Mr. Marvin D. Besendorfer appeals from the trial court’s judgment convicting him of driving while intoxicated. He claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Although judgment was prematurely entered, Mr. Be-sendorfer asks that we address his claim on the merits. Because the judgment is not final, we have no authority to hear his case and dismiss.
Factual and Procedural History
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence at trial showed that a State Highway Trooper found Mr. Besen-
Mr. Besendorfer was charged with driving while intoxicated, section 577.010.
Legal Analysis
On appeal, Mr. Besendorfer contends that: (1) although the case law indicates we do not have jurisdiction over his appeal, we should address his appeal on the merits for the sake of judicial economy; and (2) the trial court erred in that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
In his first point, Mr. Besendorfer concedes that, contrary to Rule 29.11, the circuit court sentenced him although Mr. Besendorfer had not waived his right to move for a new trial and fifteen days had not elapsed since his conviction. He argues that in the interests of judicial economy, we should allow him to waive his right to a new trial on appeal. He contends that “no purpose would be served in dismissing and remanding ... since [he] will simply waive the filing of a motion for new trial, and he will again appeal,” again raising a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Rule 29.11(b) provides that “[a] motion for new trial ... shall be filed within fifteen days after the return of the verdict.” Rule 29.11(c) prohibits the circuit court from rendering judgment “until the time for filing a motion for new trial has expired.” The right to move for a new trial is valuable, and cannot be denied absent the defendant’s express waiver. State v. Herron, 136 S.W.3d 126, 128 (Mo. App. E.D.2004) (internal citations omitted).
In Herron, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial. 136 S.W.3d at 127. The court entered judgment and sentenced the defendant on the same day that he was convicted. Id. at 128. The Eastern District held that it was without authority to hear the appeal: the judgment was premature and void because the defendant should have had the opportunity to move for a new trial, the defendant did not expressly waive his right, and the fifteen-day deadline had not elapsed. Id. at 128. Likewise, in Dean, the trial court sentenced the defendant on the day of his conviction. 5 S.W.3d at 617. The judgment was found to be premature and void because the defendant did not waive his right to move for a new trial, and fifteen days had not elapsed since the conviction. Id.
Mr. Besendorfer does not cite any case law supporting a contrary argument. He cites two cases, Dean and State v. Goth, 792 S.W.2d 437 (Mo.App. W.D.1990), and acknowledges that both dismissed appeals because the trial court had entered judgment without permitting the 15-day time-line to pass or for the defendant to exercise or waive his right to move for a new trial.
Here, at the time of sentencing, fifteen days had not elapsed and Mr. Be-sendorfer did not exercise or expressly waive his right. Consequently, the judgment is not final. Although Mr. Besendor-fer asks us to accept his waiver on appeal, we have no authority to hear his case and must dismiss.
Conclusion
Therefore, Mr. Besendorfer’s appeal is dismissed.
. Statutory references are to RSMo 2000 and the Cumulative Supplement 2006. Rule references are to Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure 2011.
. In light of our dismissal of Mr. Besendor-fer’s appeal, we do not address his second point contesting the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Herron, 136 S.W.3d 126, 128 (Mo.App. E.D.2004).