STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DONTA CAMPBELL, Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL NO. C-110627
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
July 25, 2012
[Cite as State v. Campbell, 2012-Ohio-3332.]
TRIAL NO. B-1101716
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 25, 2012
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Ohio Justice & Policy Center and Marguerite Slagle, for Defendant-Appellant.
Please note: This case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
O P I N I O N.
Facts and Procedure
{¶1} On November 1, 2002, defendant-appellant Donta Campbell was convicted of rape. After a sex-offender-classification hearing under former
{¶2} Campbell was indicted on March 17, 2011, for failing to notify the sheriff of an address change, a felony of the first degree. On May 5, 2011, he pleaded guilty to failure to notify as a second-degree felony. The trial court accepted Campbell‘s plea and set sentencing for May 20, 2011. On May 19, Campbell filed a motion and a supplemental motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he had entered his plea in ignorance of the Ohio Supreme Court‘s decisions in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, and State v. Gingell, 128 Ohio St.3d 444, 2011-Ohio-1481, 946 N.E.2d 192. Campbell also argued that the indictment was facially invalid, that the state had not filed a bill of particulars even though Campbell had requested one, and that the facts did not support the charge. The trial court granted Campbell‘s motion to withdraw his plea.
{¶3} Campbell filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on June 24, 2011, arguing that the indictment was facially invalid because (1) it failed to state an
{¶4} After a hearing on July 13, 2011, the trial court orally overruled Campbell‘s motion to dismiss the indictment. Campbell filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court‘s oral denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment, which the trial court overruled in a written entry. Campbell pleaded guilty to failing to provide notice of an address change. The court accepted Campbell‘s plea and found him guilty on September 20, 2011. Campbell filed a premature notice of appeal on October 5, 2011. Campbell was sentenced on October 13, 2011, to two years’ incarceration.
Analysis
{¶5} Campbell‘s sole assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss the indictment because the application of
{¶6} The Ohio Supreme Court held in Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, that ”
{¶7} In State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, as applied to defendants who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates
{¶8} The Supreme Court applied the holdings of Bodyke and Williams in State v. Palmer, 131 Ohio St.3d 278, 2012-Ohio-580, 964 N.E.2d 406. Palmer had pleaded guilty to sexual battery in 1995 and had served an 18-month sentence. He had no duty to register under Megan‘s Law because he had completed his sentence prior to July 1, 1997. After Senate Bill 10 became effective, Palmer was administratively
{¶9} Because Campbell committed his crime in 2002, Senate Bill 10‘s classification, registration, and community-notification provisions may not be applied to him. Campbell argues that he was unconstitutionally charged and convicted under Senate Bill 10. The indictment alleges that Campbell failed to provide written notice at least 20 days prior to an address change. Campbell argues that when he was convicted of his original sex offense, he was required, under Megan‘s law, to give written notice at least seven days prior to an address change. Therefore, Campbell asserts, the indictment unconstitutionally charges him with a Senate Bill 10 violation.
{¶10} Megan‘s Law was amended effective May 7, 2002, by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 175, to provide for a 20-day notice requirement. Megan‘s Law and its amendments were upheld as constitutional by the Ohio Supreme Court. See State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110; State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998). Therefore, Campbell had a duty under Megan‘s Law to provide written notice at least 20 days prior to an address change.
{¶11} Campbell also argues that the indictment unconstitutionally charged him with a Senate Bill 10 violation because it charged him with a first-degree felony, and when he committed his sex offense, failure to notify of an address change was a
{¶12} Current
{¶13} The Supreme Court‘s decision in Williams does not require a different result. As we pointed out in Bowling and Freeman, Williams dealt with the imposition of Senate Bill 10‘s more stringent registration requirements upon an offender who had committed his sex offense prior to its enactment. Bowling at ¶ 28; Freeman at ¶ 21. This case deals with the imposition of
{¶14} Campbell had an ongoing duty to notify the sheriff of any change of address. His indictment, conviction, and sentence were based upon his failure-to-notify offense, which occurred after
{¶15} Campbell had an ongoing duty under Megan‘s Law to provide written notice 20 days prior to a change of address. His failure-to-notify offense was based upon that duty, and not on any unconstitutional reclassification under or retroactive application of Senate Bill 10. Further, the penalty provisions of current
{¶16} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
SUNDERMANN, P.J., and HENDON, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.