STATE OF NEW MEXICO v. LARRY BYROM
NO. A-1-CA-34951
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
October 2, 2017
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, John A. Dean, Jr., District Judge
Santa Fe, NM
Kenneth H. Stalter, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant
Arlon L. Stoker
Farmington, NM
for Appellee
FRENCH, Judge.
{1} The State appeals from the district court‘s order granting Defendant Larry Byrom‘s motion to suppress evidence discovered in Defendant‘s vehicle during a warrantless search by a police officer. The district court suppressed the evidence on the ground that the community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment‘s warrant requirement of the United States and the New Mexico Constitution was not applicable because (1) Defendant was not arrested before the officer decided to impound and inventory Defendant‘s vehicle, and (2) there was no evidence that the parking lot where Defendant‘s vehicle was located posed particular safety concerns or subjected the vehicle to the risk of theft or vandalism. We reverse the district court‘s decision to suppress the evidence because the applicability of the community caretaker exception does not depend on the existence of an arrest or on the presentation of evidence specifically showing unsafe conditions or the potential for loss or damage.
BACKGROUND
{2} The facts are taken from the testimony at the suppression hearing held on June 11, 2015, unless otherwise noted. New Mexico State Police Sergeant James R. Foreman responded to a call from dispatch on February 2, 2015 around 3:30 p.m.
{5} Defendant was charged with trafficking a controlled substance, contrary to
{6} In response to the motion, the State argued that the warrantless search of Defendant‘s vehicle was reasonable under the community caretaker exception, citing two New Mexico cases—State v. Shaw, 1993-NMCA-016, 115 N.M. 174, 848 P.2d 1101, and State v. Ruffino, 1980-NMSC-072, 94 N.M. 500, 612 P.2d 1311—discussing the impoundment and inventory doctrine of the community caretaker exception. Following the suppression hearing, the district court allowed the parties to submit additional briefs. Defendant‘s supplemental brief maintained that Sergeant Foreman‘s decision to impound the vehicle cannot be justified under the community caretaker exception because an officer responding to an emergency assistance call must have a reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the location searched. Once medics removed Defendant from the vehicle, Sergeant Foreman could not possibly have needed to search the vehicle in order to aid in the emergency response. The State‘s supplemental brief maintained that during each stage of an encounter, an officer‘s actions must be justified. The initial encounter was “justified by the community caretaking doctrine[,]” and the justification for the decision to tow and search Defendant‘s vehicle after Defendant went to the hospital “is based on the inventory exception to the warrant requirement.”
{8} The State timely appealed. The State argues that Sergeant Foreman acted as a community caretaker by responding to the call from dispatch and that his subsequent decision to impound the vehicle was justified by the impoundment and inventory doctrine of the community caretaker exception. Defendant maintains that the emergency aid doctrine of the community caretaker exception applies and does not justify Sergeant Foreman‘s decision to impound and inventory Defendant‘s vehicle. We begin with a review of the community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment and the doctrines it encompasses—the emergency aid doctrine, the impoundment and inventory doctrine, and the public servant doctrine. We detail the
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{9} “Appellate courts review a district court‘s decision to suppress evidence based on the legality of a search as a mixed question of fact and law.” State v. Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 11, 137 N.M. 174, 108 P.3d 1032. “We view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and defer to the district court‘s findings of historical facts and witness credibility when supported by substantial evidence.” Id. “The legality of a search, however, ultimately turns on the question of reasonableness.” Id. “Although our inquiry is necessarily fact-based it compels a careful balancing of constitutional values, which extends beyond fact-finding, to shape the parameters of police conduct by placing the constitutional requirement of reasonableness in factual context[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We thus review the determination of reasonableness de novo.” Id. Given the arguments and decision below, our analysis necessarily begins with a review of the community caretaker exception.
DISCUSSION
{10} The community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment developed from the understanding that police officers frequently interact with citizens without an
{11} From this balancing of interests, three separate doctrines within the community caretaker exception have been developed—the emergency aid doctrine, the impoundment and inventory doctrine, and the public servant doctrine. Id. ¶ 25 (“[D]efining the community caretaker exception as ‘broad’ and encompassing three versions, each requiring a different test[.]” (citing Mary E. Naumann, Note, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet Another Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 325, 330-31 (1999))). Each doctrine stems from the basic premise underlying the community caretaker exception—an officer‘s interaction with a citizen
{12} The State argues that the facts of this case must be analyzed under the impoundment and inventory doctrine, and not the emergency aid doctrine, as Defendant contends. We outline the tests of each doctrine as set forth in several New Mexico cases and conclude that the facts of this case call for analysis under the impoundment and inventory doctrine.
{13} Under the emergency aid doctrine, the State has the burden of establishing the following three-part test:
First, the police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property. Second, the search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. Third, there must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.
Id. ¶ 29 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). Typically, the application of the emergency aid doctrine is limited to situations where an officer acts to protect or preserve a citizen‘s life, or acts to avoid serious injury. Id. ¶ 26. In New Mexico, we have exclusively applied the emergency aid doctrine to intrusions into
{14} The impoundment and inventory doctrine has, under our cases, been applied to searches of vehicles and other personal items. To be valid under the impoundment and inventory doctrine, the seizure and search of the item must meet a three-part test, different from that required by the emergency aid doctrine. First, the vehicle must be in police custody and control. Ruffino, 1980-NMSC-072, ¶ 5. More specifically, the police must lawfully have custody and control of the item. Id. Police custody must be
{15} We evaluate the constitutionality of the search of Defendant‘s vehicle in the present case using the impoundment and inventory doctrine of the community
{16} Under our case law, the emergency aid doctrine operates to justify the search of a home upon an officer‘s arrival at a given location under circumstances that call for the officer to exercise the community caretaking responsibility to provide emergency assistance. See Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 4 (describing entry into a home
{17} We must, therefore, analyze Sergeant Foreman‘s decision to impound Defendant‘s vehicle and inventory the items within it under the impoundment and inventory doctrine of the community caretaker exception. We begin by reviewing the
A. The Impoundment and Inventory Doctrine of the Community Caretaker Exception
{18} The State cites federal circuit court opinions in support of its argument that Sergeant Foreman‘s decision to tow Defendant‘s vehicle was justified by the impoundment and inventory doctrine. The State asserts that there is “no standardized criteria for evaluating reasonableness—it depends on a case-by-case inquiry of the facts and circumstances leading to the decision to impound.” We find the State‘s characterization of the law accurate and supported by four decisions from New Mexico‘s appellate courts. We discuss these four cases sequentially, apply the resulting legal precepts to the facts of this case, and conclude that Sergeant Foreman‘s decision to impound and inventory Defendant‘s vehicle was reasonable.
B. New Mexico Cases
{19} As previously discussed, New Mexico‘s appellate courts have established a three-part test for assessing reasonableness under the impoundment and inventory doctrine, often referred to as the Ruffino requirements. In Ruffino, our Supreme Court found reasonable an officer‘s search of a vehicle following the arrest of the owner of the vehicle. The officer first searched the vehicle‘s interior, then used the keys to
{20} The following three cases apply the Ruffino requirements and together embody New Mexico law on valid inventory searches. In Williams, our Supreme Court found reasonable an officer‘s search of a vehicle legally parked behind a grocery store following the arrest of its owner. Officers arrested the defendant while he attempted to force a cashier to empty her register at gun point. Williams, 1982-NMSC-041, ¶ 2. After taking the defendant to the police station for booking, officers discovered “a set
{21} Our Supreme Court concluded that “the first Ruffino requirement was satisfied,” citing two federal cases. Williams, 1982-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 5, 7 (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) and United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973)). In Preston, the police properly took custody of a vehicle after arresting the defendants for vagrancy while sitting in the parked vehicle, “even though they presumedly could have locked it and left it parked where it was.” Williams, 1982-NMSC-041, ¶ 5. In Lawson, the police impounded a locked vehicle parked in the parking lot of a motel on the day that they arrested the vehicle‘s owner for passing insufficient funds checks. Williams, 1982-NMSC-041, ¶ 5. Our Supreme Court observed that the decision to impound in those cases could not be justified because of some necessity, e.g., the car presented a traffic hazard or its location violated a parking ordinance. Id. ¶ 6. Rather, Preston and Lawson illustrate “that no
{22} In Boswell, our Supreme Court found reasonable a search of the defendant‘s wallet conducted after an officer took the defendant to the police station for booking. Suspecting the defendant of shoplifting at his grocery store, the store‘s manager detained the defendant in his office. 1991-NMSC-004, ¶ 2. Upon arrival, the police requested the defendant‘s identification. Id. After retrieving his identification from his wallet, the defendant inadvertently placed his wallet on a cabinet in the office where it remained until an officer returned to the grocery store to find it during the defendant‘s booking. Id. As in Williams, the defendant in Boswell sought to suppress the drugs later found in his wallet, arguing that the police did not have lawful custody of the wallet, i.e., that there was no reasonable nexus between the defendant‘s arrest for shoplifting and the officer‘s seizure of the wallet. Boswell, 1991-NMSC-004, ¶¶ 4, 8.
{24} Importantly, Boswell also explicitly rejected the defendant‘s argument that the officer cannot lawfully acquire custody of the defendant‘s possessions if the defendant can arrange for someone else to retrieve the item. Id. “This would not have removed the risk that intervening causes would result in the loss of the wallet, nor would it exculpate the police had it been lost.” Id. The officer‘s investigation of the defendant created a situation that put the defendant‘s property at risk of theft or loss, and therefore, the officer has an “on-going” responsibility to safeguard the defendant‘s property. Id. The risk of loss to the defendant and the possibility of police incurring liability for that loss provide valid bases upon which an officer may claim
{25} Finally, in Shaw, this Court found reasonable a search of a cigarette pack removed from the defendant‘s pocket during booking, following his arrest for a domestic disturbance. 1993-NMCA-016, ¶¶ 2, 17. The defendant argued that searching the cigarette pack did not further any of the permissible purposes of an inventory search. Id. ¶ 12. Because the value of cigarettes is negligible, the defendant argued that a search of a cigarette pack cannot be necessary to protect the arrestee‘s property or to prevent claims against police for the loss or theft of the cigarettes. Id. We rejected this argument for “miss[ing] the essence of the law controlling inventory searches,” and we emphasized “that a clearly established inventory procedure may properly require that jailers search all containers, including cigarette packs.” Id. ¶ 13. Moreover, we acknowledged that Boswell “is illustrative of the broad scope of lawful inventory searches.” Shaw, 1993-NMCA-016, ¶ 14. We concluded “there was substantial evidence to find that the inventory of [the d]efendant‘s cigarette pack . . . was reasonably made in furtherance of both the protection of the arrestee‘s property
and to protect the police against false claims because items of value such as money, rings, and bracelets are often temporarily stored in open cigarette packs.” Id. ¶ 16. In short, we found the search reasonable because the purpose was to inventory the contents of the cigarette pack and because the detention facility‘s procedure furthered legitimate police interests. Id. ¶ 17.
{26} In sum, the state of the law of the impoundment and inventory doctrine has evolved from the distinctive three-part test first established in Ruffino, and now focuses more generally on the reasonableness of the officer‘s asserted custody or control of the item seized and searched. Insofar as the officer‘s decision to impound the vehicle or seize the item stems from concerns that the vehicle or item could be lost or stolen and that the officer could be liable for such loss or theft as a result of the officer having separated the owner from the vehicle or item, the officer may impound or seize. Notably, the following considerations do not by themselves defeat the reasonableness of the officer‘s decision to impound a vehicle or seize an item: whether the vehicle could remain in its location legally if not impounded, Williams, 1982-NMSC-041; whether another person could acquire the item on the defendant‘s behalf, Boswell, 1991-NMSC-004; and whether the item is valuable, regardless of whether the officer has any way of knowing its value, Shaw, 1993-NMCA-016.
{27} Turning to the present case, we address Defendant‘s argument and evaluate the reasonableness of Sergeant Foreman‘s decision to impound Defendant‘s vehicle. Defendant focuses on several facts that tend to show the unreasonableness of Sergeant Foreman‘s decision to impound his vehicle. First, Defendant rented the vehicle; he did not own it. Defendant maintains that the car rental company presumably had contingencies for retrieving its own abandoned or disabled vehicles. The initial encounter between Defendant and Sergeant Foreman began at 3:30 p.m., a time the car rental company was reachable by phone. Defendant maintains that these facts prove that calling the car rental company to seek assistance from an agent was the reasonable course of action. Alternatively, Defendant notes that the owner of Dino‘s Mini-Mart could have arranged for the removal of the vehicle given its location on the owner‘s property. Second, Defendant highlights the condition and the location of the vehicle. The vehicle was not disabled; it was not a nuisance; it was not obstructing a highway or other public roadway; and it was parked legally.
{28} We are not persuaded that these facts prove Sergeant Foreman‘s decision to impound the vehicle was unreasonable. Defendant asserts that the availability of two other persons besides Sergeant Foreman who initiated the police-citizen encounter compel the conclusion that Sergeant Foreman‘s decision to manage the vehicle
{30} Similarly, we are not persuaded by Defendant‘s contention that the operability of the vehicle and the fact that it was parked legally control the reasonableness of Sergeant Foreman‘s decision to impound the vehicle. Our Supreme Court previously decided that “[t]he fact that the vehicle was legally parked and could have been left there does not make the impoundment improper.” Williams, 1982-NMSC-041, ¶ 7.
{31} We note that we examine the reasonableness of Sergeant Foreman‘s conduct under circumstances unique to our past cases applying the impoundment and inventory doctrine. Unlike our other cases, Sergeant Foreman did not arrest Defendant before deciding to impound and therefore inventory Defendant‘s vehicle. The broader legal issue this appeal presents concerns the applicability of the impoundment and inventory doctrine where the officer does not arrest the owner of the vehicle prior to making the decision to impound. See Boswell, 1991-NMSC-004, ¶ 2 (describing arrest prior to the search of the arrestee‘s wallet); Williams, 1982-NMSC-041, ¶ 2 (describing arrest prior to the search of the arrestee‘s vehicle); Ruffino, 1980-NMSC-072, ¶ 2 (describing arrest prior to the search of the arrestee‘s
{32} Defendant argues that the impoundment and inventory doctrine can only apply to situations where police first arrest the owner of the vehicle. We disagree with Defendant, and we conclude that Sergeant Foreman‘s decision to impound and inventory Defendant‘s vehicle was reasonable under the impoundment and inventory doctrine given the circumstances that confronted him. We acknowledge that if the defendant‘s arrest is a necessary component of the rationale underpinning the impoundment and inventory doctrine, then the doctrine may not be applied to the facts of this case, absent novel reasons for the doctrine‘s existence. We cannot conclude, however, that the doctrine only applies to searches following an arrest for two reasons.
{33} First, the impoundment and inventory doctrine is, as explained previously, one branch of the community caretaker exception to the
{34} Second, we believe, and our case law supports the conclusion, that an arrest is not what makes an officer‘s decision to impound a vehicle reasonable. Reasonableness is a function of an officer‘s responsibility to safeguard the citizen‘s property and a prudent officer‘s need to insulate the police from liability should the citizen‘s property be lost or stolen. Shaw, 1993-NMCA-016, ¶ 10. Any time a citizen is separated from his or her belongings, be it because an officer arrested that citizen or because the officer‘s judgment led the officer to believe the citizen required medical attention at a facility some distance from the citizen‘s vehicle where the officer responded to the citizen‘s medical emergency, the citizen‘s property is left exposed and unattended, and because the officer is involved in the separation of the citizen from the citizen‘s belongings, the officer opens himself or herself up to potential liability for the loss or theft of those belongings. The reasons an officer‘s decision to impound may be reasonable rest not on the existence of an arrest, but on the resulting circumstances after an arrest occurs—the separation of the citizen from the citizen‘s property leaves the citizen‘s property unattended and in a public place.
{35} Finally, we address Defendant‘s two remaining arguments. Defendant argues that the State did not offer any evidence proving that there existed a threat of theft or vandalism to the vehicle were Sergeant Foreman to leave the vehicle parked in the parking lot. The only evidence the State presented came from Sergeant Foreman‘s testimony at the suppression hearing, during which he stated that the location of the convenience store was “known for criminal activity.” Defendant cites to our decision in Apodaca v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep‘t, for the proposition that the
{36} We cannot rely on Apodaca for this proposition of law. There, an officer stopped the driver of a motorcycle weaving within one lane of traffic in a pendulum-type motion. Id. ¶ 2. The officer specifically admitted that he never suspected the driver was intoxicated or otherwise committing a traffic infraction. Id. ¶ 3. Rather, the officer initiated the stop out of concern for the driver‘s welfare, perhaps an injury or illness. Id. Accordingly, the defendant argued that the stop was unconstitutional because the officer had no reasonable suspicion that the driver was engaged in criminal activity. Id. ¶ 4. We found the stop constitutional because “a police officer may stop a vehicle for a specific, articulable safety concern, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a violation of law has occurred or is occurring.” Id. ¶ 5. Our decision relied on State v. Reynolds, 1993-NMCA-162, 117 N.M. 23, 868 P.2d 668, rev‘d on other grounds by 1995-NMSC-008, 119 N.M. 383, 890 P.2d 1315.
{38} Lastly, Defendant argues the State failed to prove Sergeant Foreman‘s inventory search complied with police regulations and procedures, the second Ruffino requirement. Defendant cites two sections of the Department of Public Safety Policy Manual, providing “[w]hen the driver is arrested, the officer shall inventory the vehicle if it is being towed from the scene[,]” and “[o]fficers shall not tow vehicles from private property at the property owner‘s request due to them being abandoned.” According to Defendant, the policies only authorize the towing of a vehicle if the officer arrested its owner. We disagree with Defendant‘s reading of these policies. The first policy cited by Defendant applies only if the officer arrested the driver of the vehicle. It says nothing about the proper procedure to follow if the antecedent is not true, i.e., where the officer did not arrest the driver. The second policy cited by Defendant is irrelevant because Sergeant Foreman did not receive a request from anyone (neither the car rental company nor an owner or employee of Dino‘s Mini-Mart) to remove Defendant‘s vehicle.
{39} We hold that a police officer may decide to impound a citizen‘s vehicle under the impoundment and inventory doctrine of the community caretaker exception to the
{40} IT IS SO ORDERED.
STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge
WE CONCUR:
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge