STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THADDEUS CARROLL, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 32,909
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
October 21, 2013
VIGIL, Judge.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY, Judith Nakamura, District Judge. Gary K. King, Attorney General, Corinna Laszlo-Henry, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee. Bennett J. Baur, Acting Chief Public Defender, Santa Fe, NM, Susan Burgess-Farrell, District Public Defender, Steven J. Forsberg, Assistant Public Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
OPINION
VIGIL, Judge.
{1} Defendant Thaddeus Carroll was convicted of driving while under the influence (DWI) in violation of
DISCUSSION
{2} The State‘s challenge to this Court‘s authority necessitates that we consider both our jurisdiction and Defendant‘s right to appeal. “Jurisdiction” refers to subject matter jurisdiction and “implicates a court‘s power to decide the issue before it.” State v. Rudy B., 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 14, 149 N.M. 22, 243 P.3d 726 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, as our Supreme Court acknowledged early in our State‘s jurisprudence, a grant of jurisdiction does not “confer upon litigants an affirmative right to invoke such jurisdiction.” State v. Chacon, 1914-NMSC-079, ¶ 8, 19 N.M. 456, 145 P. 125, superseded by constitutional amendment,
{3} Both this Court‘s jurisdiction and a litigant‘s right to appeal must derive from a statute or constitutional provision. See City of Las Cruces v. Sanchez, 2007-NMSC-042, ¶ 10, 142 N.M. 243, 164 P.3d 942 (“[I]t has long been settled that the creating of a right of appeal is a matter of substantive law and outside the province of the court‘s rule making power.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted)); State v. Smallwood, 2007-NMSC-005, ¶ 6, 141 N.M. 178, 152 P.3d 821 (“[O]ur Constitution or Legislature must vest us with appellate jurisdiction[.]“). Our Supreme Court has recognized that it cannot create jurisdiction through its rule-making authority. Id. ¶ 6. Similarly, our Supreme Court has “conceded that if the [L]egislature ha[s] authorized no appeal, [it is] powerless to create the right of appeal by rule.” State v. Arnold, 1947-NMSC-043, ¶ 11, 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845. This Court is therefore limited to relying on state constitutional and statutory provisions to support our conclusion that Defendant has the right to appeal, and this Court has the authority to consider it.
Jurisdiction
{5} The Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction is governed by Article VI, Section 29 of the New Mexico Constitution and
As discussed above, “[t]he phrase ‘as may be provided by law’ means that our Constitution or Legislature must vest us with appellate jurisdiction[.]” See Smallwood, 2007-NMSC-005, ¶ 6. The Legislature has defined this Court‘s jurisdiction in Section 34-5-8.
Right to Appeal
{6} Of course, a determination that this Court has jurisdiction does not end our inquiry. Instead, we must also determine
Any party aggrieved by a judgment rendered by the metropolitan court in a criminal action involving driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors . . . may appeal to the district court of the county in which the metropolitan court is located within fifteen days after the judgment was rendered. The manner and method of appeal shall be set forth by supreme court rule.
{7} The State points out that these provisions do not explicitly provide for an appeal to this Court, instead, referring only to appeals to district court. The State further argues that to the extent court procedural rules indicate that defendants have a right to appeal the district court‘s review of a metropolitan court decision to this Court, our Supreme Court was without authority to grant a right of appeal via rule.2 While we have acknowledged that the Supreme Court does not have authority to create or enlarge a right to appeal, the Supreme Court does have authority to promulgate procedural rules where the right to appeal has been provided by the Legislature.
{8} The State argues that the term “criminal proceeding” in Section 39-3-3 should not be interpreted as extending to a district court‘s “on-record review of a lower court judgment.” The State‘s argument is premised on the fact that a defendant bears the burden to prosecute his or her appeal in district court, see Rule 5-828 NMRA; that our case law describes an appeal as “no part of the trial,” see Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 1976-NMSC-031, ¶ 20, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354; and that the rules governing such appeals are collected under “appeals” or “special proceedings” within the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Metropolitan Courts and District Courts, see Rules 7-703 and 5-827. Having considered these arguments, we conclude that the State‘s definition of “criminal proceeding” is much too narrow.
“Proceeding” is a word much used to express the business done in courts. . . . It is more comprehensive than the word “action,” but it may include in its general sense all the steps taken or measures adopted in the prosecution or defense of an action, including the pleadings and judgment. As applied to actions, the term “proceeding” may include—(1) the institution of the action; (2) the appearance of the defendant; (3) all ancillary or provisional steps, . . . (7) the trial; (8) the judgment; (9) the execution; . . . (11) the taking of the appeal or writ of error[.]
Black‘s Law Dictionary 1324 (9th ed. 2009). Based on this definition of “proceeding,” we conclude that Section 39-3-3(A)(1) is intended to include a defendant‘s right to appeal a district court‘s review of an on-record metropolitan court decision.
{10} Moreover, if this Court were to construe the term “proceeding” as the State suggests, we would necessarily have to conclude that our Supreme Court did not possess the authority to promulgate Rule 5-827(N); that by promulgating Rule 5-827(N), our Supreme Court exercised legislative power; and that by doing so it violated the New Mexico Constitution. “It is, of course, a well-established principle of statutory construction that statutes should be construed, if possible, to avoid constitutional questions.” Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 1991-NMSC-002, ¶ 12, 111 N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603. Accordingly, where this Court is presented with a reasonable interpretation of a statute that does not call into question the constitutionality of the actions of our Supreme Court, that interpretation is the one this Court will adopt.
{11} Finally, the State argues that interpreting Section 39-3-3 to provide for a right to appeal under these circumstances would give rise to claims under the Equal Protection Clause. The State argues that to provide a second appeal by right for certain petty crimes, but not for more serious crimes, is an “unreasoned distinction” that bears no “rational relationship to any legitimate state interest.” While we note that our interpretation of the relevant statutes recognize a different appellate procedure depending on the type of crime, we disagree that it rises to the level of an equal protection violation. Practically speaking, however, the Legislature‘s decision to alter the nature of the appeal for petty offenses originating in metropolitan court from de novo to on-record, eliminated the necessity for the most populous district in this State to hold a de novo trial where the case had already been heard by a law-trained judge. Compare
CONCLUSION
{12} We conclude Section 34-5-8(A)(3) vests this Court with jurisdiction to hear appeals from a district court‘s on-record review of a metropolitan court decision, and
{13} IT IS SO ORDERED.
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge
WE CONCUR:
M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge