State v. CatlettState v. Catlett
Erika LaHote for Appellant
John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Scott L. Catlett (“Catlett“), appeals the December 16, 2022 judgment entry of sentence and the January 30, 2023 sex-offender-classification entry of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm appellate case number 1-22-83 and dismiss appellate case number 1-23-06.
{¶2} On November 10, 2021, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Catlett on Count One of kidnapping in violation of
{¶3} The case proceeded to a jury trial on December 13-16, 2022. On December 16, 2022, the jury found Catlett not guilty of the kidnapping charge alleged in Count One and the rape charge alleged in Count Two, but guilty of abduction (as a lesser-included offense of kidnapping) in violation of
{¶5} On January 30, 2023, the trial court classified Catlett as a Tier I sex offender after recognizing on January 10, 2023 that “the Court received a notification from the Department of Corrections that the sentencing entry in this case, filed on December 16, 2022, did not reflect a Tier designation.” (Doc. Nos. 144, 148, 149).
{¶6} Catlett filed his notices of appeal on December 28, 2022 (assigned appellate case number 1-22-83) and February 22, 2023 (assigned appellate case number 1-23-06). This court consolidated the cases for purposes of appeal. Catlett raises three assignments of error for our review. For ease of our discussion, we will address Catlett‘s third assignment of error, followed by his first and second assignments of error together.
Catlett‘s convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence, in violation of his right to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶7} In his third assignment of error, Catlett argues that his abduction and gross-sexual-imposition convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Catlett contends that his abduction and gross-sexual-imposition convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence because “[t]he testimony offered by [the victim] was riddled with inconsistencies, evasion, and contractions.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 18).
Standard of Review
{¶8} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.‘” State v. Tompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the
Analysis
{¶9} In this case, Catlett was convicted of abduction in violation of
(A) No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual contact with the offender; or cause two or more other persons to have sexual contact when any of the following applies:
(1) The offender purposely compels the other person, or one of the other persons, to submit by force or threat of force.
In addressing the force-or-threat-of-force language under the rape statute,
[t]he Supreme Court of Ohio has further clarified that “[a] defendant purposely compels another to submit to sexual conduct by force or threat of force if the defendant uses physical force against that person, or creates the belief that physical force will be used if the victim does not submit. A threat of force can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding sexual conduct[.]”
State v. Henry, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-08-10, 2009-Ohio-3535, ¶ 26 (applying the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s discussion of the force-or-threat-of-force element to Ohio‘s gross-sexual-imposition statute), quoting State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51 (1992), paragraph one of the syllabus. Indeed, “‘[f]orce’ is defined as ‘any violence, compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person
{¶11} On appeal, Catlett argues that his abduction and gross-sexual imposition convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence because the victim‘s testimony lacks credibility and reliability. In particular, Catlett asserts that the jury lost its way in concluding that he committed the offenses because (1) the victim‘s explanation of the events was not plausible; (2) the victim “offered only vague reasons why he was fearful of Catlett and believed him capable of using force to cause [the victim] harm“; and (3) the victim‘s testimony was contradictory. (Appellant‘s Brief at 21). Further, Catlett contends that the evidence of a “text [message] exchange between [the victim] and his brother” and the DNA evidence presented at trial weigh against his convictions because—absent the victim‘s testimony—that evidence does not demonstrate that Catlett restrained the victim‘s
{¶12} However, we will not second-guess the weight that the jury assigned to the evidence that Catlett committed the offenses or the jury‘s witness-credibility determination unless it is clear that the jury lost its way and a miscarriage of justice occurred. See State v. Mitchell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93076, 2010-Ohio-520, ¶ 20 (announcing that courts of appeal will not second guess witness-credibility determinations unless it is clear that the jury lost its way and a miscarriage of justice occurred); State v. Banks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96535, 2011-Ohio-5671, ¶ 13 (“Although we review credibility when considering the manifest weight of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses is primarily a determination for the trier of fact.“), citing DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, at paragraph one of the syllabus. “The trier of fact is best able ‘to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures[,] and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.‘” Banks at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 24. “Therefore, typically, ‘[m]ere disagreement over the credibility of witnesses is not a sufficient reason to reverse a judgment on manifest weight grounds.‘” State v. Poindexter, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-394, 2021-Ohio-1499, ¶ 33, quoting State v. Harris, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-770, 2014-Ohio-2501, ¶ 25.
{¶14} After reviewing the entirety of the record, we conclude that Catlett‘s arguments concerning the weight of the evidence are unpersuasive. Even though the “‘credibility of the witnesses was the primary factor in determining guilt‘” in this case, “‘the choice between credible witnesses and their conflicting testimony rests solely with the finder of fact and an appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact.‘” State v. White, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-21, 2017-Ohio-1488, ¶ 50, quoting In re N.Z., 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2010-L-023, 2010-L-035, and 2010-L-041, 2011-Ohio-6845, ¶ 79, quoting State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 123 (1986). Importantly, Catlett‘s trial counsel explored the credibility issue at trial and thoroughly cross-examined the victim. See State v. Bachman, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-17-006, 2018-Ohio-1242, ¶ 18. Thus, in reaching
{¶15} Likewise, contrary to Catlett‘s contention that the text-message and DNA evidence weighs against his convictions, that evidence bolsters the victim‘s testimony. Indeed, similar to the jury‘s dominion over gauging the credibility of witnesses, “it was the prerogative of the jury to take note of [any] inconsistencies and resolve or discount them accordingly.” Ealy, 2016-Ohio-1185, ¶ 20. Importantly, “‘while the [factfinder] may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve or discount them accordingly, * * * such inconsistencies do not render [a] defendant‘s conviction against the manifest weight * * * of the evidence.‘” Ealy at ¶ 29, quoting Samatar, 152 Ohio App.3d 311, quoting Craig, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 99AP-739, 2000 WL 297252, *3 (Mar. 23, 2000).
{¶16} Notwithstanding the jury‘s superior role in resolving inconsistency and credibility issues, Catlett‘s DNA-evidence argument fails to consider “that a criminal conviction can be based in whole or in part on circumstantial evidence.” State v. Marques, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-849, 2019-Ohio-42, ¶ 29. “‘Circumstantial evidence’ is the ‘proof of facts by direct evidence from which the trier of fact may infer or derive by reasoning or other facts.‘” State v. Lawwill, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-01-014, 2008-Ohio-3592, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Wells, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2006-02-029, 2007-Ohio-1362, ¶ 11. Importantly, circumstantial evidence has no less probative value than direct evidence. State v. Griesheimer, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-1039, 2007-Ohio-837, ¶ 26. Thus, contrary to Catlett‘s contention regarding the lack of proof as to “how [Catlett‘s] DNA was deposited” on the victim‘s underwear, the jury could infer how the DNA was deposited based on the victim‘s testimony. (Appellant‘s Brief at 22). See State v. Frye, 5th Dist. Richland No. 17CA5, 2017-Ohio-7733, ¶ 47.
{¶17} Therefore, after reviewing the evidence, the trier of fact did not lose its way and create such a manifest miscarriage of justice requiring that we reverse Catlett‘s convictions and order a new trial. Thus, Catlett‘s abduction and gross-sexual-imposition convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶18} Catlett‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court did not retain jurisdiction to impose the requirements of
The trial court violated Catlett‘s Due Process and Double Jeopardy Rights when, following his December 16, 2022, sentencing, it held a subsequent sex offender classification hearing imposing additional punishment for a conviction for which he was already sentenced. See Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶19} In his first and second assignments of error, Catlett argues that the trial court erred by classifying him as a Tier I sex offender. Catlett specifically contends in his first assignment of error that the trial court was without jurisdiction to classify him as a sex offender since he “had filed a notice of appeal” from the trial court‘s December 16, 2022 judgment entry of sentence. Furthermore, Catlett argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court deprived him of due process and violated his protection from double jeopardy by classifying him as a sex offender after it imposed his sentence.
Standard of Review
{¶20} Under
{¶21} In this case, the trial court notified Catlett of his Tier I sex-offender status and reporting requirements on January 30, 2023—that is, the trial court notified Catlett of his sex-offender status and registration requirements more than one month after the trial court sentenced Catlett and after Catlett filed his notice of direct appeal. Specifically, at Catlett‘s sentencing hearing, the trial court decided “not [to] impose any duty to register on [Catlett] at th[at] time” after questioning whether Catlett was subject to such sex-offender registration. (Dec. 13-16, 2022 Tr., Vol. III, at 541). Catlett filed his notice of direct appeal of the trial court‘s December 16, 2022 judgment entry of sentence on December 28, 2022. Nevertheless, the trial court—on its own motion—concluded on January 10, 2023 that such notification is required as a matter of law. Consequently, the trial court notified Catlett of his sex-offender classification and registration requirements on January 30, 2023.
{¶22} “‘It is well established that a trial court cannot reconsider a valid final judgment in a criminal case.‘” State v. Clark, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-18-10, 2018-Ohio-4168, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Cozzone, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2017-G-041, 2018-Ohio-2249, ¶ 34. See also State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, ¶ 20 (addressing a trial court‘s “‘lack [of] authority to reconsider their own
{¶23} In this case, because a trial court‘s reconsideration of a final and appealable order is a nullity and not subject to appeal, we conclude that the trial court‘s January 30, 2023 sex-offender notification is not a final, appealable order. See Clark at ¶ 14. In other words, the trial court‘s January 30, 2023 entry is null and void and of no legal consequence. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal in appellate case number 1-23-06—that is, we lack jurisdiction to consider Catlett‘s first and second assignments of error. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal in appellate case number 1-23-06.
{¶24} Moreover, even though there may be an issue as to whether the trial court was statutorily required to notify Catlett at sentencing of his sex-offender registration requirements, we cannot reach that issue in this appeal since the State did not appeal from the trial court‘s December 16, 2022 judgment entry.
Judgment Affirmed in Case Number 1-22-83.
Appeal Dismissed in Case Number 1-23-06
MILLER and HESS, J.J., concur.
** Judge Michael D. Hess of the Fourth District Court of Appeals, sitting by Assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.