State v. BoldmanState v. Boldman
Rendered on the 7th day October, 2022.
JANE A. NAPIER, Atty. Reg. No. 0061426, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Champaign County Prosecutor‘s Office, Appellate Division, 200 North Main Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
GLENDA A. SMITH, Atty. Reg. No. 0070738, P.O. Box 15353, Wyoming, Ohio 45215
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
I. Background
{2} On December 6, 2021, Boldman was indicted by the Champaign County grand jury on two counts of pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired minor, in violation of
{3} On December 15, 2021, Boldman entered a written negotiated guilty plea to the offenses as charged in the indictment, and the State agreed to recommend a sentence of an indefinite prison term consisting of a minimum term of no more than 12 years and a maximum term of 16 years. The State‘s recommendation was contingent on Boldman‘s not having any additional criminal history other than what was already known to the State and not committing any new criminal offenses or violating any conditions of bond prior to sentencing. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Boldman was informed that the second-degree felony offenses carried an indefinite sentence of a minimum of two to eight years in prison with a maximum term being the minimum term that is imposed plus one-half of the minimum sentence imposed. He was also informed of the rebuttable presumption that he would be released after the expiration of his minimum sentence. Both second-
{4} Because Boldman entered a guilty plea to multiple felony offenses, Boldman was advised that he could be sentenced to serve consecutive sentences. Although the State made a recommendation for sentencing, it was not a jointly-recommended sentence, and Boldman was advised that the trial court had discretion to impose any sentence within the statutory range, which, in this case, if all sentences were ordered to be served consecutively, was a minimum sentence of 17 1/2 years to a maximum of 21 1/2 years in prison. Since none of the offenses carried mandatory prison terms, Boldman was advised that he was eligible for community control sanctions. However, he was also informed that he was subject to a mandatory period of post-release control of five years if he were to be sentenced to prison and that violations of post-release control could result in additional sanctions. Further, as a result of Boldman‘s being on post-release control for a prior felony sex offense at the time he committed the underlying offenses in this case, Boldman was advised that if his post-release control were revoked, he could be subject to an additional 741 days in prison to be served consecutively to the underlying sentence in this case. Boldman agreed to pay court costs and forfeit certain items to the Champaign County Sheriff‘s Office.
{5} After entering his guilty plea, the trial court found Boldman guilty as charged and ordered a presentence investigation report (“PSI“) for sentencing. At the sentencing
{6} Prior to imposing sentence, the trial court stated that it had reviewed the PSI, statements of counsel, and Boldman‘s statements, as well as a colloquy that occurred between the court and Boldman. The court acknowledged it had considered the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in
{7} Boldman appeals, raising three issues all related to the imposition of his sentence.
II. Review of Boldman‘s Sentence
{8} In his first assignment of error, Boldman asserts that the trial court erred in finding that there “were not substantial grounds to mitigate Boldman‘s conduct, in determining recidivism and promot[ing] the effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions.” Boldman insists that the trial court did not adequately consider his mental health and his youth; Boldman was 22 years of age at the time of sentencing. Boldman contends, as he did in the trial court, that he should have received sex offender treatment, a community control sanction, rather than a prison sentence. His argument lacks merit.
{9} In reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts must apply the standard of review set forth in
{10} Boldman did not raise an issue involving a challenge to any of the specified
{11} “The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give its reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.” State v. King, 2013-Ohio-2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). In exercising its discretion, a trial court must consider the statutory policies that apply to every felony offense, including those set out in
{12} The Supreme Court also confirmed that
{13} Here, all of the sentences imposed were within the statutory ranges for the respective offenses. See
III. Reagan Tokes Law
{14} In his second assignment of error, Boldman argues that the trial court violated his “rights to appeal, right to trial by jury and due process rights” by imposing an indefinite sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law. The premise of his argument is that
{15} In both his second and third assignments of error, Boldman attempts to challenge the constitutionality of the sentencing statutes, yet he failed to raise any constitutional challenge in the trial court. “[T]he question of the constitutionality of a statute must generally be raised at the first opportunity and, in a criminal prosecution, this means in the trial court.” State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986). “The failure to challenge the constitutionality of a statute in the trial court forfeits all but plain error on appeal, and the burden of demonstrating plain error is on the party asserting it.” State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 2. Boldman makes no acknowledgement in his brief of his failure to challenge the constitutionality of the sentencing scheme in the trial court and submitted no plain error argument on appeal. Therefore, his constitutional arguments are forfeited. Although we retain the ability to consider constitutional challenges on appeal where no challenge was raised in the trial court, we have previously analyzed and rejected similar arguments and find no need to reiterate them here.
{16} We have consistently held that the Reagan Tokes Act does not violate the
{17} Because Boldman does not advance any novel argument left unaddressed by this Court‘s prior decisions, we find the constitutional challenges presented in this appeal, even if not forfeited, lack merit. As a result, his second and third assignments of error are overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{18} Having overruled each of Boldman‘s assignments of error, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
TUCKER, P.J. and DONOVAN, J., concur.
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Jane A. Napier
Glenda A. Smith
Hon. Nick A. Selvaggio