State v. BeauchampState v. Beauchamp
Donald Ray Beauchamp was charged by bill of information with aggravated battery in violation of
FACTS
On September 17, 1981, the defendant was involved in an altercation at the Gonzales Truck Stop, located on the corner of Airline Highway and Old Germany Road in Ascension Parish. The owner of the Gonzales Truck Stop, Robert Starkey, was in the restaurant sitting on a bar stool near the cash register. The defendant entered the front door of the restaurant and walked up to the cash register. When Mr. Starkey observed the defendant, he ordered him to leave the premises because the defendant had been involved in prior disturbances at the truck stop. The defendant informed Mr. Starkey that he only wanted some change or matches or something of that nature, but Mr. Starkey replied that the defendant “couldn‘t get anything here.” At that point, the defendant hit Mr. Starkey with his fist and knocked him to the floor. As the defendant continued his attack, Mr. Starkey defended himself by kicking at the defendant. When Mr. Starkey reached his feet, the defendant opened his jacket and produced a long knife resembling a butcher knife. The defendant uttered “a lot of profanity” and “told [Mr. Starkey] a lot of unpleasant things [the defendant] was going to do to [him].” Although the defendant threatened to “cut [Mr. Starkey‘s] heart out,” the defendant did not attack him with the knife. Instead, the defendant ran out the front door, across the parking lot, and disappeared into some nearby woods.
In connection with this offense, a bill of information was filed on November 8, 1985, charging the defendant with aggravated battery. On November 13, 1985, the defendant filed several pre-trial motions, including a motion for speedy trial. The trial court apparently granted the defendant‘s motion for speedy trial and assigned a trial date of December 17, 1985. After several delays, trial was held on April 9, 1986; and the trial court took the case under advisement. On June 9, 1986, the trial court rendered a judgment of guilty of simple battery.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5 (Issue No. 1 in Defendant‘s Brief):
In this assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his two motions to quash the bill of information. The second motion to quash related to his motion for speedy trial and will be addressed in assignment of error no. 6. The instant assignment of error will address the defendant‘s first motion to quash, relating to his allegations that the time limitations for the institution of prosecution had expired.
The defendant was charged by bill of information with aggravated battery, a relative felony. See
The motion to quash is essentially a mechanism by which to raise pre-trial pleas of defense, i.e., those matters which do not go to the merits of the charge. See
In considering a motion to quash, a court must accept as true the facts contained in the bill of information and in the bills of particulars and determine, as a matter of law and from the face of the pleadings, whether or not a crime has been charged. While evidence may be adduced, such may not include a defense on the merits. State v. Perez, 464 So.2d at 739. The question of factual guilt or innocence of the offense charged is not raised by the motion to quash. See State v. Rembert, 312 So.2d 282, 284 (La.1975); State v. Perez, 464 So.2d at 740.
Since the bill of information charged the defendant with aggravated battery, which is a relative felony, the trial court correctly applied a four year time limitation on the institution of prosecution and correctly denied the defendant‘s motion to quash on these grounds.
In the alternative, the defendant argues that the four year time limitation under
The instant offense was committed on September 17, 1981, and the prosecution was instituted when the Bill of Information was filed on November 8, 1985. Therefore, the bill of information was filed approximately four years and fifty-two days after the date of the offense. However, the state argues that the time limit for the institution of prosecution was interrupted during the period of time the defendant was committed to Feliciana Forensic Facility, a period of approximately one hundred ten days. Therefore, according to the prosecution, the bill of information was filed within the four year time limit established in
The periods of limitation established by this Chapter shall be interrupted when the defendant:
(1) For the purpose of avoiding detection, apprehension or prosecution, flees from the state, is outside the state, or is absent from his usual place of abode within the state; or
(2) Lacks mental capacity to proceed at trial and is committed in accordance with Article 648 of this Code.
We find nothing in the language of Article 575 to support the defendant‘s argument that his commitment to Feliciana Forensic Facility in connection with Bill of Information No. 1009 did not also act to interrupt the time limitation for the institution of prosecution in the instant offense. Nor does the defendant cite any jurisprudence or statutory authority to support his argument. Defendant‘s commitment to Feliciana Forensic Facility effectively kept the State from prosecuting him on any charge. Accordingly, we conclude that the instant bill of information was filed within the four year time period established by
The defendant also contends that S-1 should not have the effect of interrupting the running of the time limitation for the institution of prosecution because it was filed into evidence over his objection. Specifically, he argues that the prosecution failed to lay the proper foundation before S-1 was introduced into evidence at the first motion to quash. However, as previously noted, the record does not contain a transcript of the hearing on the first motion to quash. The court minutes indicate that S-1 was introduced into evidence at the hearing on the first motion to quash, but the minutes give no indication of any defense objection to S-1. In any event, the defendant‘s objection that S-1 was admitted into evidence without the proper foundation is without merit, because S-1 contains certified medical records which are an exception to the hearsay rule and are exempted from the general foundation requirement under
We conclude that S-1 was properly admitted into evidence at the hearing on the defendant‘s first motion to quash. We also conclude that S-1 demonstrated an approximate 110 day interruption of the time limitation on the institution of prosecution in the instant case. Therefore, the filing of Bill of Information No. 1844, on November 8, 1985, was within the four year time period established by
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 6 (Issues Nos. 2, 3, and 4 in Defendant‘s Brief):
In this assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his right to speedy trial guaranteed by the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. He also contends that his statutory right to speedy trial provided in
The instant offense was committed on September 17, 1981. Bill of Information No. 1844 charging the defendant with aggravated battery, was filed on November 8, 1985. On November 13, 1985, the defendant filed several pre-trial motions, including his first motion to quash and a motion for speedy trial. On February 26, 1986, the defendant filed his second motion to quash, based upon his allegation that his right to speedy trial guaranteed by the Louisiana and United States Constitutions had been violated. On March 10, 1986, the hearing on the defendant‘s second motion to quash
There are two separate and distinct bases for a defendant‘s right to a speedy trial: a statutory right granted by
STATUTORY RIGHT
D. After the filing of a motion for speedy trial by the defendant, the time period for commencement of trial shall be as follows:
(1) The trial of a defendant charged with a felony shall commence within one hundred twenty days if he is continued in custody and within one hundred eighty days if he is not continued in custody.
(2) The trial of a defendant charged with a misdemeanor shall commence within thirty days if he is continued in custody and within sixty days if he is not continued in custody. Failure to commence trial within the time periods provided above shall result in the release of the defendant without bail or in the discharge of the bail obligation, if after contradictory hearing with the district attorney, just cause for the delay is not shown.
The remedy for a violation of
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
The constitutional right to a speedy trial is not dependent upon a motion but attaches when an individual becomes
The four factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of a speedy trial are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant‘s assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); State v. Baker, 452 So.2d 737, 741 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1984). The peculiar circumstances of the case will determine the weight to be ascribed to the length of the delay and the reasons for the delay. See State v. Reaves, 376 So.2d 136 (La.1979).
As previously noted, the instant offense was committed on September 17, 1981; the defendant was not charged until Bill of Information No. 1844 was filed on November 8, 1985. Nowhere in his brief does the defendant allege that he was arrested in connection with the instant offense between September 17, 1981 and November 8, 1985, nor does the record indicate such an arrest. Therefore, although slightly more than four years passed before the institution of prosecution in this case, the defendant‘s constitutional right to a speedy trial did not attach until the bill of information was filed on November 8, 1985. See State v. Pleasant, 489 So.2d at 1010.
As noted above, the length of delay from filing of the bill of information to commencement of trial on April 9, 1985, was a period of approximately one hundred fifty-two days. The length of delay in this case is well within the prescriptive period for the commencement of trial, provided in
Finally, we must consider whether or not the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. We conclude, without hesitation, that the defendant was not prejudiced by the one hundred fifty-two day delay between the institution of prosecution in this offense and the commencement of trial. Considering the four year delay between commission of the offense and filing of the bill of information, we note that the defendant has failed to allege any actual prejudice, such as an impairment of his ability to prepare his case, locate witnesses, or produce items of evidence. See State v. Gladden, 260 La. 735, 257 So.2d 388, 392 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 920, 93 S.Ct. 1377, 35 L.Ed.2d 581 (1973); State v. Pleasant, 489 So.2d at 1011.
Considering the four relevant factors, we conclude that neither the four year delay between commission of the offense and filing of the bill of information nor the one hundred fifty-two day delay from filing of the bill of information to commencement of trial violated the defendant‘s constitutional right to a speedy trial under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2 (Issue No. 5 in Defendant‘s Brief):
In this assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to proceed to trial when he had previously requested the appointment of a sanity commission.
On February 7, 1986, the defendant filed a motion for the appointment of a sanity commission. On February 26, 1986, the
Mental incapacity to proceed exists when, as a result of mental disease or defect, a defendant presently lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.
The record in the instant case reflects that the provisions of
We note that the arraignment was the only proceeding held prior to the sanity commission hearing in Charles, Nicholas, and Sharlow, cited above. In the instant case, after the defendant‘s request for the appointment of a sanity commission, his second motion to quash was argued, taken under advisement, and denied by the trial court. Also, the case was submitted to the
In the instant case, the proceedings which occurred after the defendant‘s request for the appointment of a sanity commission, but before the hearing on this motion, were much more substantial than a mere arraignment hearing. Yet, there is no indication from the record that the defendant objected to the fact that any of the above proceedings were occurring before the hearing on his motion for the appointment of a sanity commission. Furthermore, the transcript of the hearing on March 10, 1986, indicates that the defendant‘s motion for the appointment of a sanity commission could not be taken up because the defendant was absent on this date. The court minutes also indicate that on May 12, 1986, the sanity commission hearing was again rescheduled because of the defendant‘s absence.
Finally, we note that the transcript of the proceedings held on June 9, 1986, indicates that the trial court intended to “take up the motion for the sanity commission” immediately after rendering judgment. The court minutes state that on June 9, 1986, the trial court scheduled sentencing for June 17, 1986, “pending results of motion by defense for Sanity Commission Hearing.” The court minutes then indicate that defense counsel made an oral motion to withdraw his motion for the appointment of a sanity commission hearing. In his brief, the defendant explains his reason for withdrawing the motion as follows: “[t]he court scheduled the defendant for sentencing on June 17, 1986. Defense attorney then withdrew his application for a Sanity Commission, the record having been made in the case.”
We do not agree with the defendant that he had made his record in this case. The defendant‘s mental incapacity to proceed may be raised by the defense, the district attorney, or the court at any time, even after conviction as a reason why sentence should not be imposed.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 7 (Issue No. 6 in Defendant‘s Brief):
In this assignment of error, the defendant contends that “[t]he trial court erred by depriving defendant of due process rights based upon the record in the proceedings.” In briefing this assignment of error, the defendant cites several general constitutional precepts which are guaranteed by the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. He then argues that all of these rights were violated, but fails to give specific examples. Included in this recitation of general constitutional rights, the defendant complains about the denial of his motions to quash and of the continuances granted for the hearing on his motion for the appointment of a sanity commission. Because these arguments were specifically addressed in previous assignments of error and found without merit, we conclude that the instant assignment is also without merit.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.