State v. Coleman, 264 P.3d 523

Defendant Coleman was convicted of aggravated fleeing in violation of §30-22-1.1 and conspiracy to commit shooting at a dwelling in violation of §30-28-2.
Shooting occurred when Mario Montoya fired three rounds at Villa's trailer at 2409 North Mesa Street in Roswell; Defendant aided by driving the shooters to the location.
Deputy pursued Coleman at high speed (over 100 mph); a shotgun was jettisoned from Coleman’s vehicle and the pursuit ended when he crashed.
At the station, Coleman provided post-arrest statements after a Miranda warning; he claimed peer pressure and following Mario’s commands.
The State sought exclusion of evidence about the Chaves County high speed pursuit policy; the district court issued a letter ruling prohibiting evidence of pursuit policy or compliance.
Coleman challenged evidentiary rulings, denied directed verdicts on both counts, and appealed jury instruction issues.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court properly admitted post-arrest statements.	State: admissible under Miranda procedural requirements; foundational.	Coleman argued voluntariness; not preserved as voluntariness below.	Admissibility upheld; voluntariness not preserved on appeal.
Whether evidence of the pursuit policy was properly excluded.	State: Padilla controls; pursuit policy not element of offense.	Coleman contends policy evidence should show noncompliance.	Court follows Padilla; exclusion affirmed.
Whether there was substantial evidence for aggravated fleeing.	State: evidence shows high-speed, endangering conduct.	Insufficient evidence to show willful carelessness or endangerment.	Substantial evidence supported both aggravated fleeing elements.
Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict of conspiracy to shoot at a dwelling.	State: conspiratorial agreement to drive to and shoot at the dwelling.	Insufficient evidence of knowledge or intent to shoot at a dwelling.	Evidence supports conspiracy; know-ing occupancy not required for this charge.
Whether the jury instructions properly addressed phone-call rights under §31-1-5(A).	State: statute does not create a jury instruction right.	Requested instruction on three post-arrest calls.	No reversible error; statute provides entitlement, not a right to a jury instruction.

Padilla v. State, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299 (2008-NMSC-006) (pursuit policy not element of aggravated fleeing; policy evidence not required)
State v. Gallegos, 587 P.2d 1347 (Ct.App.1978) (Miranda requirements and voluntariness are separate admissibility concepts)
State v. Elmquist, 844 P.2d 131 (Ct.App.1992) (occupancy knowledge not an element of conspiracy to shoot at a dwelling; occupancy relevant to other offense)
Jackson v. State, 672 P.2d 660 (1983) (jury instruction sufficiency; absence of essential element can be error)
State v. Jernigan, 139 P.3d 537 (2006-NMSC-003) (failure to instruct on theory of the case reversible only if essential)
State v. Sarracino, 964 P.2d 72 (1998-NMSC-022) (abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
State v. Padilla, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299 (2008-NMSC-006) (reiterated standard for pursuit policy relevance)