STATE OF OHIO v. TROY W. COLEMAN
C.A. No. 26008
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
April 18, 2012
2012-Ohio-1712
BELFANCE, Judge.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CR 10 10 2775
Dated: April 18, 2012
BELFANCE, Judge.
{1} Defendant-Appellant Troy Coleman appeals from his convictions for aggravated vehicular assault, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and driving under suspension. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
{2} Mr. Coleman was indicted in connection with a traffic accident for aggravated vehicular assault, vehicular assault, driving under suspension, failure to control, and two counts of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He pleaded guilty to aggravated vehicular assault, driving under suspension, and one count of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The remaining charges were dismissed.
{3} The trial court sentenced Mr. Coleman to an aggregate prison term of 7 years, suspended his license for 10 years, and ordered him to pay $55,000.00 in restitution. He has appealed, raising a single assignment of error for our review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY NOTIFY APPELLANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AND THUS THE DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE THOSE RIGHTS IN VIOLATION OF
{4} Mr. Coleman argues that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court failed to properly inform him that he had the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, that he could not be compelled to testify against himself and that “he had the right to have the jury unanimously find him guilty should his case have gone to trial.”
{5} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, ¶ 9. ”
{6}
[B]y changing your plea you will give up your right to a jury trial; give up your right to make the prosecutor prove all the charges against you beyond a reasonable doubt; give up the right to have [your counsel] subpoena and cross-examine witnesses for you; give up the right to testify or not testify in your own defense, and you will give up your appellate rights[.] Do you understand all of that?
To which Mr. Coleman responded, “Yes, I do.”
{8} It appears Mr. Coleman‘s argument is that, because the trial court did not repeat the language of
{9} Mr. Coleman argues that the trial court failed to inform him that he had a right to compulsory process because the trial court‘s statement that by pleading guilty he was giving up the right to have his counsel “subpoena and cross-examine witnesses for you[]” was insufficient to apprise him of this right. He further argues that the trial court inadequately informed him that he could not be compelled to testify against himself. In Barker, the trial court told the defendant that he had the “right to call witnesses to speak on [his] behalf.” Id. at ¶ 16. The Supreme Court of Ohio determined that this adequately informed the defendant of his right to compulsory
{10} To the extent that Mr. Coleman suggests that there is any ambiguity in the oral plea colloquy, we note that, in addition to the trial court‘s oral colloquy, Mr. Coleman, who was represented by counsel, signed a written plea agreement, which informed him that, by pleading guilty, he was waiving his “right to have compulsory process, that is the right to subpoena witnesses to court to testify in [his] favor.” Mr. Coleman was also told during the oral plea colloquy that he was giving up the right “to testify or not testify in your own defense,” and the written plea agreement informed him that, at trial, he “could not be compelled to testify against [him]self.” By signing the agreement, Mr. Coleman indicated that he had read the agreement and understood the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty.
{11} While the trial court‘s colloquy did not precisely track the language in
{12} Mr. Coleman also argues, without supporting authority, that the trial court was required to inform him that any verdict by a jury had to be unanimous. However, a trial court does not need to inform the defendant that a jury verdict must be unanimous in order to comply with
{13} Mr. Coleman‘s assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{14} Mr. Coleman‘s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
EVE V. BELFANCE
FOR THE COURT
MOORE, P. J.
CARR, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
ADAM VAN HO, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.