Appellant, Danny J. Gears, Jr., appeals from that portion of the judgment entry by the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas requiring him to surrender his personal jewelry as restitution to the victim of his crime. We reverse.
In August 1998, appellant was indicted on one count of burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), a felony of the second dеgree, for the theft of jewelry and personal property from the victim’s residence. On Septеmber 23, 1998, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense of burglary, a violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(3), a felony of the third degree.
At appellant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court read the victim’s impact statement, which stated that the jewelry and jewelry box taken from her by appellant had sentimental value and were never recovered. The judge then engaged in the following colloquy with aрpellant:
“THE COURT: What are you wearing around your neck?
“THE DEFENDANT: A necklace my ex-girlfriend gave me.
“THE COURT: Your girlfriend gave it to you. Does it have sentimental value?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Ma’am.”
She then ordered appеllant to forfeit the necklace and other jewelry he was wearing as restitution.
*299 The court’s sentencing order imposes three years of community control, conditioned upon a six-month term at а correctional treatment facility. The court also conditioned community control on rеstitution, stating: “Restitution satisfied by [$]50.00 payment plus defendant’s jewelry taken on date of sentence.”
Appellant asserts the following assignments of error:
“The confiscation of defendant’s personal property as a term and condition of sentenсing to community control is not authorized by statute.’’
“The confiscation of defendant’s personal property as restitution is not authorized by statute.”
“The unauthorized confiscation of defendant’s pеrsonal property is a taking of property without due process.”
In addition, amicus curiae, the Maumee Valley Criminal Dеfense Lawyers Association, Inc., filed a brief in support of appellant’s position.
We notе at the outset that appellant failed to object to the confiscation of his persоnal jewelry and to the court’s failure to determine the amount of the victim’s damage arising from his offеnse. Nevertheless, Ohio appellate courts recognize restitution-based sentencing errors under the plain error doctrine.
State v. Marbury
(1995),
Unless a specific sanction must be imposed or is precluded from being imposed pursuant to law, a trial court has the discretion to impose any sanction or combination of sanctions provided in R.C. 2929.14 through 2929.18. R.C. 2929.13(A). As applicablе to this case, R.C. 2929.15(A) provides that “the court may directly impose a sentence that consists of оne or more community control sanctions.” A community control sanction is a sanction that is not a prison term, R.C. 2929.01(F), and may consist of (1) community control, R.C. 2929.15; (2) residential sanctions, R.C. 2929.16; and (3) financial sanctions, R.C. 2929.18.
A reading of these statutes reveals a total lack of any intent to authorize in-kind restitution. As aptly obsеrved by amicus:
“[T]he law does not provide that because the victim may have lost items of sentimental valuе the offender may be deprived of items of sentimental value. Restitution as penalty is a financial rather than moral sanction. It is for that *300 reason that the section of the Revised Code addressing rеstitution for felony-offenses is captioned ‘Financial sanctions.’ R.C. 2929.18.”
Thus, we conclude that as a mаtter of law, the common pleas court lacked the authority to order appellant to surrender his personal jewelry as restitution.
Turning to R.C. 2929.18(A)(1), that statute allows a trial court to order an offеnder to pay restitution to the victim of the offender’s crime “in an amount based on the victim’s ecоnomic loss.” Thus, restitution is limited to the actual loss caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct for which he was convicted.
State v. Brumback
(1996),
Here, the court failed to follow any of the procedures necessary to determine that any amount of rеstitution imposed bore a reasonable relationship to the loss suffered by the victim. Consequently, all three of appellant’s assignments of error are found well taken.
The judgment of the Lucas County Cоurt of Common Pleas as to the imposition of restitution as part of appellant’s sentence is reversed and vacated. This cause is remanded to that court for a hearing to permit the сourt to ascertain an appropriate award of restitution. Appellee is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal.
Judgment accordingly.