STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, - vs - SCOTT A. CAUDILL, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. CA2017-05-011
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO MADISON COUNTY
2/12/2018
[Cite as State v. Caudill, 2018-Ohio-550.]
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CRI 20160158
Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Ohio Public Defender, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, Ohio 43215, for defendant-apрellant
OPINION
PIPER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Scott Caudill, appeals his convictions in the Madison County Court of Common Pleas for illegal manufacturing and possession of drugs.
{¶ 2} Madison County officials went to the home of Travis Basham to perform a welfare check on Basham‘s childrеn. The officials located a methamphetamine lab, and law enforcement officers later returned to arrest Basham. Officers discovered a
{¶ 3} Basham told officers that Caudill was a frequent visitor to Basham‘s house and that Caudill participated in manufacturing methamphetamine and using the drugs they created. Officers ran Caudill and his wife‘s information through a national database and learned that the two frequently purchased pseudoephedrine, a key ingredient in making methamphetamine, on multiple occasions. Officers later determined that Caudill‘s fingerprints werе located on the equipment used to manufacture the methamphetamine found in Basham‘s shed. Officers arrested Caudill, and the state charged him with illegal manufacture of drugs, illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs, and aggravated possеssion of drugs.
{¶ 4} Caudill pled not guilty, and the matter proceeded to a two-day trial. The jury found Caudill guilty on each count. During sentencing, the trial court merged the manufacturing charge into the possession conviction and sentenced Caudill to an aggregate sentence of five years in prison. The trial court ordered Caudill to pay a fine over objection. Caudill now appeals his convictions and sentence, raising the following assignments of error.
{¶ 5} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON COUNT III, AGGRAVATED DRUG POSSESSION WHEN THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION AND WHEN THE CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶ 7} Caudill argues in his first assignment of error that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and wеre against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 8} Whether the evidence presented at trial is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction, an appellate court examines the еvidence in order to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Paul, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2011-10-026, 2012-Ohio-3205, ¶ 9. Therefore, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, аny rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 9} A manifest weight of the evidence challenge examines the “inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.” State v. Barnett, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-177, 2012-Ohio-2372, ¶ 14. To determine whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the reviewing court must look at the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider thе credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Graham, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2008-07-095, 2009-Ohio-2814, ¶ 66.
{¶ 10} In reviewing the evidence, an aрpellate court must be mindful that the jury, as the original trier of fact, was in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and determine the weight to be given to the evidence. State v. Blankenburg, 197 Ohio App.3d 201, 2012-Ohio-1289, ¶ 114 (12th Dist.). Therefore, an appellate court will overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the evidence “only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id. Although the legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence are quantitatively and qualitatively
{¶ 11} In this assignment of error Caudill challenges only his conviction for possession of the finished methamphetamine product. According to
{¶ 12} “An accused has ‘constructive possession’ of an item when the accused is conscious of the item‘s presence and is able to exercise dominion and control over it, even if the item is not within the accused‘s immediate рhysical possession.” State v. Jester, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-10-264, 2012-Ohio-544, ¶ 25. Constructive possession may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone. Williams at ¶ 15. Absent a defendant‘s admission, the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the defendant‘s actions, are evidence that the trier of fact can consider in determining whethеr the defendant had constructive possession. Id.
{¶ 13} A person may knowingly possess or control property belonging to another; the state need not establish ownership to prove constructive possession and two or more persons may have possession of an object together if they can control it, exclusive of others. State v. Weckner, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2001-06-009, 2002-Ohio-1012.
{¶ 14} During trial, the state presented testimony demonstrating that Caudill‘s fingerprints were found on several items necessary in the manufacture of the methamphetamine,
{¶ 15} Moreover, Basham was a witness at trial and testified that Caudill brought pseudoephedrine to make the batch of methamphetamine seized from the shed by officers. An officer confirmed that Caudill was known to purchase pseudoephedrine, and testified that a search for Caudill‘s name in a national database indicated that Caudill purchased pseudoephedrine every 30 days. The officer further testified that there is a 30-day waiting period between times one is permitted to purchase pseudoephedrine.
{¶ 16} Basham also testified that Caudill was involved in the manufacturing process by cooking the methamphetamine, peeling batteries, measuring chemicals, and shaking the bottles. Caudill also instructed Basham on the manufacturing process, and Basham testified that Caudill was present on the nights when the specific mеthamphetamine was made that officers ultimately seized.
{¶ 17} After reviewing the record, and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond а reasonable doubt. Moreover, we find that the jury did not clearly lose its way or create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Caudill‘s first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶ 18} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 19} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONVICTING MR. CAUDILL OF A SECOND-
{¶ 20} Caudill argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court erred in convicting him of a second-degree felony for Count I, illegal manufacture of drugs, when the jury verdict form did not provide support for a second-degree conviction.
{¶ 21} According to
{¶ 22} “Pursuant to the clear language of
{¶ 23} According to
{¶ 24} Therefore, and to know which degree оf manufacturing Caudill was guilty of, the jury verdict form was required to contain either a designation of the specific degree or a
{¶ 25} The state contends that the only drug discussed during the trial was methamphetamine. While that may be true, the Ohio Supreme Court specifically directs reviewing courts to focus only upon the jury verdict form when determining whether the conviction comports with the dictates of
{¶ 26} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 27} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPOSING A $7,500 FINE AFTER DENYING MR. CAUDILL THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN WHY HE LACKED THE ABILITY TO PAY.
{¶ 28} Caudill argues in his third assignment of error that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay a $7,500 fine as part of his sentence.
{¶ 29} According to
{¶ 30} “Although preferable for appellate review, a trial court need not expliсitly state in its judgment entry that it considered a defendant‘s ability to pay a financial sanction. Rather, courts look to the totality of the record to see if this requirement has been satisfied.” State v. Dehner, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2012-12-090, 2013-Ohio-3576, ¶ 47. There are no express factors that must be considered or speсific findings made regarding the offender‘s ability to pay. State v. Dandridge, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2003-12-330, 2005-Ohio-1077, ¶ 6.
{¶ 31} “The determination that a defendant is indigent for purposes of appointed counsel is separate and distinct from a determination of being indigent for purposes of paying a mandatory fine.” State v. Johnson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-11-212, 2014-Ohio-3776, ¶ 15.
{¶ 32} Caudill filed an affidavit of indigenсy after being indicted, and later objected to any fine being imposed at sentencing. The affidavit of indigency reflected that Caudill had no income and few expenses. The trial court questioned Caudill regarding his finances and how he generated income. Specifically, the court asked Caudill how he had been supporting himself, and asked Caudill to describe his employment history. Caudill reported he had been “drawing assistance” but also told the court that he received help from his son and that he worked on cars, “mechanic work here and therе.” The trial court went on to conclude that while Caudill was indigent for the purposes of court-appointed counsel, Caudill nonetheless had “future earning capacities.” The court then imposed a $7,500 fine.
{¶ 33} While the transcript indicates that Caudill may have been interrupted by the trial court during his answer to the question about his employment history, the record nevertheless indicates that the trial court was able to consider Caudill‘s present and future ability to pay based on the answers Caudill had already given. Caudill invites us to speculate
{¶ 34} After personally observing Caudill and noting the difference between Caudill‘s affidavit and his representations at the sentencing hearing, nothing was presented to the trial court suggesting Caudill would not be able to pursue his mechanic endeavors in the future once his sentence has been served. We do not find the trial court failed to cоnsider Caudill‘s future ability to pay toward fines. As such, we overrule Caudill‘s final assignment of error.
{¶ 35} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter is remanded for the sole purpose of vacating Caudill‘s conviction for Count I as a second-degree felony, and entering a judgment and resentencing Caudill on Count I as a third-degree felony.
S. POWELL, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.