State v. BellState v. Bell
On brief: Darrell L. Bell, pro se.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Darrell L. Bell, appeals a deсision and judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas entered on August 20, 2019 denying his motion to vacate and set aside the judgment and sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In 1999, appellant was convicted of the stipulated lesser-included offense of murder of Nyomi Conley; the stipulated lesser-included offense of attempted murder of Mark Newton; and one count of having a weapon under a disability. Although the indictment contаined a death penalty specification and three firearm specifications, appellant was not convicted of the same. Appellant was sentenced to serve an aggregate sentеnce of 26 years to life. Appellant filed a direct appeal, and this court affirmed. State v. Bell, 10th Dist. No. 00AP-739 (Mar. 30, 2001). Appellant filed a petition for
{¶ 3} On April 4, 2019, appellant filed a “motion to vacate and set aside the judgment and sentence pursuant to civil rule 60(B)(5) fraud upon the court.” State of Ohio, plaintiff-appellee, filed a memorandum contra, and appellant filed a mеmorandum in opposition to the state‘s memorandum contra on May 6, 2019.
{¶ 4} The trial court construed the motion as a petition for postconviction relief. On August 20, 2019, the court denied the motion because it was untimely and barred by res judicata. The court further noted, citing
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 5} Appellant appeals and assigns the following five assignments of error for our review:
- [I.] Does a trial court abuse its discretion where it is charged with the question of whether there was probable cause for putting the accused on trial, and whether the indictment was fair on its face to the court to which it was returned?
- [II.] Does a trial court abuse its discretion where it is charged with the question of whether there was probablе cause for putting the accused on trial, where the defendant is facing the death penalty?
- [III.] The trial court commits plain error and abuses its discretion when convicting a defendant of attempted felony murder when felony murder, alternatively, involves an inadvertent homicide resulting from the commission of a felony of violence. By definition, therefore, a felony murder charge requires both a felony of violence and аn unintended death.
- [IV.] The Ohio Supreme Court has established in criminal cases that under the doctrine of cumulative error, “a
conviction will be reversed when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a fair trial. - [V.] Where successive prosecutions are at stake, the double jeopardy guarantee serves “a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant‘s benefit.
(Sic passim.)
III. Analysis
{¶ 6} In the portion of his brief titled “Facts of the Case,” appellant states the trial court never had jurisdiction to hold him to answer at trial and that a void judgment is one that has been imposed by a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Howеver, appellant does not explain why he thinks the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Nor does appellant point to any authority to support his statement that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. In support of his second assignment of error, appellant also states the trial court did not have jurisdiction to proceed against him, yet does not explain why he thinks the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Furthermore, in his second assignment of error, appellant complains about the fact that the indictment contained a death penalty specification, yet he was not convicted of the death penalty specificatiоn.
{¶ 7} Appellant did not raise as an assignment of error that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the judgment was void. Nevertheless, because he made the statements referenced above, we apply here the reasoning outlined in
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} In addition to substantive limitations, a petition for postconviction relief is bounded by statutory timeliness requirements, subject to specific, limited exceptions. “Effective September 21, 1995,
{¶ 11} Furthermore, as relevant to the facts of this case, a court may not consider an untimely petition unless the petitioner satisfies the two-pronged test provided in
{¶ 12} Unless the petitioner establishes an exception to the timeliness requirement, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of an untimely petition for postconviction relief. State v. Mason, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-120, 2012-Ohio-4510, ¶ 8. See State v. Apanovitch, 155 Ohio St.3d 358, 2018-Ohio-4744, ¶ 22. Whether a trial court has jurisdiction tо consider an untimely petition for postconviction relief is a question of law to which we apply a de novo standard of review. Apanovitch at ¶ 24, citing State v. Kane, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-781, 2017-Ohio-7838, ¶ 9.
{¶ 14} Having reviewed appellant‘s motiоn, memorandum in opposition to the state‘s memorandum contra, and his appellate brief, we find the trial court did not err in finding appellant‘s motion was untimely, the arguments raised therein were barred by res judicata, аnd appellant did not meet the criteria to establish an exception to the timeliness requirement in
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 15} Having overruled appellant‘s fivе assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
SADLER, P.J., and LUPER SCHUSTER, J., concur.
Judgment affirmed.