State v. ClellanState v. Clellan
Rendered on December 2, 2010
Richard C. Pfeiffer, Jr., City Attorney, Lara N. Baker, City Prosecutor, Melanie R. Tobias and Orly Ahroni, for appellee.
Joan K. Clellan, pro se.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court.
BRYANT, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Joan K. Clellan, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court denying her application to seal records pursuant to
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} Defendant and her husband each were charged with onе count of aggravated menacing in violation of
{¶3} On October 13, 2009, defendant filed an application to seal the records related to the charge against her. At a December 16, 2009 hearing, the Stаte of Ohio, without prior written notice to defendant, opposed defendant‘s application. In an entry dated December 16, 2009, the trial court denied defendant‘s application, determining the state‘s legitimate governmental interests in keeping the records open outweighed the interests of defendant in having them sealed.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶4} Defendant timely appeals, assigning the following errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I:
The trial court erred by denying Petitioner reasonable notice of opposition by prosecutor for the State to Petitioner‘s application for expungement.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II:
Thе trial court erred by denying Petitioner‘s application for expungement due to the fact that the manifest weight of the evidence before the trial court mandated the conclusion that the interests of Appellant in having her record sealed outweighed any hypothetical or legitimate needs of the government to maintain the same.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III:
The trial court erred as a matter of law by denying the Appellant‘s motion to expunge records.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV:
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to carry out the clear legislative intent in enacting
RC 2953.31 andRC 2953.52 by denying Appellant‘s application to expunge records.
III. Second and Fourth Assignments of Error
{¶5} Taken together, defendant‘s second and fourth assignments of error assert the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant‘s application to seal the records relating to the aggravated menacing charge for which she was acquitted.
A. Applicable Law
{¶6} Pursuant to
{¶7} “The decision whether to grant or deny an application to seal criminal records lies within the sound discretion of the triаl court.” Streets at ¶6, citing State v. Haney (1991), 70 Ohio App.3d 135, 138. An appellate court may only reverse such a
B. Trial Court Proceedings
{¶8} At the December 16, 2009 expungement hearing, the trial court asked the state why it objected to defendant‘s application to seal records. The state responded it objected on two grounds, both of which resolve to the same issue: a gun was involved in the scenario leading to the charges. The state initially noted that “the charge of aggravated menacing and the specific facts of this case involved a gun.” Secondly, the state asserted that, in the event law enforcement ever has to respond to defendant‘s residence again, it nеeded to “be aware that these people have used guns to protect themselves before.” (Tr. 3.)
{¶9} The trial court asked defendant to respond to the state‘s objections to her application to seal records. Defendant initially pointed to her background as a law-abiding attorney of 30 years, with “not so much as a traffic ticket” against her. (Tr. 5.) Because she had “done nothing wrong,” she did not want her “name to be smeared” or the “documents to be accessible.” (Tr. 6.) Defendant explained, “[t]he only reason [she] had a gun was because [she] was undеr a protective order” from a man who four times threatened to kill her as a result of her representing “his family against him in a probate matter.” (Tr. 6.) She advised she “was raised with guns[,] * * * know[s] the safe usage of guns[,] * * * [and] never pulled a gun on anyone.” (Tr. 7.) Noting she has political aspirations, defendаnt stated she would like the records to be sealed both for her own privacy and to prevent disclosure of this matter should she seek public office.
C. Argument on Appeal
{¶11} In response to defendant‘s second and fourth assigned errors, the state asserts the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request to seal records where the trial court complied with all statutory requirements by holding a hearing, asking questions, considering arguments and evidence, and weighing the interests of the parties. See Streets at ¶11, citing In re Page, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-966, 2009-Ohio-1565 (finding no abuse of discretion in denying application where trial court complied with all statutory requirements). The state argues that, after weighing defendant‘s interest in privacy against the government‘s interest in protecting its law enforcement officers against the рossibility of a future visit to defendant‘s residence, the trial court properly concluded the state‘s legitimate interests in opposing the application to seal outweighed defendant‘s interest in sealing them. See, e.g., In re Brown, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-715, 2008-Ohio-4105, ¶14 (noting “the government‘s interest in maintaining the safety of law enforсement officers is served by permitting access to criminal records of persons with whom officers are confronted, especially those * * * who were charged with crimes involving the discharge of a firearm“).
{¶13} Applying Kalish here by analogy, we first must “ensure that the trial court has adhered to all applicable rules and statutes” in its decision, the part of the review process the state‘s argument appears to address. Id. at ¶14. Thus, “[a]s a purely legal question, this is subject to review only to determine whether it is clearly and convincingly contrary to law * * *.” Id. Cf. Streets, supra. Once we have ascertained that the trial court complied with the statutory language, we must consider the trial court‘s applicаtion of the statutory language, under which the trial court has “full discretion” to determine whether the government‘s interest in maintaining open records outweighs the acquitted individual‘s need to have the records sealed. Id. at ¶16. Here, we agree with the state that the trial court‘s entry on its face complies with the statutory requirements. The remaining issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in the weighing process that led to the court‘s decision to deny the request to seal defendant‘s records.
{¶14} Defendant presented a plausible, legitimate reason for wanting the record sealed. She noted she is a 30-year attorney who has not incurred so much as a traffic
{¶15} To the extent the trial court relied on the argument that a gun alone warrants denying defendant‘s application to seal the records, it arguably erred. A single factor, such as the presence of a gun, generаlly is not a sufficient basis for denying an application. See State v. M.D., 8th Dist. No. 92534, 2009-Ohio-5694, ¶22, quoting State v. Haas, 6th Dist. No. L-04-1315, 2005-Ohio-4350, ¶24, citing State v. Hilbert (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 824, 827, appeal not allowed, 94 Ohio St.3d 1430, 2002-Ohio-5651 (noting “[t]he nature of the offense, however, ‘cannot provide the sole basis to deny an application’ “); State v. Berry (1999), 135 Ohio App.3d 250, 253 (reversing the trial court for failure to hold hearing and on the separate error of “summarily and categorically denying the application because the matters investigated were sex offenses“); State v. Bates, 5th Dist. No. 03-COA-057, 2004-Ohio-2260 (reversing denial of application where gambling addiction was sole basis for denying expungement of theft offense); cf. State v. Spicer, 1st Dist. No. C-040637, 2005-Ohio-4302, ¶9 (concluding trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the naturе of the offense “[o]nly after weighing all [the other] factors” presented by both parties at the hearing). Indeed, nothing in the statute governing applications to seal records suggests the presence of a gun alone is grounds for denying the application when possessing a gun is permitted under law.
{¶17} Moreover, although the state relies on Brown to support its argument, Brown is distinguishable. In Brown, the underlying offense involved a defendant who admitted he actually discharged a firearm. Here, however, no one alleged, and defendant did not admit, she discharged a firearm. Tо the contrary, defendant stated she has “never pulled a gun on anyone,” and the jury apparently agreed. (Tr. 7.) Similarly, to the extent the state or the trial court relied on the actions of defendant‘s co-defendant, neither the trial court nor the state clarifies on the record or through case law how his conduct creates a legitimate government interest in maintaining the records of defendant who was found not guilty of any offense. The co-defendant‘s records remain open and allow law enforcement to peruse them as needed if law enforcement is called to return to defendant‘s home.
{¶19} The abuse of discretion standard that applies here does not permit us to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court in weighing the various factors. See, e.g., Streets at ¶11 (holding thаt where trial court complied with all the statutory requirements and engaged in the requisite weighing of interests, an appellate court cannot find an abuse of discretion “[r]egardless of whether [the appellate] court might have ruled differently“). The trial court, however, has discretiоn only within the limits of the statute. Neither the state nor the trial court‘s decision articulates a legitimate government interest, under the facts and circumstances here, to support a decision to deny defendant‘s application to seal her records. Hilbert at 828 (stating the expungement statutes “are to be liberally construed, the relief available is to be liberally granted, and it is an abuse of discretion not to do so“).
{¶20} Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in concluding the legitimate interests of the government outweighed the interests of defendant in having her records sealed, and we sustain defendant‘s second and fourth assignments of error. Our
IV. Disposition
{¶21} Having sustained defendant‘s second and fourth assignments of error, we reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court and remand with instructions to grant defendant‘s application to seal her record pursuant to
Judgment reversed and case remanded with instructions.
TYACK, P.J., and CONNOR, J., concur.
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