CITY OF URBANA v. CHRISTY BOYSTEL
Appellate Case No. 2021-CA-5
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, CHAMPAIGN COUNTY
July 23, 2021
[Cite as State v. Boystel, 2021-Ohio-2529.]
Triаl Court Case No. 2020-TRD-1148; (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court)
Rendered on the 23rd day of July, 2021.
ROGER A. STEFFAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0086330, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Champaign County Municipal Prosecutor‘s Office, 205 South Main Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
REGINA ROSEMARY RICHARDS, Atty. Reg. No. 0079457, 202 Scioto Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Christy Boystel appeals from a judgment of the Champaign County Municipal Court, which found hеr guilty after a bench trial of violating
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On the evening of October 14, 2020, Kristine Faulkner was driving her red Honda Accord westbound on Church Street in Urbana. As is often the case on Church Street, cars were parked on both sides of the road, sо Faulkner was proceeding down the middle part of the street. At the same time, Boystel was traveling northbound on Wallace Street in a red minivan.
{¶ 3} The intersection of Church and Wallace Streets is a two-way stop. There are stop signs on both sides of the intersection on Wallace, but drivers on Church Streеt do not have to stop and have the right-of-way.
{¶ 4} Faulkner, traveling on Church Street, and Boystel, driving on Wallace Street, arrived at the intersection at approximately the same time. Boystel paused at the stop sign but apparently did not see the oncoming vehicle driven by Faulkner. She procеeded to drive out into the intersection to effectuate a right-hand turn and collided with Faulkner‘s Honda. Boystel‘s van struck the driver‘s side door of Faulkner‘s vehicle with the front driver‘s side bumper of hers. Both vehicles suffered minor damage.
{¶ 5} Officer Keith Hurst of the Urbana Police Department was dispatched to the sсene and, after speaking with the parties and doing some investigation of his own, he found Boystel to be at fault and cited her with failure to yield (at a stop sign), a minor
{¶ 6} On October 26, 2020, Boystel appeared for arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty, and was given a trial date. After some postponements and rescheduling, a bench trial was held on December 16, 2020. Both sides called two witnesses. Faulkner and Officer Hurst testified for the city, and Boystel testified on her own behalf. Additionally, Kaylee Jones, a passenger in Boystel‘s vehicle at the time of the crash, testified for the defense.
{¶ 7} After hearing witness testimony аnd considering exhibits from both sides, the trial court found Boystel guilty of failure to yield and imposed fines and court costs (although the amount is disputed by the parties). Boystel has appealed and raises five assignments of error. We will address them in an order that facilitates our analysis.
II. The appeal is not moot
{¶ 8} We will begin with Boystel‘s final assignment of error because the rest of her arguments hinge on its outcome. In her fifth assignment of error, Boystel contends that her conviction is not moot because of the collateral consequences she suffered as a result. While this assertion is not properly construed as an assignment of error, we agree.
{¶ 9} In misdemeanor cases, courts consider criminal appeals to be moot if the appellant has completed his or her sentence prior to a ruling on the appeal on the basis that, if the sentence had been served, a favorable judgment could not “operate tо undo what has been done or restore the petitioner the penalty of the term of imprisonment which he has served.” Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 129 Ohio St.3d 389, 2011-Ohio-2673, 953 N.E.2d 278, ¶ 17. The Ohio Supreme Court has noted that, when a defendant has been convicted of a criminal offense and has voluntarily paid the fine or completed the sentence
{¶ 10} In this case, however, Boystel has suffered collateral consequences, even thоugh she has paid her fine. The record indicates that a violation of
{¶ 11} The record indicates that Boystel paid the costs levied by the court as a result of her conviction but still incurred two demerit points on her license. Her appeal, therefore, is not moot.
III. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶ 12} In her first аnd second assignments of error, Boystel argues that her conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 13} Sufficiency is a “term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law. Id.
{¶ 15} “A weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability of the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is more believable or persuasive.” (Citation omitted) State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 12; see Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 19. When an appellate court reviews whether a conviction is аgainst the manifest weight of the evidence, “[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶ 16} The trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses, and because of that, we must defer to the factfinder‘s decisions whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of the witnesses. State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684, *4 (Aug. 22, 1997). A conviction should only be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence in exceptional circumstances. Martin at 175.
{¶ 18} In the case before us now, Boystel was convicted of failure to yield at a stop sign, a violation of
{¶ 19} Faulkner, the driver оf the other car, testified that she was driving west on Church Street and, because there were parked cars on both sides of the road, she was traveling close to the middle of roadway. As Faulkner approached Wallace Street, she continued straight without slowing down as she did not have a stop sign. Then, in the intersection of Church and Wallace, Boystel‘s van collided with her car. When asked to describe what happened, Faulkner testified: “I think she was at a stop sign, and then went to pull out, and then she just kind of scraped the car as a result. * * * The damage went all down the driver‘s side.” Trial Transcript at 7-8.
{¶ 20} Officer Hurst also testified. He stated that he learned Faulker was traveling westbound on Church Street while Boystel was driving northbound on Wallace Street. Boystel came to a stop at the stop sign, made a right-hand turn to travel eastbound on
{¶ 21} Boystel testified at trial as well and relayed a similar story. The difference, though, was that Boystel claimed that she could not see Faulkner‘s vehicle due to cars parked on the street near the intersection. That conclusion, however, was contradicted by Officer Hurst, who testified that it was possible to see approaching traffic while stopped at that stop sign.
{¶ 22} Now on appeal, Boystel argues that her conviction was based in insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence because Faulkner was actually at fault. She first asserts that the collision would not have happened had Faulkner not been driving down the middle of the road. While it is undisputed that Faulkner was driving in the center of the roadway, both Faulkner and Officеr Hurst attributed that fact to cars parked on both sides of Church Street. Officer Hurst testified that he “believed Miss Faulkner had to travel closer to the center of the roadway to be safe due to the vehicles parked on both sides of the street.” Trial Transcript at 25.
{¶ 23} Boystel also contends that speеd played a role in the crash. Faulkner did admit to driving approximately 35mph in the 25mph zone, but Officer Hurst testified that speed was not a factor that led to the collision. Further, Boystel faults Faulkner for being distracted at the time of the accident. Faulkner admitted that she had her phone out to check thе time when the accident occurred (she testified her car‘s clock did not work), but stated she was not texting and denied that looking at her phone caused her to weave or swerve out of the middle of the road.
{¶ 25} Considering the evidence рresented at trial, we conclude that the trial court did not lose its way in reaching the guilty verdict. The ordinance states that the driver at the stop sign “shall yield the right of way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hаzard[.]”
{¶ 26} Having concluded that the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, it was necessarily based on sufficient evidence, because “finding that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily comprises a finding of sufficiency.” Freeman at ¶ 39. Boystel‘s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
IV. It was not error to strictly construе Urbana Codified Ordinance 331.19(a) against Boystel
{¶ 27} In her third assignment of error, Boystel asserts that it was plain error for the trial court to strictly construe
{¶ 28} “Plain error is an error or defect at trial, not brought to the attention of the
{¶ 29} Boystel asks us to strictly сonstrue the statute against the City and liberally in her favor pursuant to
{¶ 30} Boystel also argues that failure to yield should not be considered a strict liability crime. We disagree. “Statutes and ordinances enacted for the purpose of promoting the safety, health or well-being of the public are generally meant to be enforced under a strict liability standard.” Columbus v. Shirkey, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-752, 2009-Ohio-1329, ¶ 30. In fact, traffic offenses and motor vehiclе laws are areas listed by the United States Supreme Court as being amenable to the imposition of strict liability. United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 262, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). Ohio
{¶ 31}
{¶ 32} Further, this is not a case where the trial court committed plain error. As stated above, plain error should only be noticed in “exceptiоnal cases” and only to prevent a “miscarriage of justice.” The trial court analyzed the ordinance and its application to Boystel in a reasonable way: she failed to yield to Faulker‘s vehicle, which had the right of way, and in failing to do so, she violated the plain language of
{¶ 33} The third assignment of error is overruled.
V. There is no evidence of a plea agreement
{¶ 34} In her fourth assignment of error, Boystel avers that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to accept a purported plea agreement without a reason or making a record.
{¶ 35} Appellate review is limited to the record as it was at the time the trial court rendered its judgment. State v. Deaton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28735, 2020-Ohio-6955, ¶ 29. Arguments relying on evidence outside the record are not appropriately considered on direct appeal, and we will “disregard alleged facts that are not of record in the trial court.” Chase Manhattan Mfg. Corp. v. Locker, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19904, 2003-Ohio-6665, ¶ 10.
{¶ 36} Notwithstanding the assignment of error, there is no evidence in the record before us that indicates a plea agrеement was ever presented to the trial court. In fact, both parties confirm in their appellate briefs that, while there were negotiations between counsel, a formal offer was never proposed to the court on the record.
{¶ 37} Considering the record before us, Boystel‘s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
VI. Conclusion
{¶ 38} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
TUCKER, P. J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Roger A. Steffan
Regina Rosemary Richards
Hon. Gil Weithman