706 N.E.2d 378 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1997
In this appeal from a conviction for tampering with a coin machine, we revisit the issue of when the trial court is required under R.C.
The defendant-appellant, John E. Meyer, was convicted following a plea of guilty to a violation of R.C.
In his first assignment of error, Meyer, relying upon R.C.
R.C.
"If a fine is imposed as a sentence or a part of sentence, the court or magistrate that imposed the fine may order that the offender be committed to the jail or workhouse until the fine is paid or secured to be paid, or he is otherwise legally discharged, if the court or magistrate determines at a hearing that the offender is able, at the time, to pay the fine but refuses to do so. The hearing required by this section shall beconducted at the time of sentencing." (Emphasis added.)
The state argues that the hearing required by this section "would not apply in this case unless [Meyer] were going to be sent to jail for failing or refusing to pay his fine." In Stevens and Wiggins, however, this court construed the above language to require that a trial court must hold a hearing "at the time of sentencing" whenever a fine is imposed even though the offender does not face incarceration. Furthermore, in Stevens and Wiggins we held that the hearing was a mandatory, not a discretionary, procedure, and therefore the failure to hold such a hearing was error as a matter of law.
Subsequently, in State v. Horton (1993),
Other courts of appeals have rejected the construction of R.C.
"Carried to its logical conclusion * * * Horton requires every sentencing court, including traffic referees and even mayor's court officers, to conduct a hearing on the defendant's ability to pay a fine without undue hardship at the time of sentencing. That burden is not the requirement of the United States Supreme Court, the Ohio Supreme Court, or R.C.
Application of our holdings in Stevens and Wiggins to the case at bar would, arguably, require us to hold that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a hearing in accordance with R.C.
R.C.
"The idea of paying fines to the state originated sometime in the 11th century when a criminal paid a wite to the king as part of his punishment. See 2 Pollock Maitland, History of English Law (2 Ed.) 448-451. History also reveals that most people who were unable to pay the wite were sold into slavery, presumably to repay the purchaser by labor. See id., at 460, 516. Incarceration until the fine was paid was a moderation of the slavery penalty and its primary aim was to secure payment in a more civilized manner. Cf. id., at 464, 518. Nevertheless the thrust of the original idea was that a man should work out his fine." Studt at 100, 49 O.O.2d at 431,
By requiring a hearing prior to incarceration for nonpayment of fines, R.C.
Not only does the Constitution not impose a hearing requirement when a fine is merely pronounced, but we are also convinced, upon further reflection, that the legislature in enacting R.C.
We hold, therefore, that R.C.
That is not to say, though, that the trial court was not without any duty to inquire regarding Meyer's ability to pay a fine. That duty arises, however, from R.C.
Meyer's first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
In his second assignment of error, Meyer asserts that the trial court erred by "making a determination that [Meyer] was not indigent without making an inquiry into the considerations as set forth in R.C.
In his third assignment of error, Meyer argues that the trial court erred by failing to "assure itself that [Meyer] made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to have his ability to pay the fine determined." Meyer relies upon Karr v. Blay
(N.D. Ohio 1976), 413 F. Supp.. 579, for the proposition that R.C.
Finally, in his fourth assignment of error, Meyer argues that the trial court erred by placing him on probation for a period of two years. According to Meyer, R.C.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
HILDEBRANDT, P.J., and SUNDERMANN, J., concur. *379