State v. GallantState v. Gallant
Loretta A. Riddle, for appellant.
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I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jeremy Gallant, appeals the judgment of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, convicting him of murder and tampering with evidence, and sentencing him to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 18 years.
{¶ 2} On June 1, 2011, appellant attacked his wife Maria Vera Gallant. Approximately two weeks later, she passed away as a result of his actions. Appellant was initially indicted on one count of felonious assault in violation of
{¶ 3} Appellant initially pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. After an independent evaluation, it was determined that appellant was competent and the plea was withdrawn. Appellant then entered into a plea agreement whereby he pleaded guilty to tampering with evidence and the amended count of murder. The remaining counts were dismissed. Before accepting the plea, the trial court conducted a
{¶ 4} On May 8, 2012, appellant was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 15 years on the count of murder. He received an additional three years on the count of tampering with evidence, to be served consecutively, for a total prison term of life with the possibility of parole after 18 years. Appellant requested that he receive credit for time served on a separate case, however, that request was denied. Shortly thereafter, this appeal ensued.
{¶ 5} Appellant has timely appealed, raising three assignments of error:
- The trial court committed plain error when it accepted the defendant‘s plea, found defendant guilty and sentenced defendant to murder in violation of
R.C. 2903.02(A) when defendant‘s undisputed recitation of the acts he committed and his means (sic) rea did not meet the elements of murder. - The trial court committed prejudicial and plain error by failing to einsure (sic) that appellant entered a plea “with understanding of the nature of the charge.”
- The trial court committed prejudicial error when it does not give defendant proper credit for time served.
II. Analysis
{¶ 6} The first and second assignments of error are interrelated and will be addressed together.
A. Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Plea
{¶ 7} Appellant argues that his constitutional rights were violated in that he did not know the nature of the charges against him. Specifically, appellant argues that his recitation of what happened on the night he attacked his wife demonstrates his lack of understanding of the nature of the charge of murder, in particular his understanding of
{¶ 8} Further, to the extent appellant argues that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made, or that the court erred in not informing him of the elements of murder or asking him what he did to meet those elements, we again disagree. “A plea may be involuntary either because the accused does not understand the nature of the constitutional protections he is waiving * * * or because he has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.” State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 56, quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645, fn. 13, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976).
{¶ 9} “Prior to accepting a guilty plea from a criminal defendant, the trial court must inform the defendant that he is waiving his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his right of compulsory process of witnesses.” Id. at ¶ 52, quoting State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[T]he courts of this state have generally held that a detailed recitation of the elements of the charge is not required under
{¶ 10} In State v. Fitzpatrick, the defendant was indicted on multiple counts of aggravated murder. He initially pleaded not guilty and requested a jury trial. However, during opening statements, Fitzpatrick abruptly decided he wanted to plead guilty.
{¶ 11} On appeal, Fitzpatrick argued that his plea was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent because he did not understand the meanings of “prior calculation and design” and “purposely.” Id. at ¶ 55. The record, though, showed that counsel had explained the charges to Fitzpatrick, including a signed statement by counsel that they had advised the defendant of his charges, the penalties, and his constitutional rights prior to signing the plea agreement. In addition, during the plea colloquy, the judge specifically asked Fitzpatrick if he understood the charges against him or if he needed anything explained to him regarding the charges against him. Fitzpatrick responded that he understood the
{¶ 12} Similarly, here, appellant signed the plea agreement which stated the charges, the degree, and the maximum sentence for each offense. The agreement stated that appellant had been advised of all his constitutional rights and appellant made a knowing, intelligent, voluntary waiver of the rights guaranteed to him pursuant to
{¶ 13} Accordingly, appellant‘s first and second assignments of error are not well-taken.
B. Credit for Time Served on a Separate Offense
{¶ 14} For his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to be granted credit for time served. While appellant was in jail and unable to make bond, he was found to have violated his probation in a separate case. He
{¶ 15}
The department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the stated prison term of a prisoner or, if the prisoner is serving a term for which there is parole eligibility, the minimum and maximum term or the parole eligibility date of the prisoner by the total number of days that the prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced, including confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting trial, confinement for examination to determine the prisoner‘s competence to stand trial or sanity, confinement while awaiting transportation to the place where the prisoner is to serve the prisoner‘s prison term, as determined by the sentencing court under division (B)(2)(g)(i) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code, and confinement in a juvenile facility.
{¶ 16} As we have recognized, ”
{¶ 17} Here, appellant argues that he should have received credit for the time served on a separate probation violation. Because the probation violation was not related to the murder offense for which appellant was convicted and sentenced, the trial court did not err by denying credit for time served on that offense.
{¶ 18} Accordingly, appellant‘s third assignment of error is not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 19} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.
Stephen A. Yarbrough, J.
James D. Jensen, J.
CONCUR.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.