State v. CarrisalesState v. Carrisales
Loretta A. Riddle, for appellant.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
JENSEN, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jordan Carrisales, appeals the February 10, 2017 judgment of the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to 17 months in prison. For the following reasons, we аffirm.
{¶ 2} On July 12, 2016, Carrisales was charged with one count of sexual battery in violation of
{¶ 3} During the plea hearing, the court explained the consequences of Carrisales’s plea of guilty to the gross sexual imposition charge. It addressed the maximum prison term and fine; the mandatory three-year term of postrelease control that would be imposed if he served a prison term and penalties for violating postrelease control; and Carrisales’s Tier I sex offender status and registration requirements. Carrisales responded affirmatively each time the judge asked him if he understood a term of his guilty plea.
{¶ 4} While reviewing the plea agreement, the court asked Carrisales if he had read the plea agreemеnt and understood what it said. Carrisales said that he did. When the court addressed Carrisales’s understanding of the gross sexual imposition charge, the following exchange occurred:
[Court:] What is it you are intending to plead guilty to today?
[Carrisales:] F-4 gross sexual imposition.
[Court:] Do you understand what the State would need to prove tо show that you are guilty of the offense?
[Carrisales:] No, sir.
[Court:] Okay. Do you know what you are alleged to have done?
[Carrisales:] Yeah.
[Court:] [Defense counsel], have you had the opportunity to explain to Jordan what this offense is?
[Defense Counsel:] Yes. Prior to today, I visited Jordan. We went over obviously the offеnse. It was a sexual battery. We went over what the offense—what the elements of the offense were that the State would need to prove, so we would waive reading of that at this time.
{¶ 5} The court went on to explain that Carrisales was giving up his right to a trial by jury, right to confront witnesses, right to сompulsory process, and right against self-incrimination by pleading guilty. The court explained each right before asking Carrisales if he understood the rights he was giving up. Carrisales replied “yes” to each question.
{¶ 6} Finally, the court asked Carrisales about the facts of the offense:
[Court:] So tell me what happened.
[Carrisales:] I was found guilty—
[Court:] —What did you do?
[Carrisales:] Well, I woke up and saw her and the dude that was with me having sex, and then I ended up having sex with her, too, and I knew she was under the influence.
[Court:] She was under the influence?
[Defense counsel:] And she was a minor.
[Court:] And a minor. How old?
[Defense counsel:] 17.
[Carrisales:] 17.
[Court:] Is that right?
[Carrisales:] Yes, sir.
The court did not elicit any information about the circumstances of the offense from the state.
{¶ 7} At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Carrisales knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered a guilty plea, accepted Carrisales’s plea, and set a sentencing hearing.
{¶ 8} On December 12, 2016, the parties appeared for the scheduled sentencing hearing. Counsel explained to the court that some of the information in the plea agreement was incorrect, so the court had incorrectly informed Carrisales about the consequences of his plea. The parties submitted an amended plea agreement that Carrisales signed. The court reviewed the amended maximum fine ($5,000) аnd the correct term of postrelease control (a mandatory five years) with Carrisales. Carrisales confirmed to the court that he understood the amended terms and still wanted to plead guilty. The court accepted Carrisales’s guilty plea based on the amended рlea agreement. The parties agreed to reschedule the sentencing.
{¶ 10} Next, the state addressed the court. The prosecutor noted that Carrisales had very little prior criminal history; that, although Carrisales, the victim, and others were drinking on the night of the offense, intoxication did not eliminate Carrisales’s culpability for a “violent and predatоry” offense; and that Carrisales was given the benefit of pleading guilty to a reduced charge.
{¶ 11} Carrisales’s attorney then addressed the court. He said that Carrisales took responsibility for his actions on the night of the offense and was aware that his behavior was wrong; he recognized that he could not take advantage of intoxicated, sleeping women. Counsel asked the court to place Carrisales on community control.
{¶ 12} Following his attorney’s statement, Carrisales briefly addressed the court. He said that he understood and acknowledged his mistakes, аccepted full responsibility for his actions, apologized for his behavior, and asked the court to “help me find the proper treatment needed to better myself.”
{¶ 13} After hearing from counsel and Carrisales, the court reviewed the record. The judge noted that Carrisales had committed a serious offense that was reduced to a fourth-degree felony. He also noted that Carrisales was initially dishonest with the police officers who investigated the case. He said that the assessments Carrisales completed prior to sentencing showed that Carrisales needed treatment.
{¶ 15} Carrisales now appeals the trial court’s decision, raising three assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT ACCEPTED DEFENDANT’S PLEA, FOUND DEFENDANT GUILTY AND SENTENCED DEFENDANT TO GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION IN VIOLAITON [sic] OF
R.C. 2907.05(A)(5) WHEN DEFENDANT’S RECITATION OF THE ACTS HE COMMITTED DID NOT MEET THE ELEMENTS OF GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION.ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO EINSURE [sic] THAT APPELLANT ENTERED INTO A PLEA “WITH UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF THE CHARGE”.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. III. THE TRIAL COURT’S IMPOSITION OF NEARLY THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. HENCE IT VIOLATED MR. CARRISALES’ RIGHTS UNDER
R.C. 2929.14(C) AND2929.19 , AND UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE OHIO AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.
Law and Analysis
A. Carrisales was not Required to Admit to Facts Supporting the Charge
{¶ 16} In his first assignment of error, Carrisales argues that the trial court committed plain error when it accepted his plea without a factual basis to support a charge of gross sexual imposition. The state counters that this failure did not affect Carrisales’s understanding of the nature of the charge against him.
{¶ 17} “‘A plea of guilty, from an early period in the history of criminal procedure, * * * has been regarded as an admission of every material fact well pleaded in the indictment, dispensing with the necessity of proving them, and authorizing the court to proceed to judgment.’” State v. Blevins, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-16-013, 2016-Ohio-8382, ¶ 18, quoting Craig v. State, 49 Ohio St. 415, 418, 30 N.E. 1120 (1892). (Emphasis sic.) Moreover, Crim.R. 11 does not require that a factual basis for a guilty plea be placed on the record. Id., citing State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987).
{¶ 18} Despite Carrisales’s belief to the contrary, the record need not contain a factual basis for the charge to which he pleaded guilty; his choice to enter a guilty plea is a complete admission of his guilt and “dispenses with the necessity of” the state having to
B. Carrisales Understood the Nature of the Charge Against Him
{¶ 19} In his second assignment of error, Carrisales claims that his guilty plea is invalid because he entered it without an understanding of the nature of the charge against him. The state contends that Carrisales understood the charge against him and, even if he did not, he has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the trial court accepting his plea.
{¶ 20} Under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions, a guilty plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily to be valid. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). Therefore, before accepting a defendant’s guilty plea, the trial court must address the defendant personally to inform him that he waives certain constitutional rights by pleading guilty and to determine that he understands the nature of the charges against him, the maximum penalty he is facing, and the effects of his plea. State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 41; Crim.R. 11(C)(2). The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to ensure that the information a defendant neеds to make a voluntary and intelligent decision about pleading guilty is conveyed to him. State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981).
{¶ 22} For non-constitutional rights, on the other hand, substantial compliance is sufficient. Clark at ¶ 31; Rinehart at ¶ 18; State v. Ragusa, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1244, 2016-Ohio-3373, ¶ 4. “Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.” State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990).
{¶ 23} Under Crim.R. 11(C), the trial court is required to determine whether the defendant is entering a voluntary plea in light of an understanding of the key facts; the rule does not require that the court personally notify the defendant of these facts. State v. Acosta, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-15-066, 2016-Ohio-5698, ¶ 10. Compliance with the rule generally does not require the trial court to rеcite each element of the charges against the defendant. State v. Gallant, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-12-033, 2013-Ohio-3953, ¶ 9, citing State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 57.
{¶ 24} Here, the transcript of the plea hearing establishes that the trial court engaged in a full and complete colloquy with Carrisales concerning his plea, as required
{¶ 25} The trial court also substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). The court ensured that Carrisales knew the degree of the offense, the maximum penalty and fine for the offense, the sex offender classification attached to the offense, and the consequences of being classified as a sex offender. Additionally, Carrisales signed plea papers that contained the statement “I understand the nature of these charges and the possible defenses I might have,” and he told the trial court that he understood the plea papers. Although Carrisales said that he did not know the elements of gross sexual imposition (and the trial court did not tell him the elements of gross sexual imposition), Carrisales knew the conduct he was accused of, defense counsel indicated that he had discussed the charge and its elements with Carrisales prior to the plea hearing, and counsel expressly told the cоurt that Carrisales waived reading of the elements of gross sexual imposition. This is sufficient to show that, under the totality of the circumstances, Carrisales understood the implications of pleading guilty to a charge of gross sexual imposition.
{¶ 26} The record demonstrates that the trial court complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2) and that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Carrisales understood the implications of his plea and the rights he waived. We find, therefore, that
C. Carrisales’s Sentence is not Contrary to Law
{¶ 27} Carrisales’s third assignment of error asserts that his sentence is contrary to law. He claims that the trial court erred by sentencing him to “nearly the maximum sentence.” The state counters that Carrisales was not sentenced to the maximum sentence for fourth-degree gross sexual imposition, so Carrisales’s arguments are inapplicable to his sentence.
{¶ 28} We review sentencing challenges under
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section
2929.13 , division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section2929.14 , or division (I) of section2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) .
An appellate court may not review a trial court’s sentence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 10.
{¶ 30} Despite Carrisales’s claim that his sentence is contrary to law, the substance of his argument is that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a “near maximum” sentence. We cannot considеr whether a sentence term is an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Marcum at ¶ 10.
{¶ 31} When we consider Carrisales’s sentence under
{¶ 32} On the contrary, the record shows that the trial court stated at the sentencing hearing and in its judgment entry of conviction and sentence that it considered
{¶ 33} The record shows that the trial court complied with all applicable sentencing statutes when it sentenced Carrisales to prison. We therefоre find that Carrisales’s sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law under
III. Conclusion
{¶ 34} Based on the foregoing, the February 10, 2017 judgment of the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Carrisales is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.
Arlene Singer, J.
James D. Jensen, J. CONCUR.