State v. ColemanState v. Coleman
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 10, 2022
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. CR-21-660631-A, CR-21-661531-A, CR-21-661538-A, CR-21-661539-A, and CR-21-661739-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sarah J. Denney, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Mary Catherine Corrigan, for appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, A.J.:
{¶ 1} Brian Coleman appeals multiple convictions arising from a series of unrelated felonies occurring over several months while Coleman was already serving community-control sanctions in two earlier felony cases. Coleman‘s conduct led to
{¶ 2} In the first case under review, Coleman burgled his former, live-in girlfriend‘s apartment and attacked her in the process. Coleman scaled a ladder to access the second-story apartment, used a firearm to shoot through the bedroom door, and then dragged the victim outside into the alley before she was able to escape. In the second case, Coleman attacked another victim with a firearm and stole her vehicle, a necklace, a cellphone, and a bank card. The victim identified Coleman from a lineup. In the third case, Coleman stole a motor vehicle from a family friend, totaled the vehicle, and then set it ablaze. The fourth case involved police officers attempting to stop a suspected stolen vehicle that Coleman was driving and that was procured through an aggravated robbery. Coleman fled after striking an unmarked vehicle occupied by two police officers. A short pursuit was called off, but officers found the vehicle after Coleman had driven it into a utility pole. Police stopped two suspects fleeing the scene who admitted to being in the car and identified Coleman as the driver. And finally, in the fifth case, officers attempted to execute an arrest warrant on Coleman, who fled into a neighboring apartment
{¶ 3} Coleman and the state entered into a negotiated plea agreement, limiting his aggregate sentencing exposure for all five cases to a 9- to 15-year term of imprisonment in exchange for the state dismissing numerous counts. After pleading guilty, Coleman became unsatisfied with his counsel of record. He filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, but after new counsel entered an appearance on his behalf, Coleman agreed to voluntarily withdraw that motion and to adhere to the terms of the plea agreement. The sentencing proceeded with the trial court imposing an aggregate sentence within the jointly recommended sentencing range: a 14-year aggregate term of imprisonment to resolve all five cases. This appeal followed.
{¶ 4} In the first and third assignments of error, Coleman claims that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered because either the trial court improperly coerced him into accepting the negotiated plea agreement by candidly disclosing the maximum potential term of imprisonment Coleman faced should he be convicted at trial of all counts, or the trial court failed to adequately notify Coleman of the maximum term of imprisonment he faced in one case. Neither claim has merit.
{¶ 5} “A defendant‘s guilty plea ‘is constitutionally valid only if it is entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.‘” State v. Jacobs, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190154, 2020-Ohio-895, ¶ 2, quoting State v. Foster, 2018-Ohio-4006, 121 N.E.3d 76, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), and State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). “A plea without those hallmarks is constitutionally unenforceable under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” Id., citing Engle at id. A guilty plea is considered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered when a trial court complies with the requirements of
{¶ 6} For example, offenders are permitted to challenge the trial court‘s purported involvement in the plea process without respect to the requirements of
{¶ 8} As other panels from this court have recognized, Heard involved a unique, but narrow fact pattern. In Heard, the trial court
created and presented the plea offer; the prosecutor had no input regarding the plea. The judge‘s comments clearly indicated he had determined Heard‘s guilt before any evidence was presented. The judge made reference to the potential sentencing not in terms of possible minimum and maximum sentences if the case proceeded to trial but based upon the sentence the judge would impose because he had already determined what Heard deserved. The judge also failed to provide Heard with sufficient time to consider the offered plea. This court found the judge‘s participation in the plea process could have led Heard to believe he could not get a fair trial or fair sentence after trial.
State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107561, 2019-Ohio-2571, ¶ 18. Ultimately, the Jones panel concluded that Heard does not apply in cases in which “the plea offer was created and presented by the prosecutor; the judge identified the potential
{¶ 9} There is little similarity between the factual background of Heard, 2017-Ohio-8310, 87 N.E.3d 245, and this case. Coleman‘s situation is more akin to the situation presented in Jones in which the panel rejected the coercion argument. Coleman does not dispute the fact that his defense counsel negotiated the plea offer directly with the prosecutor or that the state communicated that offer to the court on the record. The trial court did not present its own plea offer for Coleman‘s consideration, and like in Jones, Coleman had time to consider the negotiated plea deal before trial.
{¶ 10} Moreover, the trial court conducted a hearing to place Coleman‘s anticipated rejection of the offer on the record and memorialized the culmination of the state and Coleman‘s negotiations. It was in this context that the trial court simply identified what all parties should have objectively understood: that the jointly recommended sentencing range presented a favorable opportunity to avoid facing the possibility of a de facto life sentence from the maximum potential term. A trial court‘s candid description of that potential penalty does not amount to impermissible coercion, especially when the defendant and the state actively negotiated the proposed plea deal. See, e.g., State v. Lane, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 18AP-88, 18AP-89, 18AP-90, and 18AP-91, 2018-Ohio-5250, ¶ 11 (trial court‘s description of the potential maximum term as being “substantially greater” than the
{¶ 11} Coleman‘s second argument with respect to the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of his guilty plea rests with his claim that the trial court advised Coleman that the first-degree felonious assault in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-661531, to which Coleman pleaded guilty, was subject to the second-degree felony sentencing range, but in actuality, Coleman had agreed to plead guilty to a first-degree felonious assault. At the change-of-plea colloquy, the trial court notified Coleman that the offense carried a maximum penalty of eight years in prison consistent with the belief that Coleman pleaded guilty to a second-degree felony offense. The trial court imposed a five-year term of imprisonment in that case, to be served concurrent with all other sentences imposed.
{¶ 12} It is not clear from what error Coleman is seeking relief. According to the sentencing entry for CR-21-661531, Coleman pleaded guilty to and was sentenced for a violation of
{¶ 13} Even if Coleman should have been convicted of a first-degree offense according to the plea deal, Ohio‘s black letter law stands in direct contrast to Coleman‘s argument. Pursuant to
{¶ 14} Nevertheless, although the trial court misadvised Coleman of the maximum penalty related to that particular case by stating the felonious assault at issue was subject to the sentencing range of a felony of the second degree, and not one of the first degree as the plea offer anticipated (and the trial court explained during the memorialization of the plea agreement between Coleman and the state), the term of imprisonment actually imposed was still within the sentencing range
{¶ 15} The trial court notified Coleman the maximum sentence would be eight years but only imposed a five-year term of imprisonment for the first-degree felony offense. Thus, nothing in this record demonstrates that Coleman would have not pleaded guilty had he been apprised of the longer potential term or the more severe offense during the plea colloquy. The sentence imposed was within the range of potential penalties discussed in the advisement, and therefore, Coleman was not prejudiced by the alleged mistake, although he did profit from it by receiving a conviction for a less severe offense than to that which he had agreed. See State v. Malenda, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 104736 and 104829, 2017-Ohio-5574, ¶ 6 (the incorrect advisement of the maximum term of imprisonment was not prejudicial because the final sentence was still shorter than the erroneously provided description at the change-of-plea colloquy); State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101338, 2015-Ohio-178, ¶ 11; State v. Haislip, 12th Dist. Clinton Nos. CA2021-06-017, and CA2021-06-018, 2021-Ohio-4543, ¶ 14. The third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 16} In the second assignment of error, and the final argument advanced in this appeal, Coleman claims that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences without engaging in the required analysis under
{¶ 17} A defendant‘s right to appeal a sentence is solely derived from
{¶ 18} The trial court‘s imposition of an aggregate term of imprisonment within a jointly recommended sentencing range precludes appellate review of the imposed sentence. There is no dispute that the parties jointly recommended the sentencing range that was accepted by the trial court, and there is no dispute that the trial court did not make the consecutive sentence findings under
{¶ 19} The answer to that question is resoundingly in the negative. In the context of a jointly recommended sentence that includes nonmandatory consecutive sentences, a trial court is not required to make the consecutive sentence findings under
{¶ 20} Appellate review of the sentences imposed in the underlying cases is expressly precluded under
{¶ 21} Coleman‘s convictions are affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
CORNELIUS J. O‘SULLIVAN, JR., J., CONCURS;
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE OPINION
{¶ 22} Respectfully, I concur in part and dissent in part. I concur with the majority‘s resolution of the first and third assignments of error.
{¶ 23} I dissent, however, from the majority‘s conclusion regarding the second assignment of error that review of the trial court‘s imposition of consecutive sentences is precluded because appellant agreed to a jointly recommended sentencing range. The majority finds that where a defendant agrees to a jointly recommended sentencing range, the trial court is permitted to impose consecutive sentences, even where the defendant did not agree to consecutive sentences, and any review of the consecutive sentences is prohibited by
{¶ 24} My dissent in State v. Grant, 2018-Ohio-1759, 111 N.E.3d 791 (8th Dist.), sets forth my reasons for disagreeing with this proposition of law. Grant at ¶ 49-52. I find that where a defendant agrees to a sentencing range but does not expressly agree to the imposition of nonmandatory consecutive sentences, the sentence is not an agreed-upon sentence and review of the sentence is not prohibited by
{¶ 25} Appellant agreed to a sentencing range; there was no agreement to consecutive sentences. Accordingly, I would review appellant‘s second assignment of error, which asserts that the trial court did not engage in the required analysis under
{¶ 27} Nevertheless, I would remand for the court to enter nunc pro tunc entries in those three cases because the trial court did not “incorporate its statutory findings into the sentencing entries” as required by Bonnell. Id. at ¶ 29. Instead, in each sentencing entry the court merely stated, “[c]ourt states reasons for consecutive sentences ORC 2929.14.” Such a statement does not meet the requirements of Bonnell that to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must both make the statutory findings under