13 Conn. App. 120 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1987
The defendant has appealed from the judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1). His sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that the victim had made certain statements to the defendant which allegedly implicated the victim’s involvement in an attack by others on the defendant following the incident giving rise to the charges here. We find no error.
The defendant was arrested and charged with the crimes of which he was convicted after he was identified by the victim, Robert Szymanski, as the man who had shot Szymanski during the course of an unsuccessful drug transaction in Bridgeport. At trial, both Szymanski and the defendant testified to a conversation between them which had taken place in the courtroom corridor during the course of the trial. Each man gave a different version of the verbal encounter. Szymanski testified that the defendant had threatened that “I am going to blow you away.” The defendant claimed during his defense that Szymanski had at that time told him that “his friends took care of me,” in reference to injuries suffered in an attack made upon the defendant between the time of his arrest and trial.
In its charge, the court instructed the jury pursuant to the state’s request that the threat allegedly made to Szymanski by the defendant in the courthouse did not create a presumption of guilt, but could be considered as evidence “tending to prove the defendant’s consciousness of guilt.”
The defendant claims in his brief on appeal that the court erred in refusing “to provide the jury with guidance as to permissible inferences from the defendant’s testimony concerning the same out-of-court incident for which it had provided the jury with an inference which could be drawn from the victim’s version of the encounter.” The defendant, who had claimed at trial that he acted in self-defense, argues now that such evidence of the victim’s “violent character” was relevant as it corroborated the defendant’s version of the shooting and was also “evidence of consciousness of wrongdoing by Szymanski.” The defendant maintains that fairness dictates that the jury should have been “informed of their right to draw inferences favorable to the defendant from the victim’s alleged statement to him, or in the very least, that they could find the defendant’s testimony [regarding the corridor conversation] to have been more credible than that offered by the victim.” We do not agree.
There is no merit to the defendant’s claim that the jury instruction was erroneous because the jury was not also informed of the victim’s alleged incriminating
We generally do not consider a claimed error regarding a charge unless the matter is covered by a written request to charge or an exception has been taken immediately after its delivery. State v. Fullwood, 193 Conn.
There is no error.
The court’s jury charge relative to this incident was as follows: “[T]he state claims the defendant made threats to the victim, Mr. Szymanski. Such
“[Practice Book] Sec. 852. necessity for requests to charge and exceptions [Amended June 23, 1986, to take effect Oct. 1, 1986]. The supreme court shall not be bound to consider error as to the giving of, or the failure to give, an instruction unless the matter is covered by a written request to charge or exception has been taken by the party appealing immediately after the charge is delivered. Counsel taking the exception shall state distinctly the matter objected to and the ground of objection. Upon request, opportunity shall be given to present the exception out of the hearing of the jury.”