State v. BlantonState v. Blanton
Decided: June 30, 2023
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Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brenda J. Majdalani, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Mallorie A. Thomas and Catherine R. Meehan, for appellant.
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MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Daniel Blanton, appeals the September 2, 2022 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to an aggregate prison term of 13 to 18 years. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶ 2} In August 2021, Blanton was indicted on one count of rape in violation of
{¶ 3} Blanton and the state reached a plea agreement under which Blanton would plead guilty to the counts of rape and attempted rape under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). In exchange, the state agreed to dismiss the abduction counts and not make a sentencing recommendation.
{¶ 4} At the plea hearing, following the trial court’s Crim.R. 11 colloquy with Blanton, the state provided the factual basis for the charges.
{¶ 5} Regarding the rape charge, the state said that Blanton (using his own phone number and the name Daniel Coy) met K.G. on a dating app and invited her to his home. While K.G. was at Blanton’s home, she had several alcoholic beverages. She decided to sleep there because she did not think that she could safely drive home. K.G. intended to sleep on Blanton’s couch, but accepted when Blanton invited her to sleep in his bedroom. K.G. made it clear to Blanton that she did not want to have sex. However, Blanton forcibly removed K.G.’s shorts and underwear and engaged in vaginal sex with her. K.G. tried to get Blanton off of her, but could not move his weight, went limp hoping that
{¶ 6} Regarding the attempted rape charge, the state said that Blanton met A.H. through the same dating app. The day of the assault, A.H. invited Blanton to her home. Blanton drank alcohol while at A.H.’s home and “became touchy with” A.H. When A.H. rebuffed Blanton’s advances, Blanton “became angry and off-put and was repeatedly asking [A.H.] * * * if he could stay overnight at her home.” A.H. told him to leave, but he claimed that he was too drunk to drive home. A.H. “was surprised by the request, because she did not think [Blanton] had consumed that much alcohol, but she drove him home anyways.” When they reached his home, Blanton told A.H. that he needed assistance to walk to his door, fumbled with his keys, and acted like he could not open the door. A.H. believed that Blanton did not appear that intoxicated, but she helped him anyway. Once the door to Blanton’s home was open, Blanton grabbed A.H. by the arm and tried to pull her inside; grabbed her by her neck, cutting off her airway; and, when
{¶ 7} Based on this information, the trial court found Blanton guilty of rape and attempted rape. The court ordered a presentence investigation report and set the case for sentencing.
{¶ 8} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard statements from Blanton, his attorney, and K.G., and considered the PSI and letters of support from Blanton’s family and friends. Blanton’s attorney explained to the court that Blanton’s situation “seem[ed] to be a bit of a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde scenario where the very smart, sharp, and well intended Dr. Jekyll does all the good things in polite society, but Mr. Hyde drinks or otherwise engages in the worst kind of behavior, and this is kind of worst kind of behavior.” He said that Blanton was “truly remorseful[,]” had a social support system, had a clean criminal record, and had a record of online dating without “engag[ing] in such adverse conduct * * *.” Regardless, counsel acknowledged that “there’s no getting away from this and the impact it had on the victims * * *.”
{¶ 9} When Blanton addressed the court, he said that he “was blacked out beyond the point of intoxication * * *” the night to K.G.’s rape, so he did not remember anything
{¶ 10} When K.G. spoke, she explained the long-lasting, far-reaching effects that the rape had on her, including a posttraumatic stress disorder diagnosis, moving back to her parents’ house that is several hours from her old apartment, delaying her application to graduate school because the effects of the rape caused her to miss too many work-experience hours, crying and vomiting every time she received mail from the court with Blanton’s name on it, and living in fear that Blanton would find her.
{¶ 11} After hearing the statements, the court told Blanton that it did not “subscribe to this notion that you were drunk beyond recognition of what you were doing” and believed that Blanton had set up the “fake” dating-app profile for the purpose of sexually assaulting women. The court also believed that Blanton was “not truly willing to admit to the fact that you have a deviant mind, that you have this deviant desire to assault women in a sexual way * * *” and that Blanton’s actions did not “in any way lin[e] up with just somebody who is on a dating app looking to find somebody to be unfaithful with.” The court concluded that “[t]he fact that people like [Blanton] are in our midst and most of us don’t know it is probably the scariest thing about it.”
{¶ 13} In imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court determined that (1) consecutive sentences were “necessary to fulfill the purposes of 2929.11 and 2929.14(E) [sic]“; (2) consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime or punish Blanton; (3) consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of Blanton’s conduct and the danger that he poses to the public; and (4) two or more of Blanton’s offenses were committed as part of a course of conduct and the harm Blanton caused was so great or unusual that no single prison term would adequately reflect the seriousness of Blanton’s conduct. {¶ 14} In its sentencing entry, the trial court noted that it had considered the principles and purposes of felony sentence in consecutive sentence [sic] are necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish [Blanton] and are not disproportionate to the {¶ 15} Blanton now appeals, raising three assignments of error: ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED MR. BLANTON TO AN AGGREGATE TERM OF THIRTEEN (13) TO EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS IN PRISON. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 2: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING MR. BLANTON TO SERVE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 3: TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL SENTENCING UNDER THE REAGAN TOKES ACT, THUS PRECLUDING MR. BLANTON FROM RAISING THE ISSUE ON APPEAL. {¶ 16} In his first assignment of error, Blanton argues that “the trial court did not make proper findings as required by relevant statutes, namely {¶ 17} We review sentencing challenges under (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. {¶ 19} Regardless, as we have repeatedly held, ” {¶ 20} Although Blanton does not argue that the trial court misapplied the factors in {¶ 21} In his second assignment of error, Blanton argues that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences because the record lacks evidentiary support for the trial court’s conclusions. Specifically, he claims that the trial court’s recitation of the language of {¶ 23} In determining whether consecutive sentences are clearly and convincingly contrary to law under {¶ 25} A sentencing court must make its findings under {¶ 26} In this case, the trial court made all three findings at both the sentencing hearing and in the judgment entry. Although Blanton complains—without citing any case law—that consecutive sentences were inappropriate because the court failed to state {¶ 27} Blanton’s only substantive challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences amounts to his belief that the serious nature of his convictions (i.e., that they were first- and second-degree felonies), and the available prison terms for each, would have adequately punished him, protected the public, reflected the seriousness of his crimes, and accounted for the nature of the harm that he caused. This position ignores the evidence of the predatory nature of Blanton’s conduct (i.e., using a dating app and a fake name to meet his victims) and the serious and lasting mental and emotional harm Blanton’s action caused to K.G. Taking this into consideration, we cannot say that consecutive sentences are clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Therefore, Blanton’s second assignment of error is not well-taken. {¶ 28} In his final assignment of error, Blanton contends that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law in the trial court. He claims that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure because it precludes him from raising the constitutionality of Ohio’s indefinite sentencing scheme on appeal, “thus depriving Mr. Blanton of an opportunity for a full appeal [sic] review.” In making his ineffective-assistance argument, Blanton argues that the Reagan Tokes Law violates separation of powers and his right to due process. {¶ 30} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must show “(1) deficient performance of counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different.” State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, 204, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. Sanders, 94 Ohio St.3d 150, 151, 761 N.E.2d 18 (2002). {¶ 31} This court (along with nearly every appellate district in Ohio) has determined that the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional. As relevant to Blanton’s case, we have repeatedly rejected challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law based on separation of powers and due process. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1152, 2022-Ohio-2812, ¶ 10-12, 20-23, citing State v. Gifford, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1201, 2022-Ohio-1620; State v. Stenson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-20-1074, 2022-Ohio-2072; and State v. Bothuel, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-20-1053, 2022-Ohio-2606. See also State v. Eaton, 2022-Ohio-2432, 192 N.E.3d 1236 (6th Dist.) (where, on issue of due process, lead decision analogized additional term hearings to parole/probation release decisions {¶ 32} Blanton does not raise any novel challenges to the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law in his ineffective-assistance argument. See Williams at ¶ 10-12, 20-23. Thus, the probability of a different result if trial counsel had objected to the law in the trial court is not “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Sanders at 151. Accordingly, Blanton cannot show that trial counsel was ineffective. See Williams at ¶ 13 (“Given our conclusion that Williams has failed to demonstrate that the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional, we find that counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge its constitutionality in the trial court.“); State v. Garza, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-22-006, 2023-Ohio-395, ¶ 13 (“Considering our established precedent, * * * trial counsel’s challenge [to the Reagan Tokes Law] would have been a futile act. * * * [T]he failure to perform a ‘futile act’ does not satisfy the standard of deficiency and prejudice.“). {¶ 33} Blanton’s third assignment of error is not well-taken. {¶ 34} The September 2, 2022 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Blanton is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. Judgment affirmed. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Gene A. Zmuda, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Myron C. Duhart, P.J. CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
A. Blanton’s challenge to the trial court’s consideration of the factors in R.C. 2929.12 is precluded by Jones.
B. The trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences is not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record.
C. Blanton received effective assistance of trial counsel.