STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LASHON BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 108699
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
April 23, 2020
[Cite as State v. Brown, 2020-Ohio-1615.]
RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J.
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR-19-638305-A
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 23, 2020
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy Troup, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Buckeye Law Office and Craig W. Smotzer, for appellant.
RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Lashon Brown (“Brown”) appeals from the consecutive sentences imposed by the common pleas court following his guilty plea. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the appellant’s sentence.
{¶ 2} This appeal stems from Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-19-638305-A (“2019 case”) where Brown, in an intoxicated state, gained access to the home of victim EK, and assaulted her and her three daughters.
{¶ 3} As EK and her three daughters cowered in a bedroom corner, Brown swung two leather belts at them, striking all four victims with both ends of the belts and causing injuries to the four victims. Brown also assaulted a female police officer as she placed Brown into a police cruiser. The 2019 case occurred when Brown was a fugitive under Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-18-634033-A (“2018 case”).1 The record reflects Brown’s extensive criminal history dating from 1996.
{¶ 4} On March 20, 2019, Brown was charged with a nine-count indictment in the 2019 case that included: Count 1, burglary, with a notice of prior conviction and repeat violent offender specification, in violation of
{¶ 5} On May 2, 2019, Brown was fully advised in open court of his constitutional rights and penalties and withdrew his former not guilty plea. Brown pleaded guilty to the following: (1) burglary, a felony of the second degree, in violation of
{¶ 6} At the 2019 case’s sentencing hearing on June 12, 2019, the court ordered Brown to serve three years under amended Count 1; two years under Count 2; 180 days under amended Count 6; and six months under Count 9. Brown’s sentences under Counts 1, 2, and 6 were ordered to be served concurrently to one another. Count 9’s six-month sentence was to be served consecutively with the other counts, with an aggregate sentence of three years and six months.
{¶ 7} The trial court’s judgment entry filed on June 17, 2019, reflected the sentence ordered at the sentencing hearing.
The trial court erred by ordering Appellant to serve a consecutive sentence without making the appropriate findings required by
R.C. 2929.14 and H.B. 86.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 9} On appeal, Brown presents one assignment of error for our review. Brown argues that the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive sentence for his assault charge without the court making the required findings. Brown’s claim is not supported by the record.
{¶ 10} In Ohio, there is a presumption that prison sentences should be served concurrently, unless the trial court makes the findings outlined in
- The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section
2929.16 ,2929.17 , or2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct. - The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
{¶ 11} The sentencing court must make the statutory findings at the sentencing hearing and also incorporate the findings into its sentencing entry. State v. Hendricks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101864, 2015-Ohio-2268, ¶ 12, citing State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, syllabus. “‘“The trial court must indicate that it engaged in the analysis and that it considered the statutory criteria and referenced the given basis for its decision.”’” Morris at ¶ 26, quoting Bonnell at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326, 715 N.E.2d 131 (1999). “However, a word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute is not required, and as long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.” Bonnell at ¶ 29. A sentencing court’s failure to make the statutory findings is “‘contrary to law.’” Hendricks at ¶ 12, quoting Bonnell at ¶ 37.
{¶ 12} A reviewing court may overturn the imposition of consecutive sentences, under
{¶ 13} When the trial court sentenced Brown, it made the following findings on the record:
The consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public, and punish the offender and not disproportionate, and that the harm was so great or unusual, that a single term does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the conduct.
(Tr. 60.) We find these statements satisfied
{¶ 14} Brown argues the trial court did not recite the
[w]hile we prefer that the sentencing judge make separate and distinct findings under
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) , we have noted that in State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 33, the Ohio Supreme Court took a more “relaxed” approach to those findings, finding that the requisite findings could be made if the reviewing court could “discern” them from statements made by the sentencing judge.
{¶ 15} Here, the sentencing court stated it found consecutive sentences necessary to both protect the public and punish the offender, even though the court only needed to make one or the other of those findings rather than both. The court stated the consecutive sentence was not disproportionate. Although the court did not reiterate verbatim the statutory disproportionate language, we can discern from the trial court’s statements — including the trial judge’s reference to Brown’s PSI — that the judge considered the disproportionate prong with regard to both Brown’s conduct and the danger he posed to the public.2 Tr. 55-56; Kirkman at ¶ 3-5 (on appeal, the trial court’s statement — “I don’t believe it’s disproportionate” — along with a reference to the defendant’s criminal history and a need to protect the public, satisfied the strictures of
{¶ 16} We can discern from the transcript that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and that the record supports the trial court’s findings. Hendricks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101864, 2015-Ohio-2268, at ¶ 15, citing Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, at ¶ 29.
{¶ 18} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
RAYMOND C. HEADEN, JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR