State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Teitelbaum, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 19AP-137 (C.P.C. No. 11CR-6440)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Rendered on August 8, 2019
[Cite as State v. Teitelbaum, 2019-Ohio-3175.]
(ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
SADLER, J.
On brief: Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor, for appellee.
On brief: Daniel Teitelbaum, pro se.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
{1} Defendant-appellant, Daniel Teitelbaum, appeals from the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{2} In April 2014, a jury found appellant guilty of two counts of aggravated murder, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of tampering with evidence. The trial court merged the aggravated murder charges and sentenced appellant to life without the possibility of parole, to be served concurrently with a six-year sentence on the aggravated burglary charge and one-year sentence on the tampering charge and consecutively to two additional three-year terms for firearm specifications. Appellant filed
{3} On July 16, 2015, appellant filed a postconviction petition, pursuant to
{4} On February 4, 2019, appellant filed the “Motion for Relief from Judgment” under
{5} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
{6} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:
- THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT‘S MOTION UNDER RULES CIVIL OF PROCEDURE 60(B)(4).
- PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT‘S 4TH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE SECURE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES WAS VIOLATED BY THE STATE OF OHIO‘S USE OF CELL-SITE LOCATION INFORMATION (CSLI).
- THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT‘S MOTION UNDER RULES CIVIL OF PROCEDURE 60(B)(3).
- STATE PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE COUNSEL COMMITTED FRAUD AND COLLUSION DURING TRIAL, RENDERING THE TRIAL VERDICT VOID.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Appellant‘s Second Assignment of Error
{7} For clarity of analysis, we will address appellant‘s assignments of error out of order. In appellant‘s second assignment of error, he asserts relief should be granted under
{8} Appellee counters that appellant‘s motion must be construed as a postconviction petition under State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, and then barred as an untimely and successive postconviction petition. Appellee states that even viewed under the standards of a
{9} We agree with appellee that appellant‘s motion should be construed as a postconviction petition in regard to his claim involving Carpenter. In Schlee, the defendant
{10} Similarly here, appellee filed his motion subsequent to his direct appeal, claims a denial of constitutional rights with regard to his Carpenter claim, and seeks reversal of the judgment rendered against him. Therefore, on the facts of this case, appellant‘s motion meets the definition of a petition for postconviction relief, pursuant to
{11}
{12} Furthermore, a petition for postconviction relief is subject to timeliness requirements excused only by limited exceptions defined by statute. Pertinent to the facts here, if a direct appeal has been taken by the defendant, an
Whether a hearing is or is not held on a petition filed pursuant to section
2953.21 of the Revised Code, a court may not entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the period prescribed in division (A) of that section or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief on behalf of a petitioner unless * * *:(1) Both of the following apply:
(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section
2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner‘s situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right.(b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted or, if the claim challenges a sentence of death that, but for constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner eligible for the death sentence.
“[A] petitioner‘s failure to satisfy
{13} Here, the trial transcripts in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction was filed on January 8, 2015, and appellant filed the instant “Motion for Relief from Judgment” on February 4, 2019. The record also shows appellant filed a previous petition for postconviction relief in 2015. Therefore, appellant‘s petition was both untimely and successive.
{14} Furthermore, the limited exceptions that allow a trial court to consider an untimely or successive postconviction petition under
{15} Finally, regarding
{16} Considering all the above, we find appellant‘s failure to satisfy
{17} Accordingly, appellant‘s second assignment of error is rendered moot.
B. Appellant‘s First Assignment of Error
{18} Under his first assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court‘s denial of his motion under
{19} Furthermore, as explained in our resolution of the second assignment of error, we construe appellant‘s
{20} Accordingly, we overrule appellant‘s first assignment of error.
{21} In his third assignment of error, appellant states the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion under the rules of
{22} As a preliminary issue, appellant does not argue his third assignment of error separately from the fourth assignment of error as required by
{23}
{24} Here, appellee filed his motion subsequent to his direct appeal and moved to “void” the judgment. (Appellant‘s Mot. at 18.) Furthermore, appellant‘s claim regarding evidence of fraud and collusion committed by the defense counsel and prosecutors both expressly invokes protections afforded by the Ohio Constitution and implicate fundamental
{25} Under
{26} Furthermore, the limited exceptions that allow a trial court to consider an untimely or successive postconviction petition under
{27} To the extent appellant argues timeliness requirements do not apply at all to judgments of conviction which are “void,” we find appellant has not demonstrated that appellant‘s judgment of conviction is void or that the timeliness requirements for postconviction petitions do not apply in this case. (Appellant‘s Brief at 18.) Considering all the above, we find appellant‘s failure to satisfy
{28} Accordingly, our disposition of the jurisdictional issue renders moot appellant‘s third and fourth assignments of error, which address the merits of his petition. Jones at ¶ 19;
IV. CONCLUSION
{29} The trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over appellant‘s untimely and successive petition for postconviction relief. Apanovitch at ¶ 36, 41; Jones at ¶ 15-17. While generally the trial court “should dismiss a petition for postconviction relief when jurisdiction is lacking rather than denying the petition on some other grounds,” in this case we “nevertheless conclude that the trial court did not err in its disposition of appellant‘s petition, and we affirm the trial court‘s judgment, albeit for different reasons than the trial court.” Jones at ¶ 17, 18.
{30} Accordingly, having overruled appellant‘s first assignment of error and determined appellant‘s second, third, and fourth assignments of error are moot, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
BROWN and BEATTY BLUNT, JJ., concur.