State v. BurnsState v. Burns
OPINION
{¶ 1} This is an accelerated appeal from the decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas sentencing defendant-appellant, Jeffrey Burns, for breaking and entering, and forgery.1
{¶ 2} We overrule appellant‘s first assignment of error because the common pleas court did not err in its imposition of consecutive sentences. The record shows that the court complied with the dictates of State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463, 2003-Ohio-4165, by sufficiently articulating the findings in
{¶ 3} Further, the fact that the common pleas court judge and not a jury made the findings to support consecutive sentences did not violate appellant‘s right to a jury trial pursuant to Blakely v. Washington (2004), ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Blakely restated the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Blakely at 2536, quoting Apprendi at 490. Blakely defined “statutory maximum” as “the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely at 2537. It is clear that the term “statutory maximum,” as used in Apprendi, Blakely, and the subsequent case of U.S. v. Booker and U.S. v. Fanfan (2005), ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, refers only to the maximum sentence for a single crime, not the maximum aggregate sentence for multiple, separate crimes. Therefore, Blakely does not limit a sentencing court‘s discretion to impose consecutive sentences. See State v. Collier, Butler App. No. CA2003-11-282, 2005-Ohio-944, at ¶ 41; State v. Wheeler, Washington App. No. 04CA1, 2004-Ohio-6598, at ¶ 23; State v. Taylor, 158 Ohio App.3d 597, 2004-Ohio-5939, at ¶ 26; State v. Abdul-Mumin, Franklin App. Nos. 04AP-485 and 04AP-486, 2005-Ohio-522, at ¶ 30.
{¶ 4} We overrule in part and sustain in part appellant‘s second assignment of error. We reject appellant‘s argument as to the common pleas court‘s imposition of $1,000 in fines because, contrary to appellant‘s argument,
{¶ 5} Judgment affirmed as modified.
Walsh and Bressler, JJ., concur.