State v. ColemanState v. Coleman
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made: {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Jessica Coleman has appealed from her convictions in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I
{¶ 2} Defendant-Appellant Jessica Coleman was indicted on July 22, 2005. The indictment included one count of involuntary manslaughter, in violation of
{¶ 3} Appellant has timely appealed asserting one assignment of error.
II
Assignment of Error
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY IMPOSING A SENTENCE GREATER THAN THE MINIMUM SENTENCE REQUIRED IN VIOLATION OF OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 2929.14(B).”
{¶ 4} In her sole assignment of error, Appellant has argued that her sentence, which was based on factors enumerated in
{¶ 5} In Foster, the Ohio Supreme Court explicitly rejected the State‘s argument regarding waiver. In doing so, the Supreme Court stated:
“Foster could not have relinquished his sentencing objections as a known right when no one could have predicted that Blakely would extend the Apprendi doctrine to redefine `statutory maximum.‘” Foster at ¶ 31.
However, in Dudukovich, this Court was faced with a factual scenario unlike the one presented in Foster. In Dudukovich, the defendant had been sentenced well after Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296, had been decided. Therefore, we concluded that the Foster Court‘s discussion concerning waiver did not apply to cases in which the defendant was sentenced after Blakely had been decided.
{¶ 6} Further, this Court heeded the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in United States v. Booker (2005), 543 U.S. 220, in which the Court advised appellate courts faced with applying its decision that:
“`Nor do we believe that every appeal will lead to a new sentencing hearing. That is because we expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails the “plain-error” test.‘” (Emphasis added; internal citations omitted.) Dudukovich at ¶ 23, quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 268.
{¶ 7} Consequently, ”Foster had not directed this Court to abandon our ordinary doctrines and the U.S. Supreme Court in Booker implored appellate courts to continue to follow these doctrines.” Dudukovich at ¶ 24. In complying with Booker‘s expectation to apply “ordinary prudential doctrines” such as waiver and plain error, we noted that prior to Foster, “this Court held that a defendant must raise the constitutionality of Ohio‘s sentencing statutes in order to preserve such an argument on appeal.” Dudukovich at ¶ 24, citing State v. Sauer, 9th Dist. No. 05CA0031-M, 2005-Ohio-4797, at ¶ 7.
{¶ 8} The record demonstrates that Appellant was sentenced on February 8, 2006, well after Blakely was decided. As Appellant failed to raise any objection to her sentence in the trial court and specifically failed to challenge the constitutionality of Ohio‘s sentencing statutes, she is precluded from raising this argument for the first time on appeal.
{¶ 9} While Appellant has advocated that several Ohio appellate courts have remanded for re-sentencing despite an appellant‘s failure to raise a Blakely objection in the trial court, we note that this Court is not bound by the decisions of its sister districts. We further note that recently, the Sixth District Court of Appeals in State v. Custodia Mota, 6th Dist. No. L-04-1354, 2006-Ohio-3800, and the Tenth District Court of Appeals in State v. Payne, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-517, 2006-Ohio-2552, certified this same conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court for review. On October 4, 2006, the Supreme Court accepted Payne for review. 10/4/2006 Case Announcements, Supreme Court of Ohio, 111 Ohio St.3d 1410, 2006-Ohio-5083. Until review of Payne, we see no reason to revisit Dudukovich or its progeny.
{¶ 10} Appellant has also argued that her sentence constituted plain error. This Court disagrees. Pursuant to
{¶ 11} Further, Foster “vest[ed] sentencing judges with full discretion” in sentencing. Foster at ¶ 100. Accordingly, post-Foster, this Court reviews felony sentences under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Windham, 9th Dist. No. 05CA0033, 2006-Ohio-1544, at ¶ 12. An abuse of discretion is more than an error in judgment or law; it implies an attitude on the part of the trial court that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219. Furthermore, when applying the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621.
{¶ 12} In the wake of Foster, trial courts are still required to consider the general guidance factors contained in
{¶ 13} According to the record before us, the trial court was exceptionally thoughtful and discerning in handing down Appellant‘s sentence. Appellant‘s sentence was within the statutory range and thus, the trial court was completely within its discretion when it sentenced Appellant to six years incarceration.
{¶ 14} Based on the foregoing, Appellant‘s assignment of error lacks merit.
III
{¶ 15} Appellant‘s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth Judicial District execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs