STATE OF OHIO v. GREGORY E. BECKWITH
No. 98497
Cоurt of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
February 14, 2013
[Cite as State v. Beckwith, 2013-Ohio-492.]
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE vs. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT; JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED; Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR-557736
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 14, 2013
Robert L. Tobik
Chief Public Defender
Cullen Sweeney
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue
Suite 200
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
Oscar E. Albores
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center - 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
{1} Defendant-appellant, Gregory Beckwith (“Beckwith“), appeals from his menacing by stalking conviction. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.
{2} In Deсember 2011, Beckwith was charged with menacing by stalking, with Ashia Benson (“Benson“) named as the victim. The charge carried a furthermore specification that Beckwith trespassed on the land or premises where Benson “lives, is employed, or attends school.” The matter рroceeded to a bench trial, at which the following evidence was adduced.
{3} Benson testified that she was hired as a “page” at the Cleveland Public Library in March 2011. Her typical duties included showing and shelving books. Benson further testified that when she first started working at the library she was advised that “people come up there because some of them crazy, some of them creepy, but they not really. It is just how they are. It is not like they going to do anything to you.”
{4} Benson first met Beckwith in late May or early June 2011. At first, she noticed that Beckwith “was evеrywhere [she] was.” She explained that when she was shelving books on a particular floor she would observe Beckwith. Beckwith would then follow her when she proceeded to a different floor. Benson testified that this pattern became common, about three timеs a week. Benson realized that these encounters were not coincidences when he started making grunting noises at her every time she walked by him. Benson reported these encounters to her supervisors and other coworkers.
{6} As a result of these incidents, Cleveland Public Library Seсurity Guard Christopher Flak (“Flak“) advised Beckwith on October 18, 2011, that he was no longer permitted at the library. Flak testified that Beckwith “complied and left.” Benson testified that Beckwith did not return to the library after that, but she did have two encounters with him near the Hyatt Hotel at The Arcade directly across the street from the library. During the first encounter, she observed Beckwith outside of the library where the bus drops her off in the morning before work. During the second encounter, on November 16, 2011, Beckwith followed Benson as she was walked into the entrance of Thе Arcade. Benson noticed Beckwith‘s reflection behind her in the glass door. She turned around and observed Beckwith with his cell phone pointed toward her buttocks. Benson stated that these incidents made her feel uncomfortable and “creeped out.” At work, her heart would beat fast when someone walked past her. Her coworker, Aja Russo, testified that she never observed Beckwith follow Benson. Benson‘s supervisor testified that she observed Beckwith around Benson on two occasions. On both
{7} Benson testified that in the 13 months that she has been working at the library she has made complaints about other pеople. She has encountered numerous people who come into the library and “follow people and make people feel uncomfortable.” Benson recalled one incident where she heard a man unzipping his pants a few aislеs away from her. Another time, a man with “creepy hair” unzipped his pants while he looked at her through the book stacks.
{8} At the conclusion of trial, the court found Beckwith guilty. The court then sentenced him to 17 months in prison. The court also ordered that Beckwith pay a $500 fine.
{9} Beckwith now appeals, raising the following five assignments of error for review, which shall be discussed together where appropriate.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
[Beckwith‘s] menacing by stalking conviction is not support be legally sufficient evidence as required by state and federal due рrocess.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE
[Beckwith‘s] menacing by stalking conviction and his conviction on the furthermore specification are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FOUR
The trial court erred in admitting highly prejudicial other acts evidence.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FIVE
[Beckwith] was deprived of his property without due process of law, and his rights under the Sixth Amendment where the trial court imposed court costs in a journal entry after not imposing any court costs at the sentencing hearing.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
{10} In the first and second assignments of errоr, Beckwith argues that the State failed to prove that he “caused Benson mental distress, that he caused her to believe he would cause her mental distress, and/or that he acted with the requisite culpable state of knowingly” and he trespassed at the library while сommitting the offense of menacing by stalking.
{11} The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460, 2008-Ohio-6266, 900 N.E.2d 565, ¶ 113, explained the standard for sufficiency of the evidence as follows:
Raising the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law invokes a due process concern. State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541. In reviewing
such a challenge, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.
{12} Beckwith was сonvicted of menacing by stalking in violation of
(a) Any mental illness or condition that involves some temporary substantial incapacity;
(b) Any mental illness or condition that would normally require psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health services, whethеr or not any person requested or received psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health services.
{13} In order to show that Beckwith violated
{14} In the instant case, Benson testified that she first reported an incident where Beckwith asked her to locate a specific book for him. She gave the book to him and watched him walk downstairs, put the boоk on the table, and walk away. Another time, Beckwith approached Benson while she was shelving books and asked her to help him
{15} While expert testimony is not necessary to establish that a victim experienced mental distress as a result of the offender‘s behavior, mental distress must be proven by facts introduced at trial and the reasonable inferences springing from those facts. Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 8th Dist. No. 79511, 2002-Ohio-2736, ¶ 22; Rufener, supra at ¶ 17. ”
{16} Here, when viewing this testimony in a light most favorable to the State, we cannot find sufficiеnt evidence to support Beckwith‘s menacing by stalking conviction. The evidence demonstrates that Benson was uncomfortable around Beckwith and Beckwith “creeped her out.” When she started working at the library Benson testified she was advised that “peoplе come [to the library] because some of them [are] crazy [and] some of them are creepy * * *. It is just how they are. It is not like they going to do anything to you.”
{17} Benson further testified that Beckwith never threatened her, touched her, blocked her path, or called hеr phone. He only spoke to her on two occasions while she was working in her capacity as a library page — Beckwith asked her for a book and asked for help downloading a song. Moreover, her coworker testified that she never observed Bеckwith follow Benson and her supervisor testified that she observed Beckwith around Benson on two occasions. On both occasions, he was in the same area as Benson, but he did not interact with her. When the library security guard told Beckwith that he was not
{18} Furthermore, we cannot conclude that in committing the offense of menacing by stalking, Beckwith trespassed on the premises where Benson “is employed” as charged in the furthermore specification. The record reveals that Beckwith visited the public library from May 2011 to October 2011. Beckwith had every right to visit the library during that time because it is a public place. At issue is whether Beckwith trespassed at the public library, Benson‘s place of employment, while committing the offense of menacing by stalking aftеr October 18, 2011, when Flak told him he was no longer welcome. There is no evidence, however, that Beckwith trespassed at the library after his conversation with Flak. Benson‘s own testimony states that “Beckwith never came into the library after that.” Moreover, we cannоt consider his subsequent encounters with Benson near the Hyatt Hotel at The Arcade because it is directly across the street from the library. Thus, it was not the premises where Benson “is employed” as required by the furthermore specification.
{19} Therefore, the first and seсond assignments of error are sustained.
{20} In the third assignment of error, Beckwith argues that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In the fourth assignment of error, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting prejudicial other acts evidence. In the
{21} Judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate his conviction for menacing by stalking. The appellant‘s conviction having been reversed and vacated, appellate is ordered discharged. Thе trial court is ordered to take all necessary steps to effect the immediate release of the appellant from prison.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were rеasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY;
PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, J., CONCURS
