Collins, Jr. (“Collins“), appeals the November 10, 2022 judgment entry of sentence of the Union County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Background
{2} On April 29, 2022, the Union County Grand Jury indicted Collins on six counts: Counts One and Five of breaking and entering in violation of
{3} Pursuant to a negotiated-plea agreement, on September 27, 2022, Collins appeared for a change-of-plea hearing where he entered guilty pleas to the three counts of grand theft of a motor vehicle. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend dismissal of the remaining counts. The parties did not have a jointly-recommended sentence. The trial court accepted Collins‘s guilty pleas and found him guilty of Counts Two, Three, and Six. The trial court also dismissed Counts One, Four, and Five at the request of the State. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation.
{5} Collins filed a notice of appeal on December 9, 2022. He raises two assignments of error for our review. For ease of discussion, we will address Collins‘s assignments of error together.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred when it ordered Appellant‘s sentence to run consecutive to the sentence he received from Champaign County.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred when it sentenced Appellant to maximum sentences and further erred when it ordered the sentences to be served consecutive[ly].
{6} Collins‘s two assignments of error contain interrelated issues. In his first assignment of error, Collins argues the trial court erred by sentencing him to the maximum term of 18 months in prison for each count of grand theft of a motor vehicle. He also argues the trial court erred by ordering the sentences for each count in the instant case to run consecutively to each other. In his second assignment of error, Collins argues the trial court erred by ordering the sentences in the instant
{7} We first address Collins‘s argument the trial court erred by sentencing him to the maximum term of 18 months in prison for each count of grand theft of a motor vehicle.
Standard of Review
{8} Under
Relevant Authority: Maximum Sentences
{9} “‘Trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the statutory range.‘” State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-17, 2015-Ohio-4225, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Noble, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-06, 2014-Ohio-5485, ¶ 9. A sentence imposed within the statutory range is generally valid so long as the trial court considered the applicable statutory policies that apply to every felony
{10}
{11} “In accordance with these principles, the trial court must consider the factors set forth in
Analysis: Maximum Sentences
{12} The trial court sentenced Collins to 18 months in prison for each count of fourth-degree felony grand theft of a motor vehicle. This sentence is within the statutory range for felonies of the fourth degree established by
{13} The record reflects that the trial court considered
{14} Yet, Collins argues his 18-month prison sentences for grand theft of a motor vehicle are unsupported by the record or contrary to law because the conduct underlying the instant offenses does not constitute the “worst form of the offense.” Collins also argues the trial court made findings not consistent with the facts contained in the record.
{15} However, the record belies his claims. Specifically, Collins argues that because the victims were not seeking restitution, the trial court erred by finding the victims suffered serious economic harm. However, despite Collins‘s argument to the contrary, the victims’ decision not to seek restitution is not mutually exclusive with the victims suffering serious economic harm as a result of the offenses. See generally State v. Orms, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-750, 2015-Ohio-2870, ¶ 11-12. Further, Collins contends the trial court erred by finding that “at the time of committing the offense[s], the offender was under release from confinement before trial or sentencing.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 7). Collins‘s argument is based on an assumption that the trial court‘s finding referenced Collins‘s cases in Madison and
{16} Further, although ”
{18} Next, Collins argues that the trial court erred by ordering the sentences in the instant case to be served consecutively to each other.
Relevant Authority: Consecutive Sentencing
{19} “Except as provided in * * * division (C) of section 2929.14, * * * a prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this state, another state, or the United States.”
(4) * * * [T]he court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct.
(c) The offender‘s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
{20}
{21} The trial court must state the required findings at the sentencing hearing prior to imposing consecutive sentences and incorporate those findings into its sentencing entry. State v. Sharp, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-01, 2014-Ohio-4140, ¶ 50, citing State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29. A trial court “has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings” and is not “required to give a talismanic incantation of the words of the statute, provided that
Analysis: Consecutive Sentencing
{22} Collins does not argue that the trial court failed to make the requisite consecutive-sentencing findings under
{23} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:
[C]onsecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish the defendant and are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and to the danger the defendant poses to the public. The Court further finds that the offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while he was awaiting trial or sentencing[,] [w]as under a sanction imposed pursuant to Revised Code Section 2929.16, 17, or 18 * * * [a]nd was under post release control for a prior offense. The Court further finds that at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct * * * [a]nd that the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct.
(Nov. 10, 2022 Tr. at 11-12). The trial court memorialized those findings in its sentencing entry. (Doc. No. 27). Accordingly, the record reflects that the trial court made the appropriate
{24} Nonetheless, Collins summarily argues that his maximum, consecutive sentences are disproportionate to the instant offenses. However, we do
{25} Finally, Collins contends that the trial court erred by imposing the sentences in the instant Union County case consecutively to the sentence he received in Champaign County. The record indicates that subsequent to Collins‘s indictment on the instant offenses, he was charged in Champaign County for actions which occurred after those underlying the instant offenses. However, Collins was sentenced in the Champaign County case prior to his sentencing in the instant case. Accordingly, Collins argues the trial court erred by ordering him to serve the sentence in the Union County case consecutively to the sentence in the Champaign County case because the criminal activity in Union County occurred prior to the criminal activity in Champaign County. We disagree.
{26} Essentially, Collins implores this Court to interpret
{27} When interpreting statutes, reviewing courts must “give effect to the words used, not * * * delete words used or * * * insert words not used.” Columbus-Suburban Coach Lines, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 20 Ohio St.2d 125, 127 (1969). Collins‘s request that this Court insert a temporal requirement not required by
{28} Collins‘s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
Conclusion
{29} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Union County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.
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