OPINION
{1} The New Mexico Legislature has mandated that any indemnity clause in a construction contract that seeks to shift tort liability from one party to another “is void, unenforceable and against the public policy of the state.” NMSA 1978, § 56-7-l(A) (2005). In this ease, we answer a question that has been certified to us by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: Is a contract for the rental of a scissor lift to be used in the construction of an aircraft hangar a “contract or agreement relating to construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of any real property,” and therefore a “construction contract” as defined in Section 56-7-l(E)? We hold that it is.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{2} In 2006, Yearout Mechanical, Inc., was a subcontractor installing duct work in the new Eclipse Aviation hangar at the Albuquerque International Sunport. To perform that work along the fifty-foot-high ceiling, Yearout rented a scissor lift on March 1 from an equipment rental company, United Rentals Northwest, Inc., which delivered the lift to the job site the same day.
{3} Under the terms of the rental contract, Yearout was not authorized to perform any repairs or maintenance on the scissor lift. The contract provided that “[sjhould the Equipment become unsafe, malfunction or require repair, Customer shall immediately cease using the Equipment and immediately notify United” and that “[i]f such condition is the result of normal operation, United will repair or replace the Equipment....” Year-out twice had to call United to the site to perform maintenance on the lift, once on March 28 and again on March 30.
{4} On April 1, two days after United’s last repair, two employees of Yearout, Anthony Magoffe and Camerino Michel Ramirez, boarded the aerial platform of the scissor lift in order to install new sections of duct work on the hangar ceiling. Routine inspections of the lift detected nothing that appeared to be abnormal before the men went aloft. After completing their tasks, Magoffe and Ramirez began their final descent when the scissor lift began rocking back and forth and then fell over sideways. In an effort to save himself, Magoffe grabbed onto a ceiling beam, but he was struck by the falling lift and fell headfirst to his death on the concrete floor nearly fifty feet below. Ramirez remained on the scissor lift’s platform during the fall but was ejected when the lift hit the ground. He died before he reached the hospital.
{5} The workers’ personal representatives brought wrongful death actions against both United and the manufacturer of the scissor lift, JLG Industries, Inc. United ultimately settled with the workers’ estates after several year’s of litigation. United then sued Yearout in federal court, arguing that Year-out should be required to reimburse United for its settlement of the workers’ suit, not because of any wrongdoing on Yearout’s part, but based instead on an “Indemnity/Hold Harmless” clause that was one of twenty-three “Additional Terms and Conditions” preprinted on the back side of United’s “Rental Out Contract” signed by Yearout when it rented the scissor lift:
3 INDEMN1TY/HOLD HARMLESS. TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, CUSTOMER AGREES TO INDEMNIFY, DEFEND AND HOLD UNITED [RENTALS) HARMLESS PROM AND AGAINST ANY AND ALL LIABILITY, CLAIM, LOSS, DAMAGE OR COSTS (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ATTORNEYS’ FEES, LOSS OF PROFIT, BUSINESS INTERRUPTION OR OTHER SPECIAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, DAMAGES RELATING TO BODILY INJURY, DAMAGES RELATING TO WRONGFUL DEATH) CAUSED BY OR IN ANY WAY ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THE OPERATION, USE, MAINTENANCE, INSTRUCTION, POSSESSION, TRANSPORTATION, OWNERSHIP OR RENTAL OF THE EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING WHENEVER SUCH LIABILITY, CLAIM, LOSS, DAMAGE, OR COST IS FOUNDED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, UPON ANY NEGLIGENT OR GROSSLY NEGLIGENT ACT OR OMISSION OF UNITED [RENTALS] OR THE PROVISION OF ANY ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE PRODUCT BY UNITED [RENTALS] THIS INDEMNITY PROVISION APPLIES TO ANY CLAIMS ASSERTED AGAINST UNITED [RENTALS] BASED UPON STRICT OR PRODUCT LIABILITY CAUSES OF ACTION OR BREACH OF WARRANTY
(approximate size of text in original).
{6} United argued that Yearout, by signing the rental contract, agreed to “indemnify, defend and hold United harmless from and against any and all liability ... relating to wrongful death” caused by (1) the operation “of the equipment, including ... [liability founded upon any] negligent act or omission of United,” (2) the provision of any “defective product by United,” or (3) any claims “based upon strict or product liability....” Yearout moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the indemnity clause was unenforceable under Section 56-7-1’s provisions invalidating indemnification clauses in contracts related to construction that would shift responsibility for wrongdoing from a culpable party to an innocent party. The United States District Court agreed that Section 56-7-1 encompassed rental contracts related to construction projects and granted Yearout’s motion to dismiss United’s claim. United appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which submitted the issue to this Court, pursuant to the certification procedures of Rule 12-607 NMRA under NMSA 1978, Section 39-7-4 (1997).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
{7} This case presents a pure question of statutory interpretation. “The meaning of language used in a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.” Cooper v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc.,
B. The Relevant Statutory Provisions
{8} The resolution of this case hinges on the interpretation and application of a statutory bar to indemnity clauses contained in “construction contracts”:
A provision in a construction contract that requires one party to the contract to indemnify, hold harmless, insure or defend the other party to the contract, including the other party’s employees or agents, against liability, claims, damages, losses or expenses, including attorney fees, arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or resulting from, in whole or in part, the negligence, act or omission of the indemnitee, its officers, employees or agents, is void, unenforceable and against the public policy of the state.
Section 56-7-l(A) (emphasis added). The Legislature has provided further guidance by defining the statutory term “construction contract”:
“[C]onstruction contract” means a public, private, foreign or domestic contract or agreement relating to construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of any real property in New Mexico and includes agreements for architectural services, demolition, design services, development, engineering services, excavation or other improvement to real property, including buildings, shafts, wells and structures, whether on, above or under real property.
Section 56-7-l(E) (emphasis added). In order to answer the question certified to us, we therefore must determine whether a contract for rental of equipment to be used in a construction project is a “contract or agreement relating to construction” within the scope of the statute. 1
C. Facial Language Analysis
{9} The first guiding principle in statutory construction dictates that we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply “the plain meaning rule, recognizing that ‘[w]hen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.’ ” Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
{10} Instead of writing a narrow anti-indemnification statute that addressed only contracts for construction, the Legislature defined the statutory scope as including all contracts relating to construction. “Relating to” is defined as “hav[ing] connection, relation, or reference [to.]” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1472 (4th ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 2000); see also Bettini v. City of Las Cruces,
{11} The facts of this ease demonstrate the relationship between the construction equipment rental contract and the construction project in which the scissor lift was to be used. The rental contract written by United specifically recited on its face the name of the construction project, its location, its job number, and the particular phase of construction. United employees delivered the commercial-sized scissor lift to the construction site where it was to be used. United knew it was contracting with Year out Mechanical, a licensed subcontractor with purchase order credit privileges allowing for payment of charges within 30 days after the rental date. All concerned had to have known the lift was rented for use in relation to construction activities.
{12} Despite all those factors, we share United’s concern that the term “relating to,” standing alone, can be an uncertain term with no clear end to its reach. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc.,
{13} Examining the remainder of the statutory language, while often helpful, is not determinative in this case. On the one hand, United argues that rental agreements for construction equipment are not included in the general clause, “agreement[s] relating to construction, alteration, repair or maintenance” of real property, because rental agreements are not named or implied in the ensuing list of specifically included agreements: “architectural services, demolition, design services, development, engineering services, excavation or other improvement to real property.” Section 56-7-l(E). Our caselaw, on the other hand, recognizes that the use of the word “includes” to connect a general clause to a list of enumerated examples demonstrates a legislative intent to provide an incomplete list of activities:
A term whose statutory definition declares what it includes is more susceptible to extension of meaning by construction than where the definition declares what a term means. It has been said the word “includes” is usually a term of enlargement, and not of limitation.... It, therefore, conveys the conclusion that there are other items includable, though not specifically enumerated____
In re Estate of Corwin,
{14} The manner in which the Legislature actually wrote the statute — by providing a list of non-obvious examples — equally supports the contention that it sought to indicate the broad range of agreements “relating to” construction projects. A plain reading of the general phrase “relating to construction, alteration, repair or maintenance” does not clearly indicate that architectural, design, engineering, or development services would be included, nor does it make obvious that deconstruction activities, such as “demolition” and “excavation,” are included as activities related to construction projects.
{15} In support of its argument that the examples are intended to exclude construction rental contracts, United defines the class of specifically enumerated examples as “services performed in connection with a construction project” and argues that a rental service for construction equipment is not a service. While it is true that the specific terms listed, “architectural services, demolition, design services, development, engineering services, [and] excavation,” Section 56-7-1(E), are all services to be performed in connection with a construction project, renting construction equipment is also a service that can be performed in connection with a construction project. The contractor’s use of rental construction equipment is just as necessary to the completion of a construction project as the use of the designer’s vision, the architect’s plans, the engineer’s specifications, and the developer’s resources. On its face, therefore, the statute neither clearly includes nor clearly excludes construction equipment rentals.
{16} Because we cannot definitively interpret the statute by a simple consideration of statutory language that is susceptible to more than one interpretation on its face, we must look to other guides of statutory interpretation. State v. Davis,
D. Legislative Purpose
{17} When interpreting statutes, our primary goal is “to facilitate and promote the legislature’s ... purpose.” State v. Smith,
{18} New Mexico precedent has recognized that Section 56-7-1 is “based on a public policy promoting safety in construction projects by holding each party to the contract accountable for injuries caused by its own negligence.” City of Albuquerque v. BPLW Architects & Eng’rs, Inc.,
{19} In enacting the anti-indemnification statutes, the Legislature overrode competing public policies favoring the freedom to contract. In general, parties have the freedom to enter into contracts that exculpate one party from liability for its own negligence unless the agreements are “violative of law or contrary to some rule of public policy.” Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp.,
{20} In its anti-indemnification statutes, the Legislature has implicitly recognized what our courts have expressly articulated as the societal benefits that can be promoted by holding wrongdoers responsible for the harmful consequences of their own behavior. “Our fault system of recovery ... serves the important social functions,” among others, of “deterring conduct that society regards as unreasonable or immoral, and providing a vehicle by which ... society may give voice and form to its condemnation of the wrongdoer.” Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque,
{21} If, as the caselaw has recognized, a legislative purpose in invalidating anti-indemnification clauses in agreements “relating to” construction projects is to make the workplace safer, it is difficult to articulate a principled basis for excluding construction equipment rental agreements from the intended scope of the statute. For example, if Year-out had subcontracted with United to construct scaffolding to be used at the building site to install ducts on the hangar ceiling, and United’s negligence in constructing the scaffolding had caused two employees to plunge to their deaths, the statute undeniably would prohibit United’s reliance on any anti-indemnification clause to shift the economic consequences of its own liability back to Yearout. We can perceive no principled difference between that situation and the case at bar in which United, instead of constructing scaffolding, provided to Yearout and was responsible for keeping in good repair a scissor lift that Yearout used to perform the same work and that caused the same fatal results. United has articulated no policy justifying any such distinction throughout these proceedings, relying instead on formalistic statutory construction arguments. We now examine those arguments.
E. Statutory Provisions In Pari Materia
{22} As our precedents exemplify, where a plain language analysis does not provide a clear interpretation, we can “look to other statutes in pari materia in order to determine legislative intent.” State v. Martinez,
{23} In 1971, the Legislature enacted two different anti-indemnity statutes: NMSA 1953, Section 28-2-1 (Vol. 5, 1975 Pocket Supp.), which voided indemnity clauses in contracts “relating to” construction activities, and NMSA 1953, Section 28-2-2 (Vol. 5, 1975 Pocket Supp.), which voided indemnity clauses in contracts “pertaining to” drilling or mining operations. Both statutes were recodified in 1978 as NMSA 1978, Sections 56-7-1 and 56-7-2, respectively, and have been amended from time to time since their original enactment.
{24} United argues that because only Section 56-7-2, the statute addressing drilling and mining activities, contained express language referring to equipment rental agreements, the Legislature intended to exclude rental agreements from the scope of Section 56-7-1, the statute addressing construction activities. The original language of Section 56-7-2(B) provided, in pertinent part:
An “agreement pertaining to any well for oil, gas or water, or mine for any mineral” means any agreement ... concerning any operations related to drilling, deepening, reworking, repairing, improving, testing, treating, perforating, acidizing, logging, conditioning, altering, plugging or otherwise rendering services in, or in connection with, any well drilled for the purpose of producing or disposing of oil, gas or other minerals or water, and designing, excavating, constructing, improving or otherwise rendering services on, or in connection with, any mine shaft, drift or other structure intended for use in the exploration for, or production of, any mineral, or an agreement to perform any portion of any such work or services or any act collateral thereto, including the famishing or rental of equipment, incidental transportation and other goods and services famished in connection with any such service or operation.
NMSA 1953, § 28-2-2(B) (1971) [§ 56-7-2(B) (amended 2003) ] (emphasis added).
{25} Among the numerous differences between the wording of Sections 56-7-1 and 56-7-2 is that Section 28-2-2(B) [Section 56-7-2(B) ] specifically mentions equipment rentals and Section 28-2-1 [Section 56-7-1] does not. The inference United asks us to draw is that the Legislature must have intended to prohibit indemnification clauses in drilling and mining equipment rental agreements, but to permit them in construction equipment rental agreements. We note that in general, “if a statute on a particular subject omits a particular provision, inclusion of that provision in another related statute indicates an intent [that] the provision is not applicable to the statute from which it was omitted.” Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of Salinas,
{26} Other varying language in the mining and construction anti-indemnification statutes exemplifies the need for caution in using simplistic and formulaic analyses of statutory wording. For example, the original language of Section 28-2-2(A) [Section 56-7-2(A) ] barred indemnity agreements for “death or bodily injury to persons” in drilling- and mining-related agreements, while the language of Section 28-2-1 [Section 56-7-1] barred indemnity agreements “arising out of bodily injury to persons.” It would be unreasonable, however, to assume that Section 28-2-1’s [Section 56-7-1’s] omission of “death” and Section 28-2-2(A)’s [Section 56-7~2(A)’s] express mention of the term meant that the Legislature intended to prohibit only construction indemnity agreements shifting liability for bodily injury, but to allow liability-shifting for any deaths that might result from the same kind of actionable conduct. See Smith,
{27} Our precedents have repeatedly cautioned against using wording variations in pari materia statutes as a conclusive determinant of differing legislative intent. For example, in Martinez, we addressed a similar statutory construction issue in deciding whether the Legislature intended to prohibit credit for presentence confinement in third-offense DWI cases.
{28} In its written opinion granting Year-out’s motion to dismiss, the United States District Court observed that “[i]t is simply inconceivable that the New Mexico Legislature, when contemporaneously enacting two anti-indemnity statutes, intended to give more protection to well and mine workers than to construction workers.” United Rentals Nw., Inc. v. Yearout Mech., Inc., Civ. No. 08-00050 RLP/CD, mem. op. and order at 6 (D.N.M. Dec. 5, 2008). We similarly can find no reason to conclude that the Legislature intended to create different protections for mine workers and construction workers simply because equipment rentals are specifically mentioned as being encompassed in the general categories of agreements “pertaining to” wells and mines in Section 56-7-2 and the same clarifying language is not mentioned with regard to the scope of agreements “relating to” construction in Section 56-7-1.
{29} United also argues that the Legislature’s 1999 removal of the specific mention of equipment rentals in Section 56-7-2 manifested an intention to exclude rental contracts from the anti-indemnity statutes altogether. We disagree.
{30} The Legislature’s 1999 amendments to Section 56-7-2 were made largely for clarity and organization. Section 28-2-2(A) [Section 56-7-2(A) ] of the original act read:
[Agreements purporting] to indemnify ... against loss or liability for damages, for:
(1) death or bodily injury to persons; or
(2) injury to property; or
(3) any other loss, damage or expense arising under either Paragraph (1) or (2) or both; or
(4) any combination of these....
The Legislature replaced the language in 1999 with the following equivalent phrase: “[Agreements purporting] to indemnify ... against loss or liability for damages.” The modification loses nothing of substance but makes the provision more concise and clear. Section 56-7-2(A). Similarly, the Legislature in 1999 deleted “or understanding, written or oral” from the phrase “any agreement or understanding, written or oral” in Section 28-2-2(B) [Section 56-7-2(B) ] of the original act.
{31} The Legislature in 1999 also replaced the original Section 28-2-2(B) [Section 56-7-2(B) ] phrase, “an agreement to perform any portion of any such work or services or any act collateral thereto, including the furnishing or rental of equipment, incidental transportation and other goods and services furnished in connection with any such service or operation,” with “an agreement ... to perform a portion of the work or services ... or an act collateral thereto.” Section 56-7-2(B). In short, the Legislature removed all the specific examples of included activities and kept only the categorical term.
{32} If equipment rentals were already included in the categorical terms of the two statutes, the removal of the specific examples of included items did not decrease the scope of those general terms. In fact, an indication that the Legislature did not intend to abandon a policy of prohibiting indemnification clauses in mining and construction-related equipment rentals was the significant extension in 2007 of the Legislature’s anti-indemnification public policy to encompass all equipment rental agreements, not just those related to mining or construction. NMSA 1978, § 56-7-3 (2007).
F. Cases and Statutes in Other Jurisdictions
{33} Although it is not critical to our decision, we note that many other jurisdictions have interpreted analogous statutes to encompass indemnity clauses in construction equipment rental agreements. 3 Philip L. Bruner & Patrick J. O’Connor, Jr., Bruner and O’Connor on Construction Law § 10:79 (2002) (“Many courts have . decided that equipment leases fall within the scope of these anti-indemnity laws. Equipment leases are often captured by the scope of these laws by virtue of the language that indemnity agreements ‘in connection with or collateral to’ a construction contract are barred.” (footnote omitted)).
{34} For instance, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Marion Equipment Co.,
{35} Aetna noted that “at least eighteen other states have enacted statutes identical or similar to AS 45.45.900, and the weight of authority from the jurisdictions that have considered this question indicates that the statute does govern such leases.” Id. at 666 (footnote omitted). A number of the cases surveyed in Aetna are instructive on the issue before this Court. In Calkins v. Lorain Division of Koehring Co.,
{36} Several cases relied on by Aetna turned on whether the piece of equipment rented was intended or expected to be used in construction activities. See, e.g., American Pecco Corp. v. Concrete Bldg. Sys. Co.,
{37} United correctly notes that many other state courts have chosen not to interpret their anti-indemnity statutes as applicable to equipment rentals. Most of those cases are distinguishable in that the opinions emphasized that the contracting parties did not contemplate the equipment was to be used in a construction project. See McMunn,
{38} Other cases are distinguishable as a matter of law because they interpret more narrowly written statutes. See, e.g., Eagle Pacific Ins. Co. v. Quintanilla,
{39} It is clear that some courts in states with anti-indemnity statutes have chosen to construe the protections of their statutes in a more restrictive manner. See, e.g., Pritts v. J.I. Case Co.,
III. CONCLUSION
{40} In order to enforce the protections of Section 56-7-1 and to honor the legislative purpose embodied in the statute, we answer the certified question by holding that the statute’s anti-indemnity protections apply to rental contracts for construction equipment because they are contracts “relating to construction.”
{41} IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. In 2007, our Legislature declared indemnification agreements in any "rental contract for equipment,” whether or not related to construction, unenforceable as "against the public policy of this state.” NMSA 1978, § 56-7-3(A) (2007). All relevant events in this case occurred prior to Section 5 6-7-3's enactment, so we do not rely on its much more comprehensive scope.