State of Ohio v. Phillip S. Clinton
Court of Appeals No. E-17-069
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ERIE COUNTY
August 31, 2018
2018-Ohio-3509
MAYLE, P.J.
Trial Court No. 2017 CR 0302; DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Karin L. Coble, for appellant.
MAYLE, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Phillip S. Clinton, appeals the November 3, 2017 judgment of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to an aggregate prison term of 34 months for two counts of aggravated assault, in violation of
I. Background
{¶ 2} On July 11, 2017, an Erie County Grand Jury indicted Clinton on eight different charges: two counts of assault in violation of
{¶ 3} On September 22, 2017, Clinton pleaded guilty to two amended counts of aggravated assault, in violation of
{¶ 4} A sentencing hearing was held on November 1, 2017, at which time the trial court sentenced Clinton to a prison term of 17 months for each count of aggravated assault, to be served consecutively, for a total term of 34 months.
{¶ 5} Clinton filed a notice of appeal on December 1, 2017, and raises the following assignments of error:
Assignment of Error One: The trial court failed to inform appellant of his Constitutional rights prior to accepting appellant‘s guilty plea, causing the plea to have been made unknowingly and involuntarily.
Assignment of Error Two: The trial court erred in imposing a consecutive sentence because the required statutory findings are not clearly and convincingly supported by the record.
Assignment of Error Three: The trial court failed to impose costs at the sentencing hearing and failed to find appellant had the ability to pay costs, rendering the imposition of costs invalid.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Clinton‘s Plea was Unknowing and Involuntary
{¶ 6} Under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions, a guilty plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily to be valid. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). In Clinton‘s first assignment of error, he argues that his plea was unknowing and involuntary because the trial court did not orally inform him of his constitutional right to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by
{¶ 7} Under
[A] trial court must strictly comply with
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and orally advise a defendant before accepting a felony plea that the plea waives (1) the right to a jury trial, (2) the right to confront one‘s accusers, (3) the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, (4) the right to require the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and (5) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. When the trial court fails to strictly comply with this duty, the defendant‘s plea is invalid. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 31.
{¶ 8} Here, the trial court engaged in the following colloquy with Clinton at the plea hearing regarding his constitutional rights:
THE COURT: Okay. Most importantly, do you understand that by entering these pleas of guilty you‘re giving up certain Constitutional rights;
for instance, you‘re giving up your right to trial by jury in this matter; do you understand that? MR. CLINTON: Yes.
THE COURT: Giving up your right to confront witnesses, and have your attorney cross-examine those witnesses that would testify against you at the trial; do you understand that?
MR. CLINTON: Yes.
THE COURT: You‘re also giving up your right to compulsory process, meaning you‘re giving up the right to have [your attorney] subpoena any witnesses that would testify on your behalf; do you understand that?
MR. CLINTON: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. And had you proceeded to trial and decided not—not to take the witness stand, you understand that no one could say anything in front of the jury about the fact that you chose not to testify against yourself; do you understand all that?
MR. CLINTON: Yes.
{¶ 9} The transcript confirms that the trial court explained four out of the five constitutional rights that are described in
{¶ 10} The state nonetheless argues that the trial court‘s failure to orally inform Clinton of this specific constitutional right created an “ambiguity” that was remedied by the written plea agreement, which included a paragraph that states:
I understand by pleading guilty I give up my right to a jury trial or court trial, where I could see and have my attorney question witnesses against me, and where I could use the power of the Court to call witnesses to testify for me. I know at trial I would not have to take the witness stand and could not be forced to testify against myself and that no one could comment if I chose not to testify. I understand I waive my right to have the prosecutor prove my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on every element of every charge. (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 11} The state is generally correct that “[a]n alleged ambiguity during a
{¶ 12} But here, the trial court completely failed to inform Clinton of his constitutional right to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, this case is unlike Barker and, instead, on all fours with Veney—which, we note, was explicitly discussed and reaffirmed in Barker.
{¶ 13} In Veney, the court held that “[a]lthough the trial court may vary slightly from the literal wording of the rule in the colloquy, the court cannot simply rely on other sources to convey those rights to the defendant.” Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, at ¶ 29. There, as here, “the trial court plainly failed to orally inform Veney of his constitutional right to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at ¶ 30. Thus, because the trial court had completely “failed to orally inform” the defendant of that constitutional right, the court could not “simply rely on other sources to convey these rights.” Id. at ¶ 29, 30.
{¶ 14} The same result is required in this case. The trial court completely failed to orally inform Clinton of his constitutional right to require the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the state may not “simply rely” on other portions of the record to remedy that failure. Given that the trial court failed to strictly comply with
Conclusion
{¶ 15} Clinton‘s first assignment of error is well-taken, and Clinton‘s second and third assignments of error are moot. We vacate Clinton‘s guilty pleas, reverse his convictions, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
{¶ 16} The state is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under
Judgment reversed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Arlene Singer, J.
JUDGE
James D. Jensen, J.
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, P.J. CONCUR.
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.