State v. AndersonState v. Anderson
vs.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. CR-509433, CR-515749, and CR-527537
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 10, 2010
Paul Mancino, Jr.
75 Public Square
Suite 1016
Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2098
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: R. Paul Racette
Assistant County Prosecutor
9th Floor, Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Duevelle Anderson (“Anderson”), appeals the trial court‘s judgment, entered after guilty pleas, sentencing him to 19 years incarceration. He contends that his pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently made, in violation of
{¶ 2} In October 2009, Anderson faced four pending indictments in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. While awaiting the jury‘s verdict in an
{¶ 3} The jury returned not guilty verdicts on all counts before it in CR-526116. However, the court found Anderson guilty of one count of having a weapon while under disability. The court sentenced Anderson to five years in prison in CR-509433, eight years in prison in CR-515749, 12 months in prison in CR-527537, and five years in prison in CR-526116, with all sentences to run consecutively to each other for a total of 19 years’ imprisonment.1 Anderson now brings this delayed appeal, raising four assignments of error.
{¶ 4} In the first assignment of error, Anderson argues he did not enter his pleas knowingly and voluntarily because the court failed to inform him that a guilty plea to the offense of failure to comply required the court to impose a consecutive sentence. We agree.
{¶ 6} A trial court must strictly comply with the
{¶ 7} Anderson was charged with failure to comply in violation of
{¶ 8}
{¶ 9} “If an offender is sentenced pursuant to division (C)(4) or (5) of this section for a violation of division (B) of this section, and if the offender is sentenced to a prison term for that violation, the offender shall serve the prison term consecutively to any other prison term or mandatory prison term imposed upon the offender.”
{¶ 10} The trial court never informed Anderson that his sentence for failure to comply would have to be served consecutively to any other prison term imposed for the counts to which he was pleading. The requirement that the court advise a defendant of the maximum penalties involved is a nonconstitutional right enumerated in
{¶ 11} However, in State v. Norman, Cuyahoga App. No. 91302, 2009-Ohio-4044, appeal not allowed, 124 Ohio St.3d 1416, 2009-Ohio-6816, 919 N.E.2d 215, this court recently held that when consecutive sentences are mandatory as opposed to discretionary, the trial court must advise the defendant of that fact. This court explained:
“When consecutive sentences are mandatory, the consecutive sentences directly affects the length of the sentence, thus becoming a crucial component of what constitutes the “maximum” sentence, and the failure to
advise a defendant that a sentence must be served consecutively does not amount to substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) . See State v. Ricks (1977), 53 Ohio App.2d 244, 246-247, 372 N.E.2d 1369.”
{¶ 12} Therefore, because the trial court never informed Anderson that any prison sentence imposed for a violation of
{¶ 13} Further, the court never identified the offenses by name during the plea colloquy. The court accepted a single guilty plea for all charges in all three cases without identifying each charge and case number separately and asking Anderson how he pleads to each individual offense. The court‘s failure to identify the offenses to which Anderson was pleading guilty coupled with its failure to inform him of the mandatory consecutive sentence for a violation of
{¶ 14} Accordingly, the first assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 15} Having determined that all of Anderson‘s guilty pleas must be reversed, we need not address the remaining three assignments of error that attack other aspects of the plea hearing and sentences.
Judgment reversed, and case remanded.
It is ordered that appellant recover of said appellee costs herein taxed.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________________________
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, JUDGE
KENNETH A. ROCCO, P.J., and
MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR