STATE OF OHIO, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL JOSEPH CARREIRO, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. CA2011-12-236
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO BUTLER COUNTY
3/25/2013
2013-Ohio-1103
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CR11-06-0813
Christopher J. Pagan, 1501 First Avenue, Middletown, Ohio 45044, for defendant-appellant
Fred S. Miller, 246 High Street, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for defendant-appellant
HENDRICKSON, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Michael Joseph Carreiro, appeals his conviction in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for aggravated murder. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On September 3, 2005, Christine Minnix was killed by her adoptive son,
{¶ 3} On October 12, 2005, Michael was indicted for the aggravated murder of Christine. Initially, the trial court found Michael not competent to stand trial. Michael‘s competency was restored six years later, and he was again indicted on the same count of aggravated murder. He pled not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). A jury trial was held which established the following facts.
{¶ 4} Middletown Police Department Detective Tim Riggs testified that he interviewed Michael regarding the homicide shortly after Michael‘s arrest. This interview was recorded and introduced into evidence. During the interview, Michael stated that the voices in his head commanded him to kill his mother. He indicated that he hears multiple voices, one of the voices is God, and that he “thinks” the voice of God told him to kill his mother. He reasoned that God told him to kill his mother because she was trying to destroy him. Throughout the interview, Michael did not consistently refer to the voice that commanded him to commit the murder as God. Michael also stated that he understood that he was guilty, he needed to pay
{¶ 5} In the interview, Michael also explained how he executed the murder. He stated that the murder was “premeditated,” that he had a plan to lure his mother to his apartment and kill her. He stated that he left a kitchen knife on the counter to kill her, and he told her he needed help with a bill so that she would come into his apartment. After the murder, he washed his hands, changed his shirt, and left his apartment. He went to a movie, the mall, and then a church. During this time, he stated that the voice of God commanded him to commit suicide so that he did not have to spend the rest of his life in jail. He did not kill himself.
{¶ 6} After the introduction of the interview, a series of psychologists and a psychiatrist testified regarding their opinion of Michael‘s mental illness at the time of the offense. All the doctors agreed that Michael suffers from a severe mental illness and that the illness was operativе at the time of the homicide. Dr. Hopes, a mental health expert called by the defense, testified that Michael heard three voices, a voice from God, the devil, and a third voice. Dr. Hopes testified that Michael did not know the moral wrongfulness of his acts because the voice of God commanded him to kill his mother and the third voice convinced him his mother was evil and was going to destroy the world. She noted that the voice of God told Michael to kill his mother earlier but he refused because he wasn‘t sure if the voice was actually from God. Dr. Hopes also stated that Michael knew his actions violated the law but his straightforward and non-defensive account оf his actions in killing his mother in the police interview and his lack of any attempt in hiding the murder weapon, his bloody clothes, or locking the apartment door showed he did not appreciate the moral “wrongfulness” of his acts.
{¶ 8} Lastly, Dr. Chiappone, a forensic psychologist, testified that while he believed Michael suffers from a severe mental illness, Michael understood the wrongfulness of his actions. In support of this conclusion, Dr. Chiappone stated that Michael‘s actions in killing his mother in a private location, laying out a kitchen knife, cleaning himself up after the crime, and leaving the apartment show that Michael understood his actions were morally wrong. Moreover, while Michael claimed that the voices told him to kill his mother, thеre was no connection between the voice and his actions. For example, the voices did not tell him how to perform the specific details of the crime, like choosing the murder weapon, changing his clothes, or how to lure his mother into his apartment. Additionally, Michael‘s conduct in leaving his apartment and his statements show that he didn‘t want to get caught, he knew he did something wrong, and he was trying to avoid punishment for it.
{¶ 9} At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court refused Michael‘s request for a jury instruction defining “wrongfulness” as including “moral wrongfulness.” Instead, the court instructed the jury that a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if the individual did not understand his actions were legally wrong. The jury rejected the insanity defense and found Michael guilty of aggravated murder. Michael was sentenced to life in prison with parole eligibility after 20 years.
{¶ 11} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WHEN IT REFUSED TO PROVIDE HIS REQUESTED INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY.
{¶ 12} Michael challenges the trial court‘s decision refusing to provide his requested jury instruction regarding whether he was not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to
{¶ 13} Jury instructions are matters which are left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St.2d 266, 271 (1981). Accordingly, we review them for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion implies that the court‘s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, and not merely an error of law or judgment. State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, ¶ 130.
{¶ 14} Ordinarily, requested instructions should be given if they are correct statements of the law, applicable to the facts in the case, and reasonable minds could reach the conclusion sought by the specific instruction. State v. Lawson, 12th Dist. No. CA99-12-226, 2001 WL 433121, *8 (April 30, 2001), citing Murphy v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 591 (1991). A triаl court must fully and completely give jury instructions which are relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and discharge its duty as fact finder. State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St. 3d 206 (1990), paragraph two of the syllabus. A trial court has the duty to instruct the jury as to the applicable law on all issues presented in the
{¶ 15} Michael pled NGRI for the aggravated murder charge.
[a] person is [NGRI] relative to a charge of an offensе if the person proves * * * that at the time of the commission of the offense, the person did not know, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, the wrongfulness of the person‘s acts.” (Emphasis added.)
Not guilty by reason of insanity is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27, 2002-Ohio-7017, ¶ 64. See
{¶ 16} At trial, Michael and the state disagrеed over how to instruct the jury regarding “wrongfulness” under
In sоme limited instances, a defendant even though he or she recognizes his or her actions to be legally wrong, may not know the wrongfulness of his or her actions because that defendant acts not on his or her subjective beliefs, but under the delusive but sincere belief that what he is doing is by the command of a superior power, which supersedes аll human laws, and the laws of nature. In those instances, it cannot be said of the offender that he knows the act to be wrong. By contrast, if a defendant knows his or her conduct violates the law and commonly-held notions of morality, that defendant cannot avoid criminal responsibility when he or she acts on subjective rules even though delusions led him or her to believe that he was acting as or like a superior power. (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 17} The trial court rejected this instruction and instead limited the definition of “wrongfulness” to include only whether the defendant knew the act was legally wrong. The jury instruction stated, “[a] defendant cannot escape criminal responsibility for what he knows
{¶ 18} The insanity defense was codified in 1990 under
{¶ 19} Before the codification of thе insanity defense, courts interpreted Staten as requiring a defendant to understand the “wrongfulness” of his actions if he knew his behavior was legally wrong. State v. Jakub, 8th Dist. No. 59762, 1992 WL 14897, *2 (Jan. 30, 1992); State v. Luff, 85 Ohio App.3d 785 (6th Dist.1993). The Eighth District found that where a defendant pled NGRI, evidence that the defendant knew his actions in killing his sister and brother-in law were legally wrong, was sufficient to show that the defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity. Jakub at *2. The court acknowledged, “[a]lthough the term ‘wrong’ is not qualified in a legal or moral sense [in Staten], we construe it to mean legally wrong. If we were to enforce our laws according to each individual‘s moral standards, our society would be one of anarchy.” Id.
{¶ 20} The Sixth District also interpreted “wrongfulness” to include only legal wrongfulness. Luff at 794. In Luff, the court determined that the trial court erred in
{¶ 21} Subsequently,
{¶ 22} In so holding, the court cited a famous case from Justice Cardozo which allowed a defendant to be found not guilty by reason of insanity if he acted pursuant to a command from God. People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 340 (1915). Jennings at ¶ 21. However, the court ultimately stated,
[d]efendant therefore is unable to escape criminal responsibility for what he knows to be legally wrong by assuming a cloak of personal belief that his actions were morally justified, even if the belief arises from mental illness.
R.C. 2901.01(A)(14) does not permit individuals who know what is legally wrong to eschew thelaw and operate under a standard of morality they set for themselves. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at ¶ 24. See State v. Myers, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-926, 2010-Ohio-4602, ¶ 13 (Finding defendant not NGRI when he understood moral wrongfulness of his acts).
{¶ 23} We find that the court did not err in refusing to provide appellant‘s requested jury instructions. All Ohio cases that defined “wrongfulness” as stated in the Ohio Supreme Court‘s test in Staten limited “wrongfulness” to legal wrongs. Additionally, prior to the codification of the NGRI defense in
{¶ 24} Further, we do not interpret the Tenth District‘s decisions in Jennings to stand for the proposition that “wrongfulness” includes an inquiry into moral standаrds or whether the defendant was acting pursuant to a deific decree. While Jennings seemed to cite conflicting propositions regarding whether wrongfulness allows for a deific decree exception, the holding was limited to whether a defendant, who killed two individuals whom he believed to be mass murderers, understood the wrongfulness of his actions. Ultimately, Jennings concluded that a defendant was not able to eschew the law by doing acts which he knows to be legally wrong because he operates under a different standard of morality he set for himself. Therefore, any language contained in Jennings regarding whether a defendant who maintains that he was acting under a command from God dоes not understand the wrongfulness of his actions was dicta and not the holding of the case. See State v. Brewer, 12th Dist. No. CA2003-01-008, 2003-Ohio-5880, ¶ 17.
{¶ 25} Thus, a defendant who knows his actions are against the law but acts under a command from God understands the “wrongfulness” of his actions under
{¶ 26} Additionally, we note that even if “wrongfulness” for purposes of
{¶ 27} Instead of acting pursuant to a command from God, Michael was able to appreciate the difference between right and wrong and simply chose to transgress these boundaries. Michael, not the voice of God, planned a ruse to lure his mother into his apartment, chose a murder weapon, and planted the weapon in the kitchen. Additionally, Michael chose to commit the murder in a private location and he changed out of his bloody shirt and washed his hands after the murder. Michael also chose not to stay in the apartment but flee the scene.
{¶ 29} Judgment affirmed.
S. POWELL and RINGLAND, JJ., concur.