THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. BELLMAN, APPELLEE.
No. 98-651
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Decided August 25, 1999.
86 Ohio St.3d 208 | 1999-Ohio-95
Submittеd April 20, 1999. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-970169.
- A defendant may waive the
R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) requirеment that a sexual predator hearing precede sentencing. - Where a defendant was both sentenced for a sexually oriented offense and released prior to July 1, 1997, and was not previously required to register under
R.C. Chapter 2950 , that defendant cannot be required to register underR.C. 2950.04 .
{¶ 1} Robert Bellman, Jr. was found guilty of offenses qualifying him for review as a sexual predator. At his February 1997 sentencing, the parties and the trial court agreed to delay Bellman‘s sexual predator hearing until the following month. When the sexual predator hearing was held, as agreed, the trial court adjudicated Bellman a sexual predator and notified him of his future, ongoing duty to register with the county sheriff. Thereafter, Bellman was released from jail prior to the July 1, 1997 effective date of
{¶ 2} Bellman appealed the sexual predator adjudication arguing, inter alia, that he was not required to register as a sexual predator because he did not fit within any of the statutory classes of persons required to do so. The First District Court of Appeals agreed. The court also sua sponte determined that the trial court lost
{¶ 3} The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary аppeal.
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Sirkin, Pinales, Mezibov & Schwartz, Martin S. Pinales and John Feldmeier, for appellee.
COOK, J.
{¶ 4} We decide here that the statutory requirement regarding the timing of the sexual predator hearing is not jurisdictional and a defendant may waive it. We also decide that a defendant who was sentenced for a sexually oriented offense, released prior to July 1, 1997, and nоt previously required to register under
I. Sexual Predator Hearing
{¶ 5}
{¶ 6} On the day of Bellman‘s sentencing, the pаrties were unprepared to proceed with the sexual predator hearing. The trial judge noted the requirement to hold the sexual predator hearing prior to sentencing, but suggested delaying the hearing in order that the parties might prepare for it. Bellman‘s counsel agreed to
{¶ 7} The court conducted the sexual prеdator hearing at the later date, as agreed, and adjudicated Bellman a sexual predator. Bellman appealed. The court of appeals reversed the adjudication, finding, sua sponte, that under the terms of the statute, the trial court had no authority (jurisdiction) to adjudicate Bellman a sexual predator after the sentencing hearing was concluded. We differ with the court of appeals on this point.
{¶ 8} “As a general rule, a statute providing а time for the performance of an official duty will be construed as directory so far as time for performance is concerned, espеcially where the statute fixes the time simply for convenience or orderly procedure.” State ex rel. Jones v. Farrar (1946), 146 Ohio St. 467, 32 O.O. 542, 66 N.E.2d 531, at paragraph three of the syllabus. This is so “unless the оbject or purpose of a statutory provision requiring some act to be performed within a specified period of time is discernible from the lаnguage employed.” Id.
{¶ 9} Generally, then, it is only where a statutory time requirement evinces an object or purpose to limit a court‘s authority that the rеquirement will be considered jurisdictional. For example,
{¶ 10} By contrast, the language of
{¶ 11} In this case, Bellman‘s counsel explicitly waived the time requirement when he agreed to the postponement. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on this issue and reinstate the trial court‘s adjudication of Bellman as a sexual predator.
II. Duty to Register
{¶ 12} The sexual predator law also includes a provision regarding registratiоn requirements for sexually oriented offenders.
“(A) Each offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to * * * a sexually oriented offense and who is desсribed in division (A)(1), (2), or (3) of this section shall register * * *:
“(1) Regardless of when the sexually oriented offense was committed, if the offender is sentenced for the sexually oriented offense to a prison term * * * and if, on or after [July 1, 1997], the offender is released in any manner from the prison term * * *.
“(2) Regardless of when the sexually oriеnted offense was committed, if the offender is sentenced for a sexually oriented offense on or after [July 1, 1997], and if division (A)(1) of this section does not aрply * * *.
“(3) If the sexually oriented offense was committed prior to [July 1, 1997], if neither division (A)(1) nor division (A)(2) of this section applies, and if, immediately prior to [July 1, 1997], the offender was a habitual sex offender who was required to register under Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code.”
{¶ 13} The court of appeals found Bellman had no duty to register as a sexual predator because he fit into none of the above categories. He does not fit section (A)(1) because he was released prior to July 1, 1997. He evades (A)(2) because he was sentenced prior to July 1, 1997. And, he evades (A)(3) because he
{¶ 14} ” ‘Where the words of a statute are plain, explicit, and unequivocal, a court is not warrantеd in departing from their obvious meaning, although from considerations arising outside of the language of the statute, it may be convinced that the legislature intеnded to enact something different from what it did in fact enact.’ ” Hough v. Dayton Mfg. Co. (1902), 66 Ohio St. 427, 437, 64 N.E. 521, 524, quoting D.T. Woodbury & Co. v. Berry (1869), 18 Ohio St. 456, paragraph one of the syllabus. There is a gap in the
{¶ 15} We conclude, then, that although Bellman is properly adjudicated a sexual predator under the new law, he has no duty to register becаuse he does not fit within the plain language of
{¶ 16} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS, J., dissents.