State v. ArnoldState v. Arnold
Rendered on the 17th day of July, 2009.
. . . . . . . . . .
AMY M. SMITH, Atty. Reg. No. 0081712, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 50 E. Columbia Street, 4th Floor, P. O. Box 1608, Springfield, Ohio 45501
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
RONALD R. BOBLITT, Atty. Reg. No. 0033097, 2 W. Columbia Street, Suite 220, Springfield, Ohio 45502
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
. . . . . . . . . .
FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} Victor Arnold, Jr., entered a negotiated plea of guilty to possession of crack cocaine in an amount more than five grams but less than ten grams, in violation of
{¶ 2} Arnold appeals from his sentence, raising one assignment of error:
{¶ 3} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SENTENCING APPELLANT TO THE MAXIMUM TERM OF INCARCERATION.”
{¶ 4} In his sole assignment of error, Arnold claims that trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the principles and purposes of sentencing under
{¶ 5} We review a felony sentence using a two-step procedure. State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, at ¶4. “The first step is to ‘examine the sentencing court’s compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law.’” State v. Stevens, 179 Ohio App.3d 97, 2008-Ohio-5775, at ¶4, quoting Kalish at ¶4. “If this step is satisfied, the second step requires that the trial court’s decision be ‘reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.’” Id. An abuse of discretion is “‘more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’” Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, quoting State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157.
{¶ 6} Since State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, a trial court has
{¶ 7}
{¶ 8} Unless otherwise required by
{¶ 9} While it is preferable that the trial court state on the record that it has considered the statutory criteria, the statute does not require the court to do so. Instead, absent an
{¶ 10} At the sentencing hearing, Arnold’s counsel told the court that Arnold admitted his offense, acknowledged that he was a drug addict, and had sent counsel and the probation department letters “ask[ing] for help to get off of drugs.” Counsel expressed Arnold’s desire to get back to his fiancee and young child as soon as possible in order to meet his family obligations and be with his child. Counsel asked the court to consider the inequity in sentencing for crack cocaine versus powder cocaine offenses.
{¶ 11} Exercising his right of allocution, Arnold informed the court that he had been using drugs daily for eight or nine months and that he recognized that he had hurt those who love him with his drug use. Arnold stated, “I’m not a bad person. And never robbed, stealed [sic], or killed for my drugs. I just know now what’s more important to me, and that’s my family.”
{¶ 12} In response, the State recommended a maximum sentence, noting Arnold’s past criminal record and that the State had dismissed several other charges as part of the plea agreement, including a second degree felony.
{¶ 13} The trial court imposed the maximum sentence of five years in prison. In doing so, the court indicated that it had reviewed the presentence investigation report. The court cited to Arnold’s “pretty significant” criminal record, which included a juvenile felonious assault, possession of crack cocaine in 2000, and breaking and entering and possession of criminal tools in 2003. Due to these convictions, Arnold had twice served sentences in prison. The court
{¶ 14} “*** And instead of getting help after that, you’ve now committed another offense of drug abuse.
{¶ 15} “It’s never too late to get help, Mr. Arnold; but it’s too late to ask the Court to help you. If you want help for your drug problem, you’re going to have to do it on your own time. Court’s job is not to help you. The Court’s job is to punish you.
{¶ 16} “Based on your prior record, it’s the order of the Court that you be sentenced to five years in the Ohio State penitentiary. ***”
{¶ 17} In its final judgment entry setting forth Arnold’s sentence, the trial court expressly stated that it had “considered the record, oral statements, any victim impact statement and presentence report prepared, as well as the principles and purposes of sentencing under
{¶ 18} Upon review of the record, we find no affirmative showing that the trial court failed to consider the principles and purposes of sentencing under
{¶ 19} The assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 20} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
. . . . . . . . . .
BROGAN, J. and FAIN, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Amy M. Smith
Ronald R. Boblitt
Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter