State v. CoffmanState v. Coffman
MARCY A. VONDERWELL, Atty. Reg. No. 0078311, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Greene County Prosecutor‘s Office, Appellate Division, 61 Greene Street, Suite 200, Xenia, Ohio 45385 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
L. PATRICK MULLIGAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0016118, 28 North Wilkinson Street, Dayton, Ohio 45401 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
EPLEY, J.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In February 2020, Coffman was charged in Clark C.P. No. 2020-CR-126 with a single count of rape of a person less than 13 years old, a felony of the first degree, three counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, felonies of the third degree, and five counts of sexual battery, felonies of the third degree.
{¶ 3} After months of negotiating, and only days before trial was set to start, the parties reached a plea agreement in Clark C.P. No. 2020-CR-739: Coffman would plead guilty by way of bill of information to one count of rape and two counts of sexual battery, and in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss Case No. 2020-CR-126. The parties also agreed that Coffman would spend 13 years in prison and be designated a Tier III sex offender.
{¶ 4} On November 12, 2020, the same day as the bill of information was filed, Coffman appeared in court for his plea hearing. He was represented by counsel, had a full
{¶ 5} Immediately after accepting Coffman‘s pleas, the trial court proceeded to disposition. In accordance with the agreed 13-year sentence, the court sentenced
{¶ 6} Coffman appeals from his convictions, raising three assignments of error. We will address them in an order that facilitates our analysis.
II. Coffman‘s plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
{¶ 7} To better effectuate this opinion, we will begin by addressing Coffman‘s second assignment of error. In it, Coffman claims that his plea cannot stand because it was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary.
{¶ 8} “In order for a plea to be given knowingly and voluntarily, the trial court must follow the mandates of
{¶ 9} The trial court is required to do several things at a plea hearing according to
{¶ 10} The trial court must strictly comply with
{¶ 11} At the outset of the plea hearing, the trial court stressed to Coffman that if at any time he needed to ask his attorney a question, he was encouraged to do so, and the court would stop and allow him all the time he needed to get the answer. Further, the court stated that it would be happy to answer any questions Coffman might have.
{¶ 12} The court then asked Coffman if he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, to which he responded, “No, sir.” The court inquired if he and counsel had discussed the nature of the charges in the bill of information; again, Coffman answered
{¶ 13} The next set of questions directed to Coffman from the court were about the performance of his attorney. Coffman admitted that he had discussed possible legal defenses with his attorney, that he told his attorney everything the attorney needed to know to properly represent him, and that the attorney had answered all his questions. When asked if he was satisfied with the legal advice he had been given, Coffman answered: “Very much so.”
{¶ 14} Next, the court inquired about the timing of the plea. It reminded Coffman that he had the opportunity to resolve the case at trial scheduled for the following Monday. When asked if he specifically had chosen to not pursue the trial option, Coffman stated, “Yes, sir.”
{¶ 15} The trial court then asked if anyone had caused Coffman to feel rushed in coming to his decision to plead guilty or if anyone had left him with the impression he had no choice but to plead guilty. Specifically, Coffman was asked if he had had enough time to consider the pros and cons of pleading guilty. He responded, “Yes, sir.” When asked by the court if he was being rushed, “No, sir,” was his reply.
{¶ 16} The court summed up what it had heard thus far: “From what you‘ve told me can the record reflect that your decision to go forward today is a decision you are making on your own; it is a free choice; you‘re doing it voluntarily without any improper influence or duress from any person or any source?” Coffman confirmed, “Yes, sir.”
{¶ 17} The constitutional rights were discussed next. The trial court explained that
{¶ 18} After the constitutional rights were discussed, Coffman confirmed that he was willing to waive them to plead guilty.
{¶ 19} The plea form was then examined on the record, with the trial court reading the details of the agreement, including that Coffman would be pleading guilty to one count of rape and two counts of sexual battery. Coffman agreed that he had discussed the document with his attorney, understood it, and then signed it.
{¶ 20} The court then discussed the maximum penalties that Coffman faced and that he would be classified as a Tier III sex offender. Coffman stated that he understood. The agreed 13-year sentence was also discussed.
{¶ 21} The next point of discussion in the colloquy was the sentence and what would happen after Coffman was released. The court informed him about post-release control, the consequences of violating it, and his duties to register as sex offender. Once again, Coffman confirmed that he understood.
{¶ 22} Finally, after the court had explained everything, it asked Coffman how he wished to plead. “Guilty” was the response.
{¶ 23} Our review of the plea hearing demonstrates that the trial court meticulously followed the requirements of
III. Ineffective assistance of counsel
{¶ 24} Coffman argues in his first and third assignments of error that his right to counsel was violated, and specifically, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was rushed into his guilty plea.
{¶ 25} The
{¶ 26} “In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.” State v. Arnold, 2d Dist. Clark Nos. 2014-CA-23, 2014-CA-24, 2014-CA-25, 2014-CA-26, 2015-Ohio-1580, ¶ 7, citing Strickland, paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). Trial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that his conduct falls within a wide range of effective assistance. Id. To demonstrate ineffective
{¶ 27} “When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” State v. Spates, 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 272, 595 N.E.2d 351 (1992). Consequently, a guilty plea waives all appealable errors, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that the errors precluded the defendant from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering his or her guilty plea. State v. Roebuck, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24799, 2012-Ohio-1859, ¶ 13. “Only if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty but would have instead insisted on going to trial will the judgment be reversed.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Huddleson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20653, 2005-Ohio-4029, ¶ 9.
{¶ 28} We have already determined that Coffman‘s plea was voluntary, so to be successful on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he must demonstrate that but for the errors of trial counsel, he would have taken the case to trial. To do this, he avers that he was rushed into making his decision whether to plead guilty. Coffman contends that he “did not have time to consult with his attorneys about what was happening *** and he had not spoken about a plea bargain because he told his attorneys he wanted to go to trial.” This claim, however, is belied by the record.
{¶ 29} During his plea colloquy, Coffman made several admissions to the court
{¶ 30} In arguing that he was rushed into making his decision whether to plead guilty and that he told his attorney that he wanted to go to trial, Coffman relies on evidence outside the record. We have held that matters outside the record that allegedly caused a plea to be less than knowing and voluntary, such as ineffective assistance provided by a defendant‘s trial counsel, are more properly raised in a petition for post-conviction relief, pursuant to
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 32} Having overruled all of Coffman‘s assignments of error, the trial court‘s judgment will be affirmed.
DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Marcy A. Vonderwell
L. Patrick Mulligan
Successor of Hon. Stephen Wolaver