State v. BlountState v. Blount
{¶1} This appeal stems from plaintiff-appellant Keilow Blount‘s conviction following a bench trial for driving under OVI suspension in violation of
Factual Background and Procedural Posture
{¶2} On March 4, 2018, at approximately 4:45 a.m., Cincinnati Police Officer Rocky Helton was dispatched to Rally‘s on Spring Grove Avenue in Cincinnati for the report of a person who was unconscious or asleep in a vehicle located in the drive-through lane of the Rally‘s parking lot. Upon his arrival, Helton observed Keilow Blount asleep in the driver‘s seat of a vehicle parked in front of the speaker in the Rally‘s drive-through lane. The engine was running, the headlights were on, and the door was locked. No one else was in the vehicle. When emergency medical technicians (“EMTs“) arrived on the scene, they began trying to wake Blount. The driver‘s side window was halfway down so one of the EMTs reached in and unlocked the driver‘s door. After some prodding by the EMT and Helton, Blount awoke. Blount stated that he was just getting something to eat and then going home. Through investigation, Helton learned thаt the vehicle was registered to Blount, and that Blount‘s driver‘s license was OVI-suspended. Helton also observed that Rally‘s appeared to be closed, and that no one was around. At trial, Helton testified that thе Rally‘s lot was private property.
{¶4} Blount denied ever moving the vehicle. He testified that he had moved from the passenger seat to the driver‘s seat after Morris and Adams disappeared in order to raise the window and lock the doors, as it was a rough part of town. However, Helton‘s testimony and his body-camera video revealed that the driver‘s side window was half way down. Blount testified that the vehicle had already been in park and running. While he waited for Morris and Adams to return, he called a few
{¶5} At trial, Blount‘s counsel moved for dismissal under Crim.R. 29 at the conclusion of the state‘s case and again at the conclusion of the trial based on the lack of evidence that defendant was operating the vehicle, arguing that there was no testimony that he had operated a vehicle upon a public road оr highway. The trial court overruled the motions, ultimately finding the defense witnesses lacked credibility because there were major discrepancies in each of their versions of the events. Specifically, the court noted that Blount‘s statement to Helton that he was getting food and then going home did not dispel the circumstantial evidence that he had operated the vehicle. The court found the circumstantial evidence more compelling—Blount was the registered owner of the vehicle, he was in the driver‘s seat with the key in the ignition and the engine running while parked in the drive-through lane of Rally‘s, and he said, “I‘m getting food аnd going home.” Blount never mentioned Morris or Adams or that he was stranded and waiting for a driver or a ride when he was talking to Helton. The court, upon pronouncing judgment stated, “I am firmly convinced that the defendant wаs driving the vehicle upon a public highway to get to the Rally‘s and that he was under suspension for OVI.”
Law and Analysis
{¶6} Blount‘s sole assignment of error is that his conviction for driving under OVI suspension is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidencе because the evidence did not demonstrate that he had moved the vehicle prior to it being parked
{¶7} The evidence in the record is that the Rally‘s lot was private рroperty. Blount was convicted for driving under OVI suspension, in violation of
{¶8} As an initial matter, the state refers in its brief to the statutory definition of operate under
{¶9} Blount argues that while circumstantial evidence is given the same weight as direct evidence, any circumstantial evidence of operation was outweighed by the testimony of the defense witnesses in this case. However, the trial court found that the defense witnesses lacked credibility because of discrеpancies in their varying accounts of events, and we do not find it clearly lost its way in doing so. Because the trier of fact is in a better position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and to weigh their credibility, the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are
{¶10} The trial court relied on circumstantial evidence and Blount‘s statements to Helton when it found Blount had, while his license was suspended for OVI, oрerated his vehicle on the public roads and highways to get to the Rally‘s drive-through. And in this case, the circumstantial evidence was overwhelming. Blount was alone in the driver‘s seat of a vehicle registered to him, with thе key in the ignition, the engine running, and the headlights on, in the drive-through lane and sound asleep. The only statement Blount made to the responding officer that night was that he was getting food and going home. No one else was in the area. He did not mention that someone else had driven him there and abandoned him. See Cochran, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22240, 2008-Ohio-3612, at ¶ 25, citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus (“Those facts are circumstantial evidence that the accused operated the vehicle to bring it to the place where it was found, and circumstantial and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value.“) It is well established that the state does not hаve to present direct evidence of a crime in order to sustain a conviction. State v. Williams, 2016-Ohio-5827, 71 N.E.3d 592 ¶ 67 (1st Dist.), citing Jenks, at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶11} Under these facts, the trial court, as the trier of fact, did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest miscаrriage of justice in finding Blount guilty of driving under OVI suspension. For the foregoing reasons, Blount‘s sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of thе release of this opinion.