STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE vs. MICHAEL CARTER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
No. 94967
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
June 2, 2011
2011-Ohio-2658
BEFORE: E. Gallagher, J., Sweeney, P.J., and Rocco, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED; Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-528720
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Terrence K. Scott
Assistant State Public Defender
250 East Broad Street
Suite 1400
Columbus, Ohio 43215-2998
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: T. Allan Regas
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} Michael Carter appeals from his convictions rendered in the Court of Common Pleas. Carter argues his convictions for gross sexual imposition in violation of
{¶ 2} On October 5, 2009, a Cuyahoga County grand jury indicted Carter on four counts of rape pursuant to
{¶ 3} The state of Ohio presented the testimony of five witnesses: K.W., the underage victim, Lekisha Scott, a Cuyahoga County Social Worker, Cleveland Police Department Detective Richard Durst, Cleveland Police Officer Mark Pesta and N.R., the mother of the underage victim. The evidence presented by the State centered around four incidents where Carter sexually abused K.W. However, as the trial court found Carter guilty of only two incidents of sexual abuse, for purposes of clarity, we will limit our discussion of the facts to those two incidents.
{¶ 4} K.W., born April 26, 1994, testified that during the summer of 2006, Carter began sexually abusing her. K.W. stated that during that
{¶ 5} K.W. also testified that Carter sexually abused her when she was 14 years of age. At the time of this incident, K.W. was visiting her aunt and Carter at their new residence located at 8114 Beman Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio 44105.1 K.W. stated that she and her cousin D.R. were present in a room when Carter entered. She testified as follows:
{¶ 6} “He pulled the cover over me. He started touching again — touching me again, and I was moving him like — I mean, I was moving
{¶ 7} K.W. clarified that during this incident, Carter inserted his fingers into her vagina.
{¶ 8} After this incident occurred, K.W. returned to her mother‘s house and eventually told her mother about Carter‘s actions. K.W. also told a Euclid police officer, who picked her up for truancy, of Carter‘s actions. K.W.‘s mother, N.R., contacted the Cleveland Police Department and filed a police report.
{¶ 9} Lekisha Scott testified that she was the Cuyahoga County Social Worker assigned to K.W.‘s case. Ms. Scott interviewed K.W., her mother, and Carter. Ms. Scott informed Carter of the nature of the allegations and he responded by stating that the allegations were untrue. Carter also provided Ms. Scott with a variety of reasons as to why K.W. would make false allegations against him.
{¶ 10} Cleveland Police Detective Richard Durst, assigned to the Sex
{¶ 11} Cleveland Police Officer Mark Pesta testified that K.W. and her mother reported the sexual abuse to him. Officer Pesta took K.W.‘s statement, verified that Carter lived in Cleveland, and reported the abuse to the county child abuse hotline.
{¶ 12} K.W.‘s mother, testified at trial that when K.W. informed her of Carter‘s actions, she took her daughter to the Euclid police station to report the incident. Ms. Roberts was eventually directed to the Cleveland Police Department where she gave her statement to Officer Pesta.
{¶ 13} The state rested its case at the conclusion of Ms. Roberts‘s testimony. Based on the evidence before the court, the trial judge dismissed two counts of rape pursuant to Crim.R. 29.
{¶ 14} The defendant presented the testimony of his wife, Julia Roberts Carter, D.R., and himself. Julia denied that the allegations occurred and blamed her sister, Ms. Roberts, for the allegations being brought against her
{¶ 15} The trial court granted the motion of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29 as to Counts 1 and 8.
{¶ 16} The trial court found Carter guilty of gross sexual imposition of a person less than 13 years of age, a felony of the third degree under Count 2, but not guilty of the sexual predator specification in that Count, and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, a felony of the third degree and a lesser included offense of the charge of rape under Count 5.2 The court found Carter not guilty on the remaining charges and all attendant specifications. It is from this conviction that Carter appeals, raising a single assignment of error.
“The trial court violated Michael Carter‘s rights to due process and a fair trial when it entered judgments of conviction for gross sexual imposition and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, when those
{¶ 17} In evaluating a challenge based on manifest weight of the evidence, a court sits as the thirteenth juror, and intrudes its judgment into proceedings that it finds to be fatally flawed through misrepresentation or misapplication of the evidence by a jury that has “lost its way.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. As the Ohio Supreme Court declared:
“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.’
* * The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id., at 387. (Internal citations omitted.)
{¶ 18} This court is mindful that weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact and a reviewing
{¶ 19} In reviewing the entire record, we cannot conclude that the trial court lost its way in convicting Carter of gross sexual imposition and unlawful sexual conduct of a minor. Carter contends that the victim was not credible as there was no physical evidence or eyewitness to corroborate her testimony. Because of the nature of the sexual abuse and the timeline of police involvement, it is not surprising that there was no physical evidence of the encounters. Additionally, although D.R. was present in the room for the second incident, she refused to answer any questions as to Michael Carter‘s contact with K.W. Accordingly, we cannot say whether D.R. witnessed the abuse or not.
{¶ 20} Carter contends that the victim was not credible because she
{¶ 21} Additionally, Carter contends that the victim was not credible because her timeline of the sexual abuse was inconsistent. Although K.W. could not remember the exact dates, she could give an approximate date based on the circumstances, holidays, and events within her family. Lastly, Carter alleges that the victim‘s mother, N.R., was trying to set him up. N.R. denied this allegation.
{¶ 22} Although Carter argues that his version of events should have been relied upon by the trial court, the trier of fact is in the best position to weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. As the reviewing court, we find that the trier of fact could reasonably conclude from the substantial evidence presented by the State, that the State has proven the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we cannot find that the trier of fact lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
{¶ 23} The sole assignment of error is overruled; the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J., and
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR
