STATE OF OHIO v. RONDEY D. BAKER
CASE NO. CA2021-03-006
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO MADISON COUNTY
12/27/2021
[Cite as State v. Baker, 2021-Ohio-4544.]
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CRI20200103
Shannon M. Treynor, for appellant.
M. POWELL, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Rondey Baker, appeals his conviction and sentence in the Madison County Court of Common Pleas for attempted murder.
{¶2} Appellant was indicted in August 2020 on one count of attempted murder and two counts of felonious assault. Each count was accompanied by a repeat violent offender specification. On January 16, 2021, appellant agreed to plead guilty to one count of
{¶3}
{¶4}
{¶5} The presumption above is rebuttable, and each violent offender must be “informed of the presumption * * *, of the offender‘s right to file a motion to rebut the presumption, of the procedure and criteria for rebutting the presumption, and of the effect of a rebuttal and the post-rebuttal hearing procedures and possible outcomes.”
{¶6} Appellant appeals his conviction and sentence, raising two assignments of error.
{¶7} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶8} THE DEFENDANT‘S PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY OR VOLUNTARILY MADE AS THE COUR[T] FAILED TO ENGAGE IN A RULE 11 COLLOQUY REGARDING THE DEFENDANT‘S REQUIREMENT TO REGISTER IN THE VIOLENT OFFENDER DATABASE.
{¶9} Appellant argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made because the trial court failed to comply with
{¶10} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 1996-Ohio-179. Pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), a trial court shall not accept a guilty plea in a felony case without personally addressing the defendant and determining that the defendant is “making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved.” In general, a trial court is not required to inform a defendant about collateral consequences before accepting a plea. State v. Tanksley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 20AP-89, 2021-Ohio-2900, ¶ 20; State v. Wright, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28368, 2021-Ohio-4107, ¶ 26.
{¶11} In two recent opinions, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that there was no indication Sierah‘s Law was enacted to inflict punishment and rejected the view that Sierah‘s Law was punitive in effect. See State v. Hubbard, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3710; and State v. Jarvis, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3712. The supreme court observed that “the enrollment requirements are not imposed as part of the offender‘s sentence and notice of those duties is merely provided to the offender either at his or her sentencing hearing or upon his or her release from incarceration.” Hubbard at ¶ 31.1 Rather, the court recognized that “offender-registration schemes like Sierah‘s Law have ‘long been a valid regulatory technique with [the] remedial purpose’ of providing information to law enforcement in order to better protect the public.” Jarvis at ¶ 12.
{¶12} This and other courts have recently held that the “violent-offender enrollment statutes do not increase the punishment for the specified violent offenses” listed in
{¶13} “[B]ecause registration requirements are collateral consequences rather than punishment, Crim.R. 11 does not require a trial court to inform a defendant of the
{¶14} Appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶15} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶16} THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE COURT IS VOID AS A MATTER OF LAW FOR FAILURE TO INCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO THE VIOLENT OFFENDER DATABASE AND THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED UPON THE DEFENDANT.
{¶17} Appellant argues that his sentence is void because the trial court failed to comply with
{¶18} This court “does not review the sentencing court‘s decision for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Scott, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2019-07-051 and CA2019 07-052, 2020-Ohio-3230, ¶ 54, citing State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 10. “It is instead the standard of review set forth in
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court‘s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶19} As stated above, appellant was classified as a violent offender under
{¶20}
require the violent offender to read and sign a form stating that the violent offender has received and understands the notice. If the violent offender is unable to read, the judge * * * shall inform the violent offender of the violent offender‘s duties as set forth in the notice and shall certify on the form that the judge * * * informed the violent offender of the violent offender‘s duties and that the violent offender indicated an understanding of those duties.
{¶21}
{¶22} We therefore find that appellant‘s sentence is contrary to law under
{¶23} Accordingly, we hereby vacate appellant‘s sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for purposes of complying with the mandatory advisements of
{¶24} Judgment vacated as to appellant‘s sentence only and remanded to the trial court.
PIPER, P.J., and S. POWELL, J., concur.
