State v. AndersonState v. Anderson
{¶ 2} The trial court imposed a suspended sentence and placed Anderson on five years' probation. Anderson's probation included a restitution order of $6,510, as well as electronic monitoring. The trial court stated that the electronic monitoring could be suspended upon Anderson's full payment of the ordered restitution.
{¶ 3} Anderson has appealed, raising three assignments of error, which we address in order.
{¶ 6}
{¶ 7} The trial court determined the amount of Anderson's restitution based upon an invoice provided by the victim. This invoice was introduced at the same hearing where Anderson pled guilty and sentence was imposed, although the invoice was not made a part of the record for this court to review. Anderson did not object during this hearing to the proffered amount of restitution.
{¶ 8} We review restitution-based sentencing errors for plain error when no objection is raised in the trial court.2 Plain error only serves as a ground for reversal when exceptional circumstances require it to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.3
{¶ 9} We find no plain error in the circumstances before us. The trial court was permitted by statute to rely on an amount of restitution recommended by the victim. Anderson caused excessive damage to her sister's apartment, and the record does not indicate that the amount of restitution ordered was not based on the victim's economic loss. And, most telling, Anderson did not contest the amount when it was proffered.
{¶ 10} We further note that the amount of restitution was not affected by the fact that Anderson destroyed rental furniture. Even though the furniture was rented, her sister was responsible for the damage.
{¶ 11} We conclude that no error resulted from the trial court's order of restitution.
{¶ 13} We faced a similar issue in State v.Downey.4 In Downey, the defendant pled no contest to a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. The trial court imposed a suspended sentence and placed Downey on one year of community control, including electronically monitored house arrest. Downey argued that because he only faced a maximum of 30 days' incarceration for a fourth-degree misdemeanor, he could have only been placed on electronic monitoring for 30 days.
{¶ 14} We found Downey's argument to be without merit, stating that "
{¶ 15} We further reasoned in Downey that "because community-control sanctions may last up to five years, it is reasonable to conclude that the state legislature must have intended to give sentencing courts a limited way to retain control over offenders convicted of misdemeanors for a period longer than the authorized maximum jail term."6
{¶ 16} The analysis in Downey is sound and well reasoned. We hold that it applies to the case presently before us. A trial court may suspend the sentence of an offender convicted of a misdemeanor and then impose up to five years of electronic monitoring as a community-control sanction, even though that time exceeds the authorized maximum jail term for the misdemeanor offense.
{¶ 17} But we are mindful that the probation, or community-control, sanctions imposed must be related to the "interests of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and insuring his good behavior."7 To determine whether a sanction is so related, we must consider whether the sanction "(1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of probation."8
{¶ 18} After considering these guiding principles, we conclude that electronic monitoring was an appropriate community-control sanction in this case. Anderson committed a violent and destructive act against her sister's property. Her sister was forced to hide in her bedroom while Anderson destroyed the apartment. Electronic monitoring was a rational and reasonable method of maintaining some degree of control over Anderson, and it helped to ensure that she complied with the court-ordered restitution.
{¶ 19} Anderson further argues that post-trial electronic monitoring constituted detention and maintains that time spent on electronic monitoring should have counted towards her sentence. As a result, she argues, five years of electronic monitoring exceeded the maximum permissible sentence.9 Although our preceding discussion determines this issue, we briefly address Anderson's contention.
{¶ 20} To support her argument that post-trial electronic monitoring constituted detention, Anderson refers us to a sentencing provision from the Revised Code concerning offenses for driving while intoxicated. This provision allows for electronically monitored house arrest, instead of jail time, to be imposed upon a determination by the trial court that there is unavailable jail space for the offender. But we have already found this argument to be without merit. In Downey, we stated that "[s]imply because the statute governing sentencing for driving under the influence provides that a term of house arrest may not exceed the mandatory jail term does not mean that the state legislature intended to equate house arrest, when imposed as a condition of community control, to jail time."10
{¶ 21} Post-trial electronic monitoring is not a form of detention.
{¶ 22} And because we have already determined that five years of electronic monitoring was properly imposed as a community-control sanction, not as an actual sentence of confinement, Anderson was not entitled to credit for time served on electronic monitoring, and her sentence was proper.14
{¶ 23} We overrule Anderson's first assignment of error.
{¶ 25} A detailed examination of
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27}
{¶ 28}
{¶ 29} As demonstrated by
{¶ 30} We hold that, before accepting a plea of guilty or no contest under
{¶ 31} Our review of the record indicates that the trial court fully complied with
{¶ 33} To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, it must be shown that counsel's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by this deficient performance.17 In the context of a plea bargain, a defendant must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."18
{¶ 34} Anderson's allegations of ineffectiveness involve discussions between her counsel and the state. Such discussions are not evidenced in the record, and we cannot review the communications, if any, that took place between these parties concerning restitution and electronic monitoring. "Any allegations of ineffectiveness based on facts not appearing in the record should be reviewed through the postconviction remedies of
{¶ 35} We overrule Anderson's third assignment of error and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
Gorman, P.J., and Sundermann, J., concur.