State v. CarpenterState v. Carpenter
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Houghton
On February 2, 2000, a jury convicted Geoffrey Carpenter of two counts of second degree robbery. Carpenter appeals from his March 22, 2000 sentence to life imprisonment without possibility of parole as a persistent offender, arguing that because the adult court did not have jurisdiction over him as a juvenile when it convicted him of second degree assault in 1996, the conviction cannot count as a prior conviction under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA).1 We agree and reverse and remand for resentencing.
On two occasions in late 1999, Carpenter took property from another with threats of force. On January 28, 2000, by amended information, the State charged Carpenter with two counts of second degree robbery. A jury convicted him as charged. At sentencing, the trial court determined that Carpenter had two prior convictions counting as sentencing strikes: a 1996 second degree assault conviction, a violation of
Adding the two prior convictions to his current conviction, the trial court then sentenced Carpenter as a persistent offender, under former RCW 9.94A.030(27) (1998), to life imprisonment without parole under the POAA. Carpenter does not dispute that his 1999 burglary conviction constitutes a strike. Thus, we limit the facts to the April 12, 1996 assault charge.
On April 12, 1996, the State charged then 17-year-old Carpenter with first degree assault.
On June 5, 1996, Carpenter pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of second degree assault while armed with a deadly weapon, a violation of
It was not until December 8, 1999, after the State charged Carpenter with two robbery counts, that it sought declination of juvenile court jurisdiction over the 1996 assault charge.4 In seeking declination, the State relied on
At the January 28, 2000 declination hearing, the trial court determined that State v. Mora, 138 Wash.2d 43, 977 P.2d 564 (1999), allowed late entry of a declination order. Mora, 138 Wash.2d at 54, 977 P.2d 564 (remand for declination hearing appropriate when no hearing was held before juvenile was convicted in the adult court). After argument, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law that Carpenter should be transferred to adult court and declined juvenile court jurisdiction over Carpenter “nunc pro tunc”6 to April 12, 1996.7
ANALYSIS
Carpenter contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to life imprisonment without possibility of parole as a persistent offender. He argues that the adult court did not have jurisdiction over him on the 1996 assault until the January 28, 2000 declination hearing. And because the adult court lacked jurisdiction until January 28, 2000, he was not convicted of second degree assault until that date. Thus, Carpenter argues, for purposes of sentencing under the POAA, he did not have two prior convictions that counted as strikes when he committed the 1999 robberies.8
Initially, the State counters that Carpenter‘s argument is an improper collateral attack on his 1996 conviction. We disagree. It is not a collateral attack because it is directed to the present use of a prior conviction to prove that Carpenter is a persistent offender. See State v. Holsworth, 93 Wash.2d 148, 607 P.2d 845 (1980) (collateral retroactive attack on an invalid plea and its relation to criminal sentencing is appropriate).
Moreover, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that two applicable prior convictions exist when seeking a POAA sentence.9 State v. Manussier, 129 Wash.2d 652, 681-82, 921 P.2d 473 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1201, 117 S.Ct. 1563, 137 L.Ed.2d 709 (1997). Thus, Carpenter‘s argument first raised at
Carpenter does not take issue with the adult court‘s findings of fact and conclusions of law entry at the January 28, 2000 hearing. Nor does he take issue with the order declining jurisdiction. Instead, he argues that the conviction cannot be effective until January 28, 2000.
We review de novo the trial court‘s application of relevant statutes in making sentencing determinations under the POAA. In the Matter of the Post Sentencing Review of Charles, 135 Wash.2d 239, 245, 955 P.2d 798 (1998). In doing so, we apply common standards of statutory construction. When construing a statute, it is our duty to adopt an interpretation best advancing the legislature‘s purpose. State v. Elgin, 118 Wash.2d 551, 557, 825 P.2d 314 (1992). But with regard to a penal statute, principles of fundamental fairness require us to strictly construe it in favor of the accused. State v. Wilbur, 110 Wash.2d 16, 19, 749 P.2d 1295 (1988). Under the POAA, a persistent offender is one who, prior to the commission of the current offense, has been convicted of at least two most serious felony offenses (strikes). Former RCW 9.94A.030(27). Thus, we must decide whether Carpenter‘s conviction of second degree assault operates as a strike on June 5, 1996, when he pleaded guilty in adult court or as a strike on January 28, 2000, when the court declined juvenile jurisdiction. To answer this question, we turn first to (Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 70 Wash.2d 331, 413 P.2d 940 (1966),), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 998, 87 S.Ct. 1320, 18 L.Ed.2d 348 (1967).
There are two Dillenburg cases involving a juvenile transferred to adult court without a juvenile court order: Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 70 Wash.2d 331, 413 P.2d 940 (1966) (Dillenburg I), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 998, 87 S.Ct. 1320, 18 L.Ed.2d 348 (1967), and Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 70 Wash.2d 331, 349, 422 P.2d 783 (1967) (Dillenburg II), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 998, 87 S.Ct. 1320, 18 L.Ed.2d 348 (1967). Dillenburg I required a written transfer order from juvenile to adult court and is not relevant to our analysis. Dillenburg II, 70 Wash.2d at 340-41, 413 P.2d 940.
In Dillenburg II, on reconsideration, the juvenile argued that juvenile and adult court jurisdictions differed and if the juvenile court improperly transferred a matter to adult court, any later proceedings were invalid. Dillenburg II, 70 Wash.2d at 350-51, 422 P.2d 783. The Dillenburg II court held that if a transfer from juvenile court is faulty and the individual has turned 18 years of age, the proper relief need not be a new trial, but rather a “de novo hearing before the superior court as to the propriety of the challenged transfer.” Dillenburg II, 70 Wash.2d at 355, 422 P.2d 783.
But the court also concluded: “In the event it be determined, as a result of such hearing, that the initiating juvenile court transfer for criminal prosecution was appropriate under all of the circumstances, then the challenged conviction will stand unless intervening events have so prejudiced the constitutional rights of the convicted person as to compel a different result.” Dillenburg II, 70 Wash.2d at 355, 422 P.2d 783 (emphasis added).
Thus, we must determine whether Carpenter‘s 1996 conviction should be effective as of the June 5, 1996 guilty plea or whether intervening events have greatly prejudiced his constitutional rights compelling a different result.
We first note that without the second degree assault conviction being effective from June 5, 1996, Carpenter could not be sentenced under the POAA on March 22, 2000. And he would not receive life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Clearly Carpenter‘s constitutional liberty interests are implicated and he suffers prejudice if the conviction stands as of June 5, 1996. But our inquiry does not end here. We must further determine whether the Legislature‘s definition of “conviction” or “convicted” leads to a result requiring the conviction to operate as of June 5, 1996.
The POAA does not define “conviction.” The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA) defines “conviction” as an adjudication of guilt under Titles 10 or 13 RCW or a verdict
For example, under
And for purposes of
Had the Legislature chosen to similarly qualify “conviction” under the POAA or SRA, Carpenter‘s conviction would stand as of June 5, 1996. But the Legislature did not.
Ultimately, the burden is on the Legislature to categorically clarify what actions expose an individual to penalties and the reasons for which they can be penalized. State v. Knowles, 46 Wash.App. 426, 432, 730 P.2d 738 (1986). Because it did not do so, we apply the rule of lenity. Hence, we hold that Carpenter‘s conviction of second degree assault operates as a strike from January 28, 2000. Knowles, 46 Wash.App. at 432, 730 P.2d 738 (“[p]enal statutes should be reasonably construed in favor of defendants“).
The State urges us to retroactively apply the findings of fact from the January 28, 2000 hearing to the June 5, 1996 guilty plea in “order to leave the conviction standing.” Respondent‘s Br. at 7. But this is incorrect.
Equitable principles require that Carpenter be placed in the same position as if the judicial error had not occurred, so a retroactive entry is appropriate only to remedy the record as to something that occurred, not something that should have occurred. State v. Smissaert, 103 Wash.2d 636, 641, 694 P.2d 654 (1985). Although the declination hearing could have occurred earlier, it did not actually occur until January 28, 2000.
Thus, retroactive entry is inappropriate and resentencing should be from date of the amended judgment on declination. Smissaert, 103 Wash.2d at 641, 694 P.2d 654. Carpenter had only one strike before committing the two counts of robbery, of which he was later convicted on February 2, 2000.
We reverse his sentence under the POAA and remand for resentencing.
We concur: BRIDGEWATER and ARMSTRONG, JJ.
Notes
A timeline clarifies the procedural facts before us.
April 12, 1996 The State charges 17-year-old Carpenter with first degree assault. June 5, 1996 Seventeen-year-old Carpenter pleads guilty to second degree assault in adult court (no declination hearing is held)later, the March 22, 2000 sentencing court counts this as strike one. October 13, 1999 Carpenter receives a conviction of first degree burglarylater, the March 22, 2000 sentencing court counts this as strike two. October 20 to Carpenter commits second degree robberycount II of January 28, 2000 amended November 15, 1999 information. November 20, 1999 Carpenter commits second degree robberycount I of January 28, 2000 amended information. December 8, 1999 State seeks retroactive declination of juvenile court jurisdiction on Carpenter‘s 1996 adult court conviction. January 28, 2000 Adult court orders declination of juvenile court jurisdiction on Carpenter‘s 1996 charge “nunc pro tunc” to April 12, 1996. February 2, 2000 A jury convicts Carpenter of two robbery counts. March 22, 2000 Over defense objection, court counts 1996 and 1999 convictions as two strikes and sentences Carpenter as a persistent offender to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
(1) The prosecutor, respondent, or the court on its own motion may, before a hearing on the information on its merits, file a motion requesting the court to transfer the respondent for adult criminal prosecution and the matter shall be set for a hearing on the question of declining jurisdiction. Unless waived by the court, the parties, and their counsel, a decline hearing shall be held when:
. . . .
(b) The respondent is seventeen years of age and the information alleges assault in the second degree, extortion in the first degree, indecent liberties, child molestation in the second degree, kidnapping in the second degree, or robbery in the second degree;